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Foreword 
The history of American blacks between the end of slavery and 
the beginning of the modern civil rights movement has been 
sadly neglected. In contrast, the publication of Kenneth Stampp's 
The Peculiar Institution in 1956 sparked a renaissance of scholar-
ship in the sociology, psychology, history, and economics of slav-
ery. The new research, challenging insights, and novel theories 
of Stanley Elkins, Herbert Gutman, Eugene Genovese, Robert 
Fogel, Stanley Engerman, and others has ignited scholarly and 
popular controversy. But if one result of the renewed interest 
in slavery has been an enriched understanding of an extraordi-
narily important period in the evolution of American race rela-
tions, considerable confusion is a by-product. The problem is 
not that the theories of this or that scholar have a pernicious 
effect on public attitudes or policy. Rather it is that this renewed 
interest reinforces the tendency to reduce the history of Ameri-
can blacks to the history of slavery. It is widely assumed, perhaps 
unconsciously, that the proper understanding of slavery holds 
the key to the recovery of our cities, to the solution of the wel-
fare crisis, and even to the ending of racial discrimination and 
inequality. Although slavery is clearly the basis for all future de-
velopments of relations between the races, it does not and can-
not explain everything. A fuller and more accurate history of 
slavery is essential, but our understanding will be restricted and 
incomplete until and unless we have an equal grasp of the his-
tory of the American black following emancipation. 
Daniel Novak's The Wheel of Servitude: Black Forced Labor after 
Slavery is, thus, of more than intrinsic importance and interest. 
It is an indication that a new generation of scholars may be be-
ginning to recognize the importance of this neglected period in 
American history. Although Novak's work is primarily a legal 
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study, it is filled with important insights into the new economic 
and social system that replaced slavery. It provides much-needed 
perspectives on the postslavery South that will be of interest not 
only to professional historians, but also to everyone who is con-
cerned with understanding the historical and social develop-
ment of racism and race relations in the United States. 
While the failure of Reconstruction, radical or otherwise, to 
establish a strong and secure basis for black freedom and equal-
ity by economically transforming southern society is well known, 
much less attention has been given to trying to understand what 
replaced slavery. The usual concentration upon the politics of 
the Radical legislatures has, if anything, directed attention away 
from the more critical questions of economic relationships that 
replaced slavery. Daniel Novak builds a convincing case that the 
new system had much in common with slavery: the old fugitive 
slave laws were reborn, and the convict-labor system quoted 
prices for classes of prisoners which were taken directly from 
the terminology of slavery. His detailed examination of the laws 
governing labor relations in the postwar South yields a stark and 
depressing picture of a new social and economic system that 
continued the oppression and degradation of black workers. As 
legally defined, the new system closely paralleled serfdom. In 
fact, Novak observes, compared to the medieval serf the freed 
Negro had considerably less legal protection, while the control 
of his movements was at least as great. 
The accepted wisdom that the entrenchment of Jim Crow was 
primarily the result of the withdrawal of federal troops from the 
South following the compromise of 1877 is persuasively chal-
lenged by Novak. He points out that not only did the federal 
government fail to reconstruct the South, but that it can accu-
rately be described as a partner in the creation of the new sys-
tem. It was the Freedmen's Bureau, not southern bourbons or 
the Ku Klux Klan, which initiated and enforced the regulations 
that became models for the Black Codes, the legal foundation 
and reflection of the new system of forced labor. Although the 
bureau and the army did try, within limits, to protect the rights 
of the freedman, they basically supported the emerging system 
of control. 
FOREWORD xz 
Even more surprisingly, not a single radical southern legisla-
ture became involved in the labor field in a way that might have, 
however briefly, destroyed the peonage system set up by the 
Black Codes and the Freedmen's Bureau. Radicalism was re-
stricted to issues like suffrage, segregation, and education, while 
legislation on labor remained essentially conservative. Thus, 
during the period when radicalism supposedly ran rampant 
over the defeated South, something far different was happen-
ing. As Novak writes, "the newly freed agricultural worker was, 
by consensus, placed in a position of peonage." 
The Wheel of Servitude suggests that economics, especially the 
forced labor system, must be placed at the center of the his-
torian's vision if we are to understand southern history. In No-
vak's hands this approach yields valuable insights into the nature 
of the Populist movement and the reasons for its failure. The 
Populist movement virtually ignored the needs of agrarians 
caught in the trap of sharecropping and wage labor, the posi-
tions occupied by the overwhelming majority of Negro farmers. 
This was not accidental, according to Novak, for the Populist 
movement was based upon property-owning farmers. Thus, it is 
not surprising that Populism did not fundamentally challenge 
the southern system. 
The great value of Daniel Novak's The Wheel of Servitude is, 
however, the clarity he brings to explaining the legal mecha-
nisms that reenslaved the newly freed blacks and to discussing 
how the laws reflected the dependence of the southern economy 
upon a system of forced labor. Changes in the lien laws, for 
instance, are convincingly explained here as a response to the 
growth of sharecropping and tenantry as alternatives to wage 
labor. 
The Wheel of Servitude is of more than historical interest. In 
one sense, it is a case study of the centrality of economics to the 
progress of social justice. More important, as Novak reminds us, 
peonage is a current issue. Cases of peonage have been reported 
in North Carolina and Florida during the summer of 1977 and 
there is no doubt that even today this form of near slavery is 
a great deal more extensive than most Americans would like to 
believe. 
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Both scholars and social activists will be richly rewarded by 
reading this illuminating study of a critical and little-understood 
period in American history, a study that traces the connections 
between the southern legal structures and the new system of 
labor control that emerged in the aftermath of the Civil War. 
BAYARD RUSTIN 
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Introduction 
... labor contracts between the freedman and the landlords [were] 
a revolutionary reform more important in the actual life of the 
freedman than the sensational but largely unsuccessful political 
changes attempted at the time. 
Francis B. Simkins 
Perhaps the most striking aspects of the study of peonage in the 
South are the dearth of widespread interest in the subject and 
the dogged resilience of the institution. The general indiffer-
ence to the subject is all the more remarkable in light of the basic 
nature of the practice. It was a simple and effective substitute for 
the previous system of labor control-slavery. Brutal as it was, 
peonage was, concededly, no match for its predecessor; but the 
elements of violence present, combined with the rigorous con-
trol of its victims, should have been prime sources of study. 
Without fanfare the freed slave was plunged into a new labor 
system that degraded his value as a worker and made his new 
freedom a mockery, in economic terms at least. Yet this new sys-
tem replaced the old, not only without significant outcry, but 
with the assistance or acceptance of those forces one would have 
expected to be in the forefront of the opposition: the federal 
government and the "radical" Reconstruction legislatures. 
Even in later years, when the "Negro revolution" was in full 
swing, peonage took a back seat. The emphasis of this revolution 
has been on the reacquisition of the rights originally present 
after emancipation. Suffrage; desegregation of schools, trans-
port, and public accommodations; the right to jury service-in 
short, those elements that we have come to call civil rights-are 
at the center of the action. It is not unreasonable to expect that 
civil rights leaders and historians would concentrate on these 
rights and how they were suppressed over the years. The highly 
symbolic nature of these rights in a democracy makes for added 
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interest. Further, the story is filled with the romance and revul-
sion of the white-sheeted Klan and the duplicity of northern 
politicians. The fact that these rights had been acquired by law 
and were removed by terror infuses this history with an aura of 
drama. Clearly, the story of the agricultural contract laborers, 
whose rights were severely circumscribed even at the height of 
Reconstruction, presents a far less juicy area of attack. Rights 
that have never been given, laws and customs that have re-
mained relatively consistent throughout postbellum southern 
history, seem to suggest a sort of consensus that the situation is 
somehow justified and reasonable. 
This very continuity of law and practice, on the other hand, 
itself poses an intriguing question. How has this practice re-
tained its viability over the years? Here other factors come into 
play-for example, the difficulty of affecting ingrained social 
practices through law, and the presence of economic pressures 
as a spur to opponents of reform and as a bar to effective 
enforcement. 
Before one can discuss these questions, however, it is neces-
sary to recount the history of peonage. In view of the lack of any 
definitive studies of the subject, a survey of that history, from the 
end of the Civil War to the present, is presented here. There is 
one major study of southern peonage: Pete Daniel, Shadow of 
Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1972). But Daniel deals only with the period after 
1900, ignoring the critical beginnings of the practice. In addi-
tion, he is writing a social rather than a legal study of peonage, 
and he concentrates his efforts on telling the full stories of a few 
significant incidents of the practice in that period. A realistic pic-
ture could not be drawn through an intensive study of the prac-
tice in any one southern state; although it is true that, generally, 
practices varied only cosmetically, in the absence of supportive 
secondary sources it has been necessary to demonstrate that fact. 
Further, the questions raised require the researcher to trace the 
patterns of peonage through the years, as practices and legal 
issues change. Although the survey cannot be comprehensive, it 
does touch all those areas which seemed relevant. 
In essence, this is a legal study. Rather than concentrate on the 
anecdotal material on peonage-that is, the brutal and often 
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sensational stories of its victims-the writer has chosen to treat 
the topic as a legal issue. Thus, the major emphasis will be on the 
development and implementation of the laws which have sup-
ported (and those which theoretically should have destroyed) 
this obnoxious spawn of slavery. 
The subject is dealt with chronologically; each chapter, with 
the exception of the conclusion, deals with a defined historical 
period. In the conclusion the questions raised here are dealt with 
in some greater detail. Finally, a brief bibliography discusses the 
historiography of Reconstruction and of peonage. 
The reader should be warned that, although peonage has a 
distinct legal meaning (i.e., debt-slavery), it will generally be used 
here to describe any system of forced labor not under penal 
supervision. The legal definition is, in the writer's opinion, a 
misreading of an old statute. The legally precise meaning will, of 
course, be used when appropriate, as, for example, when dis-
cussing the limits of the Anti-Peonage Act vis-a-vis an Anti-
Slavery Act. 
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1 
The Black Codes 
The nigger is going to be made a serf 
-Conversation of Alabama planters, 1865 
The Civil War marked the end of the great debate on slavery in 
practical political terms. The abolitionist position had been 
victorious, not through persuasion, but by force of arms. The 
slave economy of the Confederacy was destroyed and a new 
method of dealing with a vast work force had to be devised. 
Since the rationale behind the old system remained intact in the 
minds of the now dispossessed slave owners, it is not at all sur-
prising that the initial response to this new situation was an at-
tempt to retain as much of slavery as possible. This tendency is 
made clear by the creation of the "Black Codes," which seem 
intended to reproduce, within the new limits, a close approxima-
tion of the now forbidden master-slave relationship. 
The first stage of the political reconstruction of the South took 
place under the supervision of Presidents Lincoln and Johnson. 
From 1864 until 1867, when Congress took over the job, presi-
dential Reconstruction left the South relatively free from inter-
ference from the federal government, save for the requirement 
that emancipation take place. Under Lincoln's plan, when 10 
percent of the prewar voting population of a state had taken an 
oath of allegiance to the Union, they might proceed to form a 
new government. This was changed by Johnson (who excluded 
some of the wealthier old landowning classes from participa-
tion), but in this area his general thrust was the same. Therefore, 
shortly after the end of the war, the Confederacy had "recon-
structed" itself with new state legislatures and administrations. It 
should be made clear, however, that the new legislators were, 
by and large, the same men who had run the Old South, or at 
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least they reflected its values. This orientation was made evident 
by the Black Codes they quickly enacted. 
Mississippi, in the first of the postwar constitutional con-
ventions, immediately got down to the problem that was upper-
most in the minds of white southerners: "The institution of slav-
ery having been destroyed ... the legislature at its next session 
. . . shall provide by law for the protection and security of the 
person and property of the freedmen of the state, and guard 
them and the State against any evil that may arise from their 
sudden emancipation." 1 
Since this phrase was copied, in some cases verbatim, by the 
other states, it is clear that the significance of the language was 
not lost on the Radicals in and out of Congress. Even some 
modern southern historians claim that the North, and especially 
the northern press, overreacted to these phrases, but in view of 
the legislation that followed, it is difficult to sustain this position. 
The "legislation concerning the freed negro" which emerged 
from the "reconstructed" states of the Confederacy in 1865 and 
1866 made it clear that the white South had no intention of 
dealing with a truly free black labor force. With formal slavery 
barred, a complex of laws setting up a system of peonage or 
debt slavery was formulated to fill the gap. 
Short-lived though they were, at least with regard to their 
specifically discriminatory wording, the codes presaged the sys-
tem under which the black agricultural laborer was to be bound 
in later years. For the purposes of this study, only those pro-
visions relating to the imposition of forced labor will be exam-
ined, although the remaining sections of the codes make fas-
cinating reading by themselves. 
Mississippi's opening effort, ironically titled "An Act to confer 
Civil Rights on Freedmen," barred the freedman from renting 
land outside city limits, thus ensuring that blacks could not begin 
farming on their own. Further, by the following January, and 
annually thereafter, each freedman had to hold written proof of 
lawful employment (i.e., a labor contract). The absence of such 
evidence was prima facie proof of vagrancy. Should a freedman 
breach his contract "without good cause," he was subject to ar-
rest by the police or other civil officer. The arresting officer was 
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entitled to a reward of five dollars (plus ten cents per mile trav-
eled), to be paid out of the laborer's wages. As a further insur-
ance against flight, the old Fugitive Slave Laws were reborn: any 
person attempting to "entice" a laborer from his master, employ 
him, or otherwise aid or harbor him was subject to criminal as 
well as civil penalties.2 
It should be noted here that this last provision represented an 
innovation in American law. Although simple breach of contract 
by free labor was traditionally subject to civil action only (except 
when sailors jumped ship), there was some precedent for the 
imposition of criminal penalties in Anglo-American law; indeed, 
such penalties could be imposed in England until the passage of 
the 1875 Employers and Workman's Act. 3 Enticement of a ser-
vant, however, has never been a criminal offense at common 
law.4 
The next act passed by the legislature dealt with "Master and 
Apprentice" relationships "as relates to Freedmen, Free Negroes 
and Mulattoes." It allowed the probate courts to apprentice any 
black child whose parents could not or would not support him. 
First preference in the assignment of masters should go to "the 
former owner of said minors." 5 
In its new vagrancy law, Mississippi broadened the previous 
definitions to include runaways, persons lewd in speech or be-
havior, those who misspend their earnings or neglect their work, 
and all other idle or disorderly persons. Further, idle blacks, and 
whites who "associated with them on terms of equality" or had 
sexual relations with them, were similarly classified as vagrants. 
A white person could evade the fine by taking a pauper's oath, 
but a black could be hired out at auction in order to pay his fine 
and costs. To ensure adequate enforcement, justices of the 
peace, mayors, and aldermen were given jurisdiction to try such 
crimes. 6 
This act also authorized a "head" tax on all Negroes between 
the ages of eighteen and sixty, and failure to pay was prima facie 
evidence of vagrancy. Finally, an act which established new 
county courts provided that only blacks could be hired out to 
provide payment for their fines. 7 
The legislature enacted a number of other discriminatory bills 
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not germane to this study, and finally, with a superb sense of 
propriety, finished its job by voting not to ratify the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which, after all, barred involuntary servitude.8 
Thus came into law the first of the Black Codes. The reaction 
of the northern press and the federal officials in the state to this 
legislative package caused some bewilderment.9 When General 
0. 0. Howard, head of the Freedmen's Bureau, ordered the 
bureau's officers to disregard the codes, and General Thomas 
Wood issued an order forbidding prosecution of blacks under its 
provisions, the state was truly shocked. 10 There was, perhaps, 
some justice in this feeling, for both the Freedman's Bureau and 
the army had been enforcing similar restrictions on their own 
accounts. 
South Carolina was by this time in the process of producing 
her own version of the Black Codes. Governor Orr, a newly 
elected and "presidentially reconstructed" official, urged the 
passage of the code, arguing that, while the freedmen must be 
protected in their rights and property (and from "the fraud ... 
of the artful"), they must also be "restrained from theft, idleness, 
vagrancy and crime, and taught the absolute necessity of strictly 
complying with their contracts for labor." 11 
The basic elements of this latter "necessity" were contained in 
an act purporting to regulate "the Domestic Relations of Persons 
of Color." Once again, contracts were enforced by criminal sanc-
tions, and laborers were required to get the master's written 
permission to leave the plantation or to have visitors. To ensure 
that the freedman was restricted to the plantation, no black man 
could operate a store or work as a craftsman without the ap-
proval of a district judge (essentially a justice of the peace), at-
testing to his fitness and moral character-and the payment of a 
"freedman's license" fee of up to one hundred dollars. A poll tax 
on all black males and unmarried black females was authorized, 
and failure to pay was evidence of vagrancy. Vagrancy itself was 
given the broadest possible definition, as in Mississippi, and the 
convicted vagrant could be hired out for the extent of the sen-
tence. The apprenticeship sections gave the district courts the 
right to bind out the children of blacks who were idle or pau-
pers, or who failed to teach their children "habits of industry 
and honesty." 12 Notably, the use of criminal penalties to prevent 
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the enticement of a servant or his harboring was not included 
in the South Carolina codes at this time. 
The military commander of the district, General David Sick-
les, declared the codes to be without force virtually upon their 
passage. Thus, the first two Black Codes, passed almost simul-
taneously, were wiped out with equivalent speed. 13 
Louisiana and Alabama were the next states to act. Louisiana 
produced legislation to make the labor of freedmen "available to 
the agricultural interests of the State." 14 Thus blacks had to con-
tract for the year by the first of January, and breach of contract 
resulted in criminal penalties. Failure to have proof of contract 
was evidence of vagrancy. 15 The vagrancy law, which made no 
racial distinctions, was broadened in its compass, and provision 
was made for the hiring out of convicted vagrants (here an out 
was given to those who could convince a judge of their good 
behavior and future industry, obviously to provide a safety valve 
for convicted whites) and the penalty was raised from six months 
to a year. Enticement, harboring, or employing "runaway ser-
vants" was made a penal offense, and the legislature added a 
new twist, demanding that all employers be shown a written dis-
charge from the laborer's former master. 16 
The local parishes and towns went further: in Bossier Parish, 
Saint Landry Parish and in the towns of Franklin and Opelousas, 
stringent regulations were passed. These required the freedman 
to have a permit to travel and barred him from renting or buy-
ing property and from entering town limits without the permis-
sion of his employer. In Franklin, passes from the "police jury" 
were required for practically every activity known to man, and in 
Bossier Parish a similar situation prevailed. These local pro-
visions were nullified by the bureau and the military, but the 
state codes were allowed to stand. 17 
Alabama took moderate action compared to her sister states. 
An act defining a vagrant as any laborer who failed to "comply 
with any contract for a term of service without just cause" or any 
"runaway or stubborn servant" was atypical in that no reference 
was made to race. The enticement law followed the same pat-
tern. However, the apprenticeship law did give preference to 
former owners in the binding out of the children of freedmen, 
whilst applying to children of any race. 18 An act to regulate and 
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enforce labor contracts, passed by the legislature, was vetoed by 
the governor, apparently at the urging of General Swayne, the 
military commander of the district. 19 
All of the codes cited above were passed in 1865, and their 
adverse reception by the northern press, federal officials, and 
the like might have been taken as a warning by those states which 
had not yet acted. If Florida is any example, however, there was 
little impact. The legislative committee report on "legislation 
concerning the freedman" was quite spectacular. It proceeded 
from the premise that slavery was a "benign" institution "con-
stituting the happiest and best provided-for laboring population 
in the world" and that "the only inherent evil of the institution of 
slavery, as it existed in the Southern States, was the inadequately 
regulated sex life of the negroes." 20 With this set of premises, it 
is easy to anticipate the committee's recommendations. 
The Florida contract law punished breach by declaring the 
guilty laborer a prima facie vagrant. This same definition 
applied to any laborer convicted of "willful disobedience of or-
ders ... impudence ... disrespect to his employer ... [or] idle-
ness." Of course, a convicted vagrant could be hired out for up 
to a year, if not imprisoned or whipped. In fact, any person not 
able to pay a fine, regardless of offense, should be hired out at 
public auction to cover the fine and costsY None of these laws 
applied specifically to blacks, but their intended application was 
clear to all concerned. The contract law, for example, was made 
applicable only to agriculture and lumbering. 
Georgia was somewhat less defiant and operated within the 
same context (i.e., her laws made no specific reference to race). 
The vagrancy law broadened the definition of the term, pro-
vided for the binding out of those convicted (without necessary 
reference to fines), and gave the usual escape clause for whites of 
posting a bond if the judge was convinced of the criminal's po-
tential "good behavior and industry." An enticement law provid-
ing criminal sanctions was passed in the absence of a labor con-
tract provision, which died in committee. 22 
Perhaps the most fascinating ploy used by the Georgia legis-
lators was the reduction of a variety of crimes from felonies to 
misdemeanors, to some observers at least, a clear manifestation 
of southern beneficence. Its practical effect, however, was to 
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permit the substitution of whipping for imprisonment and to 
expand the field of potential candidates for "hiring out." 23 
North Carolina and Virginia did not enact much significant 
legislation in this area; both passed vagrancy laws of the (by now) 
standard stripe, broadening the definition and providing for the 
hiring out of those convicted. 24 Apparently encouraged by the 
bureau, they stopped there. 
Texas was the last state to enact a significant body of laws that 
fall under the heading of Black Codes. Acting cautiously, in 
the new pattern, no mention of race was made. The labor con-
tract law provided no criminal penalties for breach, although it 
forbade visitors, made contracts cover the entire family of the 
worker, and instituted a fascinating system of fines; the fines, 
imposed by the employer at his discretion, were clearly capable 
of making the wage system a joke. The mildness of this law was 
countered by the vehemence of the enticement statute, which 
matched the best of the earlier codes in the stringency of its 
penalties and the inclusion of the "written proof of discharge" 
idea first introduced by the Louisiana code. The vagrancy act 
was relatively mild, for the felon could be put to work only by the 
town or county, and while police courts could hire out those 
convicted of misdemeanors, the term of service was restricted to 
the length of the sentence. Apprenticeship laws were stringent, 
but without reference to race or former masters. 25 
Tennessee took no action of significance, and Arkansas did 
not even bother to repeal its old slave laws until 1867.26 
The laws cited in the preceding pages reflect, of course, only a 
few of the many aspects of the Black Codes. Those laws unre-
lated to the subject under study have been ignored, as have those 
totally on all fours with previously enacted legislation. In the 
end, the totality of the codes caused a major uproar in the 
North, with the newspapers screaming that they represented an 
open return to slavery. It seems difficult to argue with this view, 
but many historians have made the effort, denouncing the 
"agitators" of the northern press, who did not look at the prob-
lems of the South and failed to see the protections for freedmen 
inherent in the codes. 
As the arguments in the legislatures make clear, however, the 
legislators themselves had no illusions on this point. Neither, 
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needless to say, did the plantation owners. One planter put in a 
standing order with the local courts, announcing that he would 
take their entire output of criminals, and complaining about the 
sparse yield of his convenient employment agency. 27 
This interlaced construct of laws was the South's answer to the 
Thirteenth Amendment. It went straight to the heart of the mat-
ter, and it seems evident that the Alabama planters quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter knew what they were talking about. In 
fact, the control of the movements and labor of the freedman 
under the Black Codes was at least as great as that which gov-
erned the medieval serf. 
2 
The Freedmen's Bureau 
and the Army 
... wholesome compulsion eventuated in larger independence. 
General 0. 0. Howard 
In March 1864, President Lincoln signed a bill creating in the 
War Department a Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Aban-
doned Lands. It was to last for one year after the end of the war, 
and it was to supervise, manage, and control "all subjects relating 
to refugees and freedmen." 1 Basically, the bureau was to be the 
means of easing the passage of the black from slavery to free-
dom. In most Reconstruction histories, however, the bureau is 
depicted as the principal tool in the Radicals' conspiracy to sub-
jugate the South. It is shown riding roughshod over civil justice, 
economic rights, and the basic rules of social decency. 
In view of the historical record of its actions, the awesome 
reputation of the bureau surely represents an equally awesome 
historical misrepresentation. With regard to economics, in any 
case, "General 0. 0. Howard and the Misrepresented Bureau" 
enforced and supported the system of labor contracts which led 
to the establishment of black peonage.2 In fact, even a rough 
scan of the records of the Freedmen's Bureau and the army 
makes clear that the Black Codes regulating labor were little 
more than local validations of the regulations initiated and 
enforced by the federal authorities. 3 
It must be conceded that the bureau and the army faced an 
unenviable task, providing a semblance of order amidst the 
ruins of a defeated culture. The army, first to face the problem, 
arrived at a "solution" without prompting. In a variety of locales, 
a variety of officers came to similar conclusions-namely, that 
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their first job was to keep the freedman on the plantation and to 
keep him working. The freedman should stay on the farm of his 
former owner, gather the crops, and refrain from vagrancy, 
idleness, and wandering. Those who did not obey were to be 
arrested and forced to work in penal servitude. In fact, the first 
convict lease systems were initiated by military commanders in 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana. 4 
General Howard, head of the bureau, also felt the need to 
keep the former slave at work "down on the farm." However, to 
ensure that slavery was not reinstituted, he decided that the 
great intervening agency between the ex-slave and his ex-owner 
was to be the labor contract. It must be remembered that the 
idea of contract-its sanctity, enforcement, and effect-held an 
unparalleled place in American history at that time and for 
many years to come. Great judicial and legislative fantasies had 
been built upon it; it had been pronounced as coming direct 
from the Hand of God (or, at the very least, from the hands of 
philosopher-kings) by the greatest leaders and judges in the 
land.5 It was accepted doctrine that the capacity to make a con-
tract was a corollary to freedom. A "radical" might have substi-
tuted "the right freely to contract"-but here we break down in 
semantics. In any case, it is not surprising that Howard should 
have placed all the freedman's eggs in a basket called "contract"; 
his faith in it may seem touchingly nai've to a more cynical mod-
ern observer, but it is surely understandable. 
From the first, Howard ordered his agents to "quicken the 
industry of the Freedmen"; they must be forced to work; but 
also the planter must be forced to recognize his laborer's new 
status and to pay for labor received.6 There remained, however, 
one fly in the ointment: the question of the wage scale. If the 
freedman was to be forced to sign labor contracts under threat 
of arrest, what was to prevent his employer from dictating an 
unfair rate of pay? Surely equity would require that compulsion 
on one side must be met by compulsion on the other-that is, a 
fixed minimum wage. Suggestions to this effect were made to 
Howard, but they were rejected. While he permitted agents to 
make decisions of this sort on a local basis (that is, to annul or 
refuse to validate contracts calling for excessively low wage 
scales), he steadfastly refused to establish a bureau-wide policy 
FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND ARMY 11 
on the matter. Bentley argues that this represented Howard's 
feeling that "circumstances differed so greatly between localities 
and among individual workers that no wage scale could be 
fair." 7 A more likely explanation would be the innate faith of a 
nineteenth-century conservative in the "American way." The 
doctrine of "liberty of contract" had not yet made its appearance 
on the American legal scene, but the groundwork for it had been 
laid long before the general made his decision. 
I am not suggesting that the bureau and the army represented 
a monolith, determined to reenslave the freed slave. As shown 
below, both agencies tried to protect the rights of the freedmen, 
within certain limits. Indeed, some of their representatives used 
their powers to the fullest extent to destroy the emerging system 
of labor control. The basic contention is merely that the general 
thrust of official bureau and army policies was highly support-
ive of that system, and, further, that there was a general consen-
sus among the planter class, the "Black Code legislatures," and 
the federal government's agents that no other system could or 
should be considered. 
In Mississippi one of the first orders issued by the Freedmen's 
Bureau was an order to the freedmen to sign labor contracts 
immediately or be subject to arrest as vagrants. 8 The fact that 
this order is specifically addressed to "the colored people of 
Mississippi" is seen as a rationale of sorts for the similarly di-
rected codes soon to be passed by the legislature. 9 This seems 
an arguable proposition, however, as the legislature theoretically 
represented all of the people of the state while the bureau was, 
as its title stated, largely concerned with the freedman alone. In 
any case, the legislature, as we have seen, followed the bureau's 
lead. Upon passage of the code, General Howard ordered that 
no agent should enforce the section of the so-called "Act to Con-
fer Civil Rights," which barred blacks from ownership (or rental) 
of land. It is noteworthy that Howard did not object to either 
the contract provisions of the act or the enticement section. 
The army's response to the code was longer in coming, but 
more vigorous in the end. When the Mississippi authorities be-
gan to use the newly passed vagrancy laws to arrest recently dis-
charged black soldiers in Vicksburg, General Wood requested 
the mayor to give his former troops time to find employment. 
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Two weeks later, apparently having reached the end of his pa-
tience, Wood ordered that blacks not be prosecuted for offenses 
for which whites were not punished or prosecuted to the same 
degree. As this applied to almost all the laws of the Mississippi 
Black Code, he had virtually invalidated the whole structure in 
one stroke. One section of the Vagrancy Act, however, made no 
reference to color, and this law was apparently abused to its ful-
lest extent. 10 
In South Carolina, the bureau had been in operation for some 
time before the passage of the codes. The army had also been 
forcing the blacks into labor contracts throughout 1865. It is 
worthy of note that the army advised straightforward service 
contracts, while the bureau wrote contracts that included pro-
visions barring the laborers from leaving the plantation without 
the master's permission and other provisions "strongly reminis-
cent of slavery." 11 The passage of the Black Codes in December 
1865 produced a marvelously ambivalent response. General 
Sickles, military commander of the Department of the Carolinas, 
issued a military directive nullifying the codes. Yet in that same 
order he commanded that his officers should create regulations 
to provide for "hiring out to labor, for a period not to exceed 
one year, all vagrants" who could not be employed on public 
works. Any freedmen who had not signed labor contracts within 
ten days were classified as vagrants. 12 The bureau's man in 
South Carolina showed a similar concern for planters' needs. 
General Scott ordered that "men or women who leave the plan-
tation on which they are employed to labor ... and thereby ne-
glect their growing crops, be at once arrested as vagrants and 
put to work .... Their children, if any, will be bound to such 
persons as will take care of them and learn them habits of indus-
try." 13 The legislature's acts were dead, but what planter could 
have asked for a better coda for the codes than these two direc-
tives? 
In Alabama the bureau preempted the legislature by issuing 
labor regulations in August 1865. The standard contracts pro-
vided a laborer's lien upon the crops for wages, and bureau ap-
proval of all contracts was required. However, the contracts also 
included a provision that, upon the sworn statement of the em-
ployer that an employee had been absent from work without 
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good cause for longer than one day or more than three days in 
any month, the employee was to be arrested as a vagrant and put 
to work by the county. General Swayne, head of the Alabama 
division of the bureau, was on "cordial terms with most of the 
members of the [constitutional] convention," and with the gov-
ernor himself. 14 Both men tried in vain to convince the legis-
lature that a rigorous Black Code was unnecessary. The con-
vention's contract law was thereupon vetoed by the governor, 
an action for which Swayne took full credit in his letters to Gen-
eral Howard and reports to the bureau. 15 Neither gentleman ap-
parently objected to the vagrancy law passed in this period, for 
it was signed into law, and the apprenticeship statute was spe-
cifically ordered enforced by the general, despite its preference 
for "former masters." The enticement statute also appears to 
have met with the approval of both Swayne and the governor, 
for it, too, became law. General Swayne was also one of the few 
bureau agents who felt he could rely on the justice of the civil 
courts in the South, and thus he did not establish bureau courts 
to try freedmen's cases. 16 This happy joining of forces between 
the bureau and state officials helped to make Alabama a favorite 
of President Johnson's "hatchet man," General Joseph Fuller-
ton. 
Louisiana was the scene of some of the most complicated ma-
neuvers and conflicts over the control of the black labor force. 
As early as 1862, Union General Benjamin Butler had instituted 
a system of forced labor wherein he had turned over the black 
laborers to the planters. However, Butler had fixed wages, hours 
of labor, and working conditionsY When General Nathaniel 
Banks took over command of the Louisiana system in 1863, he 
continued this practice, but expanded upon it. He established a 
"Bureau of Free Labor," and its agents made terms between the 
planter and his workers. Banks continued the practice of 
minimum wages, but he increased the use of the "vagrancy ar-
rest" threat to ensure that the black stayed on the plantation and 
did his work. 18 
When the bureau took over the task of regulating, it had as 
its local chief Thomas Conway, one of the more controversial 
figures in its history. Conway, who had been in charge of Banks's 
"Bureau of Free Labor," took over as assistant commissioner of 
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the Freedmen's Bureau in 1865 and immediately established a 
"Department of Plantations" to handle labor affairs. With the 
bureau in charge of affairs, some of the army methods which 
had been objects of planter criticism were changed. The most 
significant of the changes was the elimination of a fixed wage, 
although agents were "encouraged" to ensure that wages did not 
drop below the level which slave owners had received for the 
hire of a slave. 19 
Despite these actions, Conway was considered a "radical" by 
many members of the bureau. This reputation probably arose 
as a result of his running dispute with Mayor Hugh Kennedy 
of New Orleans, who was an "unreconstructed" rebel, just par-
doned by President Johnson. Kennedy was arresting as a va-
grant virtually any freedman who was walking the streets of the 
city. Conway's view of vagrancy was on a different plane, how-
ever, and only vagabonds or drifters fell into his definition. Since 
he felt few of the freedmen qualified as such, he interfered with 
Kennedy's activities and freed civilly arrested vagrants. Further, 
bureau agents were ordered to enforce laborers' liens against 
crops. 20 
Soon Conway found himself unpopular with President John-
son, Bureau Chief General Howard, and the planter class in 
general. General Howard, under pressure from the president, 
had sent a pair of "investigators" to review the bureau's activities 
in the South. Having been badly burned by his original inves-
tigator, Carl Schurz, who had turned into a Radical, President 
Johnson wanted no further mistakes of that sort. He had, after 
all, personally given "his unequivocal approval" to the adminis-
tration of Louisiana, and Howard was anxious to cause him no 
displeasure. Therefore, after a critical report from General 
James Fullerton, a "Johnson man" to his fingertips, Conway was 
unceremoniously fired. He was not even given the usual sop of a 
post in the Washington office of the bureau. 21 Fullerton, who 
later in the year was to discount all stories of southern atrocities 
against blacks and to advise Johnson to veto the second Freed-
man's Act, was acting commissioner. 
In his brief tenure, Fullerton made clear that bureau agents 
were to permit the free market to operate with regard to wages. 
He felt that labor was overregulated and that this caused the 
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freedman to become "too excited and created a distrust in his 
mind of planters' attitudes" and a similar distrust by the planter 
of the new labor system. Agents were to refrain from setting 
minimum wage or maximum hours scales and to permit the 
freedman to make his own contracts. To encourage this "free 
market" Fullerton openly encouraged the civil authorities to 
enforce the vagrancy laws, as he, unlike Conway, saw large 
numbers of black vagrants in the city. He closed the bureau 
courts, but offered to take control of convicted vagrants and put 
them to work in the fields. When General Absalom Baird took 
over the bureau from Fullerton a month later, he simply con-
tinued to build on his predecessor's framework. 22 Thus Louisi-
ana soon found itself in the same pattern established in the states 
discussed above. 
In Georgia the situation is perhaps best summed up by the 
Georgia Apprenticeship Law in the Black Codes of 1866. The 
legislature simply made valid under state law the contracts of 
apprenticeship made by agents of the Freedmen's Bureau. As-
sistant Commissioner Davis Tillson ordered that when freedmen 
refused to sign labor contracts, the bureau agents should make 
contracts for them, to be as binding as if made "with the full 
consent of the freed people." 23 While the army commander in-
validated those sections of the Georgia codes which discrimi-
nated by race, the bureau issued an order which told the freed-
men that unless they signed labor contracts within three days, 
they would be arrested as vagrants and "the chain gang will be 
your inevitable fate." 24 
In Virginia, the problems of "mixed rule" became clear. Gen-
eral Alfred Terry invalidated the vagrancy statute, which made 
no reference to race but was, in the general's eyes, an attempt "to 
reduce the freedmen to a condition of servitude worse than that 
from which they have been emancipated-a condition that will 
be slavery in all but its name." 25 However, the other two military 
commanders whose districts included Virginia did not follow his 
lead. Furthermore, bureau agents in his district were threaten-
ing to arrest idle freedmen "according to the vagrant laws of the 
state" and their children were to be bound out until they were 
twenty-one years old. At least one agent hired out such vagrants 
to those who wanted their labor. 26 
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In Florida, Assistant Commissioner Osborn of the bureau 
threatened to shift unemployed blacks and their families by 
force from the city of Jacksonville to the plantations near Tal-
lahassee; and while the bureau did not permit the Florida courts 
to whip freedmen, it did promise, by agreement with the gover-
nor, to punish all those sentenced to such penalties "at the rate 
of one day's hard labor for each stripe spared to the Negro's 
back." The author of the only recent studies of the bureau in 
Florida concluded that the freedman was forced by the agency 
to take whatever contracts the planter offered.27 
Texas was the last state to pass a Black Code, and it appears 
that the bureau had performed such yeoman service in enforc-
ing its own vagrancy and contract regulations that the state legis-
lature could afford to be "lenient" in its own laws. Assistant 
Commissioner Kiddoo created and enforced his own enticement 
laws, and Assistant Commissioner Gregory adopted the "sworn 
statement of employer" clause, first used in Alabama, and ar-
rested as vagrants all who were charged with more than one 
day's absence (or five days in any month). 28 
This list of activities of the bureau and the army clearly does 
not represent anything like a full description of their policies in 
the period. In a brief survey of this type, only the highlights have 
been touched upon. 29 At the same time, one must acknowledge 
that both agencies did provide a basic source of justice in other 
areas regarding the freedmen. They protected voting rights, 
demanded equal access to the courts, and sometimes intervened 
when white gangs attempted to hold the ex-slaves in bondage.30 
The freedman's schools and the freedman's banks were noble 
social experiments in nineteenth-century terms. However, if the 
Black Code legislatures give us any clue to the major concerns of 
the South regarding the freed slave, it is that the creation of a 
system of forced labor was their paramount interest. In this re-
gard, the bureau and the army anticipated and encouraged the 
desires of the old, "unreconstructed" South. 
If this is true, one is forced to reckon with the apparent con-
tradiction posed by President Johnson's veto of the second 
Freedmen's Bureau bill, which would have greatly increased the 
powers of the agency. No clear answer to this question is possible 
in this study. It is possible that Johnson feared what might be 
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done in the future. Further, in order to prove that his plan of 
Reconstruction was working, he had just instigated some muck-
raking investigations which tried to show that the bureau had 
surreptitiously maltreated blacks in order to Hay the South with 
atrocity stories. His ferrets also claimed to have discovered in-
numerable cases of corruption. However, it is noteworthy that, 
through all of this, he never even threatened General Howard 
with dismissal-an act that could have been accomplished with a 
stroke of the pen. Furthermore, when a revised bill was finally 
passed over Johnson's veto, Howard indulged in a little politi-
cal housekeeping and purged the relatively few radicals in the 
bureau.31 
It is possible that the main cause of the bureau's historical 
reputation arose from Johnson's attempts to discredit it during 
this period. In practice, it appears that even Johnson had little 
trouble living with it as it actually operated. 
3 
Reconstruction 
Legislation 
[The Negroes 1 voted as a group against a resolution which would 
have put the convention on record as being opposed to the setting 
up of [racially 1 separate schools. 
Vernon L. Wharton 
In the "horror" history of Reconstruction, perhaps the most 
vilified institutions were the "Radical-Negro-carpetbagger" legis-
latures. From Thomas Nast's cartoons of black buffoons and 
smirking, malevolent scalawags to the Dunningites' descriptions 
of ignoramuses and their evil masters enacting laws without any 
idea of, or concern for, their consequences, we are given a pic-
ture of radicalism gone wild. Surely here, where the legislators 
have no understanding of the economics of agriculture or the 
need for "order" in employer-employee relationships, will be 
found the laws that, at least for a time, destroy the peonage sys-
tem set up by the codes and the Freedmen's Bureau. Clearly, the 
most simplistic remedies for relief were just the sort of legisla-
tion which ought to have come from these legislatures. A mini-
mum wage or share law, the most direct of remedies, might have 
been a logical expectation. Perhaps, in view of the numerous 
complaints of false bookkeeping and overcharges made in the 
early years of the contract laws, some kind of formal legal review 
of charges and deductions made by the planters might have 
been instituted. In brief, one is led to anticipate that these "hot-
beds of radicalism" would have significantly intruded a govern-
mental presence into the field. 
It is all the more striking, therefore, to note that no such ac-
tions were taken by any Reconstruction legislature. Even in those 
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states where the "carpetbagger-ignorant Negro" coalition was 
strong, the Radical emphasis was on suffrage, desegregation, 
education, and the like; legislation on labor was essentially con-
servative, if any positive action was taken at all. 
It might prove useful at this point to review the legal struc-
tures under which the ex-slaves were forced to operate at the 
time the Radicals took power in the congressionally recon-
structed states. The freedman was forced, by bureau and army 
orders or by contract or vagrancy laws, to contract for his labor 
with a planter. He might be paid wages (with half of these 
withheld until the crop was harvested) or receive a share of the 
crop. Under sharecropping, advances made to him by the 
planter (usually in scrip or in goods) for food, seed, tools and 
housing were often evaluated by the lender. The lien concept, 
originally written into bureau contracts to protect the worker, 
became an instrument by which he was bound to the land. The 
planter (or merchant) who lent the goods, was given a lien on the 
crop. Even if the cropper were to have a crop plentiful enough 
to remove his overvalued debts after the harvest, he would have 
to borrow again to survive the winter. The wage-paying em-
ployer could fine his worker for absence from work (regardless 
of cause) or for failure to meet standards of performance set 
by the employer himself. Under pressure to sign a contract, any 
contract, the freedman was in no position to bargain about his 
wages. Should he find himself dissatisfied with his contract as it 
actually operated and try to leave his employment, he was often 
subject to arrest for breach, or for vagrancy. In any case, all his 
earnings (should he leave) were forfeit regardless of how much 
labor and time had been invested. Finally, where was the dis-
satisfied laborer to go? The enticement laws made it risky for 
anyone else to employ him, under threat of severe civil or crimi-
nal penalties, and the cost of traveling out of the region was be-
yond the financial capabilities of all but a few. The binding of the 
servant to the master was almost complete. 
This is not to say that the system was totally effective in its 
actual operation; what system oflaws ever is? The planters were 
constantly complaining of workers leaving, attracted by higher 
wage offers, the lure of the city, or simple wanderlust. The thesis 
that underlay the construct of laws, however, was clear, and the 
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evidence is that most of the freedmen worked and worked fairly 
well. 1 
The story of Reconstruction legislation is a confused one. No 
one seemed sure exactly which laws were in force in 1868. For 
example, that portion of the Black Code of Louisiana which the 
governor failed to sign, and which had never become part of the 
code of laws, was nevertheless repealed by the 1869 legislature 
early in the session. 2 The vast numbers of private bills passed by 
these legislatures make a study of the statute records exceed-
ingly tedious and confusing; and inaccurate codification of laws 
and court cases further exacerbates the confusion. 3 Understand-
ably there is little scholarship on Reconstruction legislation by 
the states, other than the "Dunningites'" concentration on cor-
ruption in financial matters and the Revisionist responses. With 
this caveat in mind, let us examine the reactions of the "recon-
structed" legislatures to the plight of the freedman. 
The South Carolina legislature, counted among the most radi-
cal of all, made a contract law one of its first priorities. In "An 
Act to protect laborers and persons working under contract on 
shares of crops" they provided that "whenever such contract or 
contracts are violated, or attempted to be violated or broken ... 
before the conditions of the same are fulfilled ... complaint may 
be made, before a Justice of the Peace or Magistrate or ... any 
Court having jurisdiction in such cases." Breach of contract, by 
either party, was a punishable offense. However, "if the offend-
ing party be the landowner or owners" he might be punished by 
a fine of "not less than fifty dollars, nor more than five hundred 
dollars." On the other hand, "If the offending party be a laborer 
or laborers ... [he] shall be liable to fine or imprisonment, ac-
cording to the gravity of the offense." 4 Theoretically, the fact 
that the planter was subject to any punishment for breach of 
contract was an advance over the provision in the Black Codes. 
As a practical matter, it had little meaning, since employers were 
simply not prosecuted under the statute. This is made clear by 
virtually all contemporary accounts; in addition, I have read all 
reported cases under the statute and no planter was ever a de-
fendant. (N.B., not all cases are reported, but only those which 
have reached the appellate courts.) The fact that simple breach 
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was made a crime was enough to ensure the subservience of the 
laborer; and the incredible disparity in punishments (with the 
laborer subject to the whim of the presiding justice of the peace, 
without limits) is clear evidence of the tenor of the statute. 5 
Furthermore, by giving jurisdiction in such cases to justices of 
the peace, the legislature was ensuring that the law would be 
enforced by those most likely to be sympathetic to the employer. 
The "Courts of superior jurisdiction" were seen by General 
Howard as places where blacks might be dealt with fairly, but he 
conceded that "it is notorious that he [the Negro] stands little or 
no chance before a jury or magistrate of inferior jurisdiction." 6 
With regard to the lien laws, the legislatures' actions were less 
precise. The lien system grew out of the disruption of the planta-
tions. The farmer had to have something to pledge in order to 
get supplies on credit from merchants. As land was not highly 
valued immediately after the war, the planter pledged his un-
grown, often unplanted, crop against the loan. The merchant 
then had a lien against the crop when it was harvested. (The 
Freedmen's Bureau essentially initiated the lien idea in its labor 
contracts by giving the worker a lien for his wages on the un-
grown crop.) This system had injurious effects on all small farm-
ers and even on some large plantation owners, but its effects fell 
hardest on the black cropper. 7 
The South Carolina Republican legislature's first action in this 
regard was a positive one. The 1866lien laws were kept in effect, 
but they were amended in 1869 to give the laborer a first (or 
prior) lien. This meant that the laborer's claim on the crop was to 
be settled before the merchant's lien could be executed. This was 
clearly a prolabor statute, but it was not to last. In 1874, the leg-
islature added a landlord's lien to the general statute and, most 
significantly, made this lien for advances prior to all others. 8 
Perhaps even more significantly, the Radical legislature en-
acted a statute that validated the practice of making parol (or 
oral) contracts between master and servant. The only contracts 
of this sort which could be enforced were those not exceeding 
one year's service, but, of course, this was precisely appropriate 
for agricultural matters. 9 In any case, it is doubtful whether a 
statute enforcing oral contracts of longer duration would have 
been upheld by the higher courts, because the common law tra-
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clition in South Carolina (and almost every other state) barred 
enforcement of parol contracts in excess of one year's service. 10 
As important as these statutes themselves were, their inter-
pretation by the South Carolina courts was of equal import to 
the black worker. For example, the act of 1869 did not give a 
sharecropper a lien on the crop unless his contract was in writ-
ing. The landlord's lien, however, could be based on a parol con-
tractY Furthermore, the acts of 1866 and 1872 were inter-
preted by the courts not to give a lien to a "mere laborer for 
hire" nor to a "mere cropper," on the ground that the master-
servant relationship does not exist in such cases. 12 It is all the 
more noteworthy, then, that the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina did find such a master-servant relationship when it came to 
enforcing, under common law, an action for enticement. It was 
necessary to use the common law remedy, said the court, be-
cause the 1865 act regulating "the domestic relations of persons 
of color," which did give such a remedy against enticement, had 
been repealed in 1872_13 Thus the cropper was a servant, should 
he try to leave his employer, but a "mere laborer" should he at-
tempt to get a lien on the crop. This seems much more a set piece 
of tortured reasoning than any attempt at legalistic rebuttal. 
The legal strictures placed on the freedom of the black agri-
cultural laborer in South Carolina, the state often described as 
the classic example of Reconstruction, where "the rule of the 
Radical Republicans was most prolonged," provide the sound-
est evidence that all parties in the South agreed on the necessity 
for a legalized system of labor control. The fact that the system 
was closer to slavery than to freedom was insufficient reason to 
challenge it. 
Mississippi, whose Black Code was perhaps the most repres-
sive, seems to have taken the most vigorous action to improve 
matters. The incredible apprenticeship and vagrancy laws, which 
had caused more uproar in the North than anything else, were 
slowly emasculated by the military governors and the legislature 
itself, though it was not until the Reconstruction legislature of 
1870 came into power that they were fully repealed. The legis-
lature repealed all of the sections of the code which made racial 
distinctions, and the vagrancy, contract, and apprenticeship laws 
were thereby removed from the books. The new apprenticeship 
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statute, while obviously made colorblind, was changed more sig-
nificantly than that. It required that the parents of the potential 
apprentice must give their consent in order for the court to bind 
him over. 14 This took the teeth out of the law insofar as it pro-
vided a tool to enslave black children. 
At the same time, the legislature passed a new vagrancy law, 
which narrowed the definition of vagrancy and, most important, 
did not permit the hiring out of convicted vagrants who could 
not pay their fines. 15 Of course, any vagrancy law could be used 
to discriminate against any particular class through improper 
and prejudiced application by the courts and legal authorities. 
As noted earlier, the Virginia vagrancy statute, whose purpose 
was precisely that, was copied from the Pennsylvania statute. 
How the statute was actually applied in practice is difficult to 
determine. No cases under this law ever reached the appellate 
courts; thus no cases were reported. In 1872 some planters obvi-
ously felt that this law, as it stood, could provide the basis for the 
return of all Negroes to "public slavery." However, their pres-
sure on the legislature to pass firmer labor control statutes indi-
cates that this was not being done. 16 
There is evidence that in Mississippi, as in other states, there 
was a significant attempt to get around the lack of a contract law. 
The ploy was simply to charge the laborer not with simple 
breach, but rather with criminal fraudY The cropper who ac-
cepted, let us say, advances for the purchase of seed, would be 
charged, if he left the employ of the planter, with receiving 
money under false pretenses, a statutory offense intended for 
use against swindlers and confidence men. The reported cases 
under this statute, for the period 1868-1875, deal only with ap-
parently legitimate applications of the law; so whether or not it 
was perVerted to punish simple breach cannot be known. 18 It is 
not likely, however, that a black laborer could have appealed 
such a conviction. 
The practice of hiring out convicted felons was opposed by the 
legislature. The military commander in Mississippi, General A. 
C. Gillem, had leased all of the state's penitentiary inmates to an 
enterprising plantation owner and paid him some eighteen 
thousand dollars a year in addition. 19 But in 1872 the legislature 
debarred the leasing of convicts and started construction of a 
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series of prison farms. This was so uneconomical, however, that 
in 1875, the last year of Republican rule, the legislature gave up 
and permitted the leasing of county convicts to outside contrac-
tors. 20 
The whole convict lease system presents an extraordinarily 
complex problem, and it will be discussed in greater detail in the 
next chapter. However, one important distinction should be 
made at this point. The leasing of penitentiary (that is, state) con-
victs involved a contract between a public authority (usually the 
board of commissioners of the penitentiary) and a contractor 
who took whole blocks of workers. County convicts, on the other 
hand, could in general be hired out either en masse or as indi-
viduals, sometimes by a board and sometimes by the local judge. 
In the latter case, the convict often made a private contract with 
his employer to work out an indebtedness caused by the em-
ployer's payment of the felon's fine and costs. While the public 
contract system provided both a windfall for employers and 
slavery of a sort for the convict, the private contract fitted a 
classic definition of peonage. In this case, the Mississippi Repub-
licans permitted only public contracts by county boards of 
supervisors, and, in that sense, demonstrated their distaste for 
the latter systemY 
The first lien law of Mississippi was passed in 1867 by the "un-
reconstructed" legislature. It was intended merely to provide 
liens for merchants based on advances to planters. But in 1872 
the Radicals passed a new statute giving the laborer a lien on the 
crop for the first time. 22 At this point, the landlord had no lien 
on the crop for rents, but in a slick piece of judicial legislation, 
the courts gave him a lien on his laborer's share of the crops for 
advances made by him. In 1873 the legislature gave the landlord 
a lien on the crop for rent. 23 While, theoretically, the laborer still 
had the prior claim under the law, the courts reduced and 
virtually removed this priority over the years. 24 Finally, the la-
borer's position was made a total farce by the ruling of the courts 
that the laborer's lien could be waived by parol. "He may rely 
upon the promise of his employer for his pay, and waive his lien 
in favor of the mortgagee." Whether there had been such a 
waiver was a question of fact for the jury or the court. 25 The 
likelihood of a black cropper's testimony in this regard being 
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given more weight than his employer's, particularly in a local 
court (whose decisions in laborer's lien cases were final) seems 
slim to the point of nonexistence. 26 
With the exception of this area, however, the Mississippi Radi-
cal legislature has by far the best record of any legislature in 
Reconstruction. While there are indications that the system of 
forced labor did operate to some degree at the local level, at least 
it did so without legal sanction. 
In Alabama, where the Black Codes had been "moderate," the 
legislature did not repeal them. The governor had vetoed the 
contract law as unnecessary (because of the good works of the 
federal authorities), and the only laws of interest which had been 
enacted were the vagrancy and enticement statutes. The Va-
grancy Act of 1866 was not repealed in full; it was, in fact, being 
enforced in the state throughout Reconstruction. 27 In the ab-
sence of a contract law, the planters did use the false pretenses 
ploy, occasionally succeeding.28 The enticement law was en-
forced to the fullest degree, and courts consistently upheld it. 
It was challenged as early as 1870 on the grounds that it vio-
lated the 1866 Civil Rights Bill passed by the Congress. In Mur-
rell v. State, the Alabama Supreme Court denied the contention 
on the grounds that the law had no openly discriminatory phrase-
ology.29 The language of the court, however, made clear that 
the act was intended to "operate chiefly in respect to colored 
agricultural laborers." 30 
The Alabama legislature acted as early as 1868 to establish 
convict labor laws and kept active in the area throughout Recon-
structionY The private contract was not instituted formally, 
however. The lien laws followed the predictable pattern: in 1868 
the laborer was given a lien on the crop, "subordinate only to 
liens for rent," but by 1871, the employer had a lien "superior to 
all other liens" for "advances made" as well. The courts soon 
accepted "a verbal agreement for a lien on the crop for supplies 
furnished" only, despite some strictures against it in the Statute 
of Frauds, and the circle was closed. 32 
Louisiana also had an extended period of Republican rule, 
and the major provisions of the codes left standing by the bu-
reau had already been repealed by the "unreconstructed" legis-
lature of 1866-1868. Despite the extraordinary efforts of the 
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Freedmen's Bureau to force the freedman to work, the Louisi-
ana planters were still unsatisfied. In 1867 the planters initi-
ated a successful drive to have blacks arrested on trumped-up 
charges and released to them to work out their fines. Despite this 
obvious misuse of the law, one of the first acts of the Radical 
legislature was to pass a new vagrancy law almost on a par with 
the original Black Code provision. 33 
The enticement law was not reenacted, and the courts in 1867 
had declared that "enticing away from defendant's ... planta-
tion, certain freedman laborers ... [is not an] offense known to 
our laws." 34 The lien laws go as usual: in 1867 the laborer gets a 
lien for the first time; by 1870 it is inferior to that of the em-
ployer for rent and advances, and so forth as in other states. 35 
On balance, the Louisiana Republicans come off pretty well. 
Georgia, on the other hand, had a relatively brief period of 
Radical rule before the conservatives won power. There was no 
distinction, however, between the Radical and conservative legis-
latures on the subject of peonage. The Georgia enticement law, 
passed in 1866, was vigorously enforced. The courts applied it to 
verbal contracts as well as written ones and apparently applied it 
often. In fact the law was held to apply even if the servant in 
question had not yet begun his term of service and no damage 
could be shown.36 The general understanding about which sort 
of laborers the act was dealing with is made clear by the judges' 
opinions. In 1906 Justice Cobb of the Georgia Supreme Court 
declared, while giving a history of the act, that "as the servant 
class in this State was made up largely of negroes, the effect of 
this statute was not to punish the negro who violated his con-
tract, probably through ignorance that such an act involved any 
moral obliquity, but to punish the persons (generally white per-
sons) who brought about the wrong ... to prevent as far as 
possible the disastrous effects resulting from ... servants being 
enticed to violate their contracts of employment." 37 The justice 
was undoubtedly correct about what the legislature intended, 
but the laborer was apparently being punished for violation of 
contract despite the lack of a contract law. For instance, when a 
certain planter claimed that his laborers had deserted him and 
"hired themselves to the agent of another" he had them arrested 
and jailed, under something known as the Court Contract Act. 
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When the laborers were released "to go to the plaintiff's planta-
tion, but returned to that of the defendant ... they were ar-
rested a second time and sent to jail." This time they were re-
leased by the Freedmen's Bureau and were "returned" to the 
enticer's lands.38 
What is fascinating about the case is not the enticement statute 
under which it was brought but rather the nature of the act 
under which the laborers were originally jailed. According to 
Judge Montgomery of the Georgia Supreme Court, the first 
owner's "contract with the negroes was a Court contract ... [al-
though it had never been] filed in the office of the County Court. 
Assuming it to have been a Court contract, West [the plaintiff] 
seems to have taken the course pointed out by the law for its 
enforcement, to wit: attachment." 39 While the original jailing took 
place in 1868, the judge was speaking in 1872, and he still could 
see nothing strange about the attachment of black workers-that 
is, their arrest and imprisonment. Presumably this particular 
ploy was not always successful, for the Georgia courts denied a 
more common method of enforcing contracts without a contract 
law in Ryan v. State. Here an action was brought under Revised 
Code 4507, a penal statute punishing "cheats and swindlers" for 
receiving money under false pretenses. Again the charge was 
really simple breach of contract, and the court denied the appli-
cability of the statute, ruling that "a promise is not a pretence." 40 
Thus, although Georgia had no contract law, it seems highly 
likely that many laborers were forced, under threat of penal 
sanction, to fulfill labor contracts (written or unwritten). It must 
be remembered that the fact that the "false pretenses" statute 
was declared inapplicable in Ryan did not mean that it was not 
used often, in cases which never reached the higher courts. In 
fact, the same tack was still being used in 1886 and therefore one 
gets the impression that it was widespread. 41 
Convict labor was started in Georgia by General Thomas 
Ruger, military commander of the district in 1868, who leased 
several hundred convicts to railroad contractors. When the Rad-
ical government came into power, one of the first acts of Gover-
nor Rufus Bulloch was to confirm the lease and to contract out 
three hundred more convicts. 42 Further, the Black Code va-
grancy law provided for the hiring out of convicted vagrants to 
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pay their fines, and this practice was apparently highly popular. 
The legislature passed a statute declaring that "when any person 
is convicted of any crime or misdemeanor, the punishment 
whereof ... is fine or fine and costs ... the convict might ... hire 
himself or herself to any citizen of this state." 43 Thus Georgia 
supported not only the public but the private contract. 
The actions of the Georgia legislature on lien laws were con-
sistent with the now familiar progression seen in other states. 44 
In sum, the situation of the black agricultural laborer in Georgia 
was almost a classic definition of peonage. 
In North Carolina, the 1866 vagrancy law was still being 
enforced in 1871, although a substitute measure (with no sub-
stantial changes) had just been passed.45 The enticement act of 
1866 was also still in force, and in 1874 the North Carolina Su-
preme Court declared that it was valid. This was done despite 
the fact that the contract in question gave the employer total 
power "to decide as to the performance or non-performance," 
and provided that, if the worker "shall misbehave in the opinion of 
the party rif the first part such misbehaving party shall quit the 
premises and forfeit to the party of the first part, all his interest in the 
common crop." The private convict labor contract was also ap-
proved in this state. 46 Otherwise, the North Carolina statutes are 
similar to those of other southern states. 
Rather than repeat the development of these laws in an end-
less litany, let it be said that the states represented above are 
fairly typical of their sisters. 47 There are, of course, differences 
in approach and enforcement, but a broad and reasonably con-
sistent pattern does emerge. By and large, even in the "Tragic 
Era," when Radicalism is supposed to have run rampant over the 
prostrate South, the newly freed agricultural worker was, by 
consensus, placed in a position of peonage. Sometimes, in the 
absence of specific laws to enforce one area of labor control or 
another, extralegal methods were employed, but in the main, 
the laws themselves (and their interpretations by the courts) 
provided an adequate tool for the job. 
4 
Redemption 
The deficiencies in the historiography of the American Negro lie 
mainly in the realm of omission, and nowhere is this so apparent as 
in the treatment of the Negro in the years 1876-1896. 
Jack Abramowitz 
In most of the histories of blacks in the South, the chapter fol-
lowing the discussion of Reconstruction and Reunion is almost 
ineluctably entitled "The Negro Migration" or "The Negro 
Moves North." In fact, the period between 1877 and the end of 
the Populist movement is perhaps the least documented in all 
black history. To be sure, there are always references to the Col-
ored Farmers' Alliance in the 1880s and 1890s, but these are 
wholly inadequate as a description of what was happening to the 
black agricultural worker in this period. For it was at this time 
that the variety of legal structures designed to keep that worker 
in a state of quasi slavery were refined, strengthened, and made 
part of the fabric of southern life and law. This development will 
be discussed in relation to the lien laws, convict labor, and the 
contract and enticement laws. 
The lien laws, as we have seen, began as a method by which 
the planter could get credit at a time when his land had little 
value. While they were by no means a postbellum innovation, 
most of them were passed either as part of the Black Codes or as 
Reconstruction legislation. These first laws, it should be noted, 
gave the whip hand to the merchant and not to the planter. The 
first additions made by the Republicans tended to be the grant-
ing of a first lien to the laborer. The next step was the landlord's 
lien, which soon became, as a pattern emerged, the prior lien on 
the crop. Finally, as Reconstruction drew to a close, the worker's 
lien lost its utility, either through direct legislation or judicial 
30 REDEMPTION 
emasculation. Despite these emendations, however, no one but 
the merchant was really content with the lien system, and it 
is interesting to note that the new Democratic governments in 
some states immediately repealed them. In South Carolina, for 
example, the first "Redeemed" legislature repealed the mer-
chant's lien in its 1877 session. The Bourbons argued against the 
lien system on the grounds that it encouraged landless tenants to 
"squat on poor ridges and set themselves up as farmers." As no 
viable alternative to the lien laws emerged, however, the legisla-
ture reenacted them before the repealer ever took effect. As part 
of the same act, the landlord's privileges were expanded to cover 
all of the crop (the Republicans had restricted such liens to no 
more than one-third) and the validity of the parol contract was 
reaffirmed. 1 This end product was similarly produced in vir-
tually all southern states, though not necessarily with the same 
chronology. 
One aspect of this emerging system which has not been 
touched on was the introduction of the invidious "two-price" 
idea: the price of goods paid for in cash was far less than the 
price of the same goods lent on credit. The credit price, accord-
ing to a contemporary reporter, "was never less than thirty per-
cent and frequently runs up to seventy percent" higher than the 
cash price. 2 Further, once a lien had been executed, no one 
would sell goods to a farmer except for cash, since his only se-
curity was already pledged. "Free-market capitalism" had been 
successfully replaced by a state-supported freedom for the en-
trepreneur; there was to be no bargaining for a better price. 
When an English creditor was accused in Parliament of usury 
for charging an Irish peasant 43.5 percent interest, a federal 
judge, speaking before the Arkansas Bar Association, asked, 
"What is 43.5%, compared to the profits charged by the holders 
of Anaconda mortgages on tenants in Arkansas? They would 
scorn 43.5%." 3 While Professor Woodward emphasizes the ef-
fects of the system on the planters, it should be made clear that 
the laws had their most deleterious effect on the cropper and the 
tenant. The landlord's lien had been made superior to the mer-
chant's, and many planters got into the business of lending 
supplies themselves. Further, while both black and white suf-
fered under these conditions, the white cropper had a far better 
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chance of emerging from the morass. He received some degree 
of fair treatment from the courts, and the threat of prison hung 
far less menacingly (if at all) over his head. 4 
The growth of sharecropping and tenantry as alternatives to 
wage labor was a marked tendency throughout Reconstruction 
and increased during Redemption. Clearly, the changes in the 
lien laws reflected this shift and provided a means of regulating 
the black labor force under these new conditions. A side effect of 
the lien system was to bind both landlord and sharecropper al-
most exclusively to cotton as the main crop because of its ready 
convertibility to cash.5 
Like the lien system, the leasing of convict labor got its start in 
the Reconstruction period. As noted above, the first leasings 
were initiated by various army commanders in the South. Ini-
tially, the rationale for this practice was defensible: the state pen-
itentiaries had been destroyed, and some means of control had 
to be established. During Republican rule leasing was seen as 
a temporary expedient, to be used only until the penitentiaries 
had been rebuilt. 6 The efforts of the Mississippi legislature to 
forestall the permanent use of the system are typical of (if more 
vigorous than) the ambiguous behavior of the Reconstruction 
legislatures on the matter. As in Mississippi, financial consid-
erations became paramount; the promise of a profit was far 
more alluring than the certainty of a large expenditure. At first 
the lease system provided only a slight reduction in cost over a 
straight penitentiary program. In Georgia, North Carolina, Ten-
nessee, and Arkansas, the contractors essentially did no more 
than relieve the state of the burden of feeding and clothing its 
convicts, and in Mississippi and Florida, the contractors were ac-
tually paid for their trouble. 7 
By the early 1870s, convict leasing began to turn a profit, par-
ticularly as the southern states embarked on railroad construc-
tion and other internal improvements. Despite this, the real im-
petus for expansion of the system came after Reunion. There 
were two major contributions to this expansion. The first was the 
realization that the South had vast areas of unexploited natural 
resources which provided a real source of attraction for inves-
tors. Part of the attraction was the availability of cheap labor, and 
the convict lease system was the apotheosis of that. As George 
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Washington Cable, a bitter opponent of leasing, noted, it "holds 
forth the seductive spectacle of these great works, which every-
body wants and no one wants to pay for, growing apace by con-
vict labor that seems to cost nothing." 8 
Perhaps of equal importance to the expansion of the system 
was the fact that it dealt almost exclusively with blacks. This had 
been true even in Reconstruction, but it became absolutely clear 
in the latter part of the seventies. In 1875 the Georgia legisla-
ture, now "Redeemed," passed its "pig-law" which raised the 
penalty for hog-stealing from that of a misdemeanor to that of a 
felony "unless the jury recommend to mercy." Mississippi's first 
Democratic legislature passed an even more invidious act which 
made it a felony to steal any property in excess of ten dollars in 
value or any livestock whatever. 9 Georgia's penitentiary popula-
tion leaped from five hundred to one thousand five hundred in 
the two years after the passage of the law, and in Mississippi it 
went from two hundred and fifty to one thousand. Up to 95 
percent of these "new" convicts were black. This was no surprise 
to anyone, of course, and it was "understood" which sort of con-
victs were to be leased. George Tillman, a South Carolina plant-
er and politician said, "The negro has a constitutional propensity 
to steal, and in short to violate most of the ten commandments. 
The State should farm out such convicts." 10 Wharton notes that 
there was a general feeling that white men should not be in-
cluded in chain gangs, and their fines or punishments were 
therefore remitted by the mayor or judges. Alabama forbade the 
mixing of black and white convicts by contractors, though few 
contractors wanted white labor. 11 In general, the few whites who 
were actually sent to prison were charged with serious crimes, 
such as murder or arson, which often debarred them from work 
outside the prison. 12 In states where such restrictions were not 
applied, it was almost impossible to get a jury to send a white 
man to be farmed out. 13 
By the mid-l880s the convict lease system had reached its 
peak. Convict labor was lauded as reliable and cheap by the 
happy exponents of entrepreneurial liberty in the "Redeemed" 
South. United States Senator Joseph E. Brown, of Georgia, had 
a twenty-year lease guaranteeing him three hundred convicts 
("able-bodied, long-term men") per year, for which he paid the 
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state the munificent sum of seven cents per man per working 
day. The senator praised this sort of labor in Congress, for "no 
matter what goes wrong you have no labor strike." This em-
phasis on the reliability of convict labor was apparent to all. Even 
if your convicts should die, the contract called for their prompt 
replacement. And die they did, in fantastic numbers. In South 
Carolina, the death rate of convicts leased to the Greenwood and 
Augusta Railroad averaged 45 percent a year for a period of two 
years, 1877-1879_14 This figure is the worst recorded, but state 
averages ranged from about 16 percent (in Mississippi) to 25 
percent (in Arkansas) in this period. 15 
In 1886 the United States Commission of Labor issued a re-
port on convict labor, and perhaps this provides the best sum-
mary of what was going on in the South. The main emphasis of 
the report was on the effect of convict labor in competition with 
free labor, a matter being given close consideration in many 
states. Thus the comments on the conditions of convict laborers 
are by way of off-hand summations, a fact which does not make 
them any the less revealing. In Alabama, the commissioner 
notes, "Convict labor more reliable and productive than free la-
bor. Ninety percent of them negroes of low class, who are ben-
efited by regular work. Mine owners say they could not work at a 
profit without the lowering effect in wages of convict-labor com-
petition. The convict accomplishes more work than the free la-
borer." On the county level: "Great hardship through extension 
of sentences to work out court costs. Convicts frequently over-
tasked on farms." In Georgia, convicts were "barbarously treated 
... [and] worked to the utmost ... the death rate is very high." 
In Mississippi: "Most of the convicts (ninety-two percent) are ne-
groes of the lowest class. They are generally overworked, and 
the death rate is high .... Convicts do thirty percent more work 
than free laborers, being worked long, hard and steadily .... 
Convict labor more reliable." Or Tennessee: "Wretched sur-
roundings, bad management, appalling death rate. The prison 
system is in all ways atrocious ... but the state makes a large 
profit from the convict labor." 16 
It should be noted that many states throughout the nation had 
some form of convict labor system, but comments like these are 
reserved for the "Redeemed" South. Woodward notes that the 
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"convict-lease system did greater violence to the moral authority 
of the Redeemers than did anything else. For it was upon the 
tradition of paternalism that the Redeemer regimes claimed au-
thority to settle the race problem and 'deal with the negro."' 17 
There seem to be numerous other grounds upon which this 
"moral authority" might have been challenged, as the peonage 
laws discussed below demonstrate, but it is also clear that the 
convict labor practices were the most brutal of all the devices 
used to restore "order" to southern labor. It even aped the old 
slave system by quoting prices for classes of prisoners-"full 
hands," "medium hands," and so forth-with phrasing taken di-
rectly from slave terminology. 18 Despite rising opposition from 
the Grange and labor organizations, the system did not begin its 
decline until the depression of 1893, when it became difficult to 
find contractors with whom to place the leases. 19 Ultimately the 
state took control of the convicts, generally working them on the 
roads, but removing them from the hands of private contractors. 
It should be made clear that the system referred to in the 
preceding pages is that of contracts by public authorities for 
"faceless" convicts. That is, the contractor had not hired indi-
viduals, but a mass of labor, whose parts were interchangeable. 
Theoretically, if a convict lived long enough (a doubtful proposi-
tion), his sentence would be served, and he would be released-
to be replaced by another cog in the machine. This differs from 
the practice of hiring out an individual to work out his fine and 
costs. As we have seen, this latter method was among the most 
popular features of the Black Codes. Vagrancy laws were so 
commonly used for this purpose that the commissioner of labor 
omits them from his report, as being well known and "similar in 
their provisions." 20 Beyond this, however, eight states of the 
Confederacy had, by the mid-1880s, laws permitting such hiring 
for all misdemeanor or felony convicts sentenced to pay a fine 
(and costs). The only exceptions were South Carolina, Louisiana, 
and Alabama-and Louisiana took up the practice in 1894. 
Alabama permitted the extension of terms of those sentenced to 
hard labor by adding on court costs to be worked out; South 
Carolina apparently never succumbed.21 
What this concept produced was a system by which the courts 
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became an employment agency for the planter. Ray Stannard 
Baker described this sort of operation in Following the Color Line. 
One of the things that I first couldn't understand in some of the 
courts I visited was the presence of so many white men to stand 
sponsor for Negroes who had committed various offenses .... I 
saw a Negro brought into court charged with stealing cotton. 
"Does anybody know this Negro?" asked the judge. Two white 
men stepped up and both said they did. The judge fined the 
Negro $20 and costs, and there was a real contest between the two 
white men as to who should pay it-and get the Negro. They ar-
gued for some minutes, but finally the judge said to the prisoner: 
"Who do you want to work for, George?" The Negro chose his 
employer and agreed to work four months to pay off his $20 fine 
and costs. 
Sometimes a man who has a debt against a Negro will sell the 
claim-which is practically selling the Negro-to some farmer 
who wants more labour.22 
If the sentence given in this case was enforced, then this par-
ticular felon was not being treated badly, for the period of his 
servitude was limited. The more common practice was for the 
planter to subtract from the wages due to his worker the costs of 
food, clothing, and shelter. As the planter set the value of these 
items, with a little judicious bookkeeping the sentence could eas-
ily be made to run for a year or more. Just as the legislature and 
courts had cooperated in making the convict lease system a suc-
cess, so the courts helped to make the "fine-cost" system function 
effectively. United States District Court Judge Emery Speer, a 
Georgian, and a bitter opponent of peonage, did a personal sur-
vey of the county court records of Bibb County, Georgia, for a 
one-month period. He found that more than 149 people (almost 
all black) had been sentenced to a total of nineteen years at labor 
for crimes no more serious than walking on the grass or spitting 
on the sidewalk. 23 
It was in this same period that the labor contract and entice-
ment laws were formally adopted, broadened, or strengthened 
in most of the South. In 1908 Assistant Attorney General 
Charles Russell said: "The chief support of peonage is the pecu-
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liar system of State laws prevailing in the South, intended evi-
dently to compel service on the part of the working-man." 24 
It should be noted that the system, peculiar though it was, had 
some precedents in American history. Besides the old practice of 
"indentured servants" which came with colonization, Richard 
Morris has traced similar usages in the antebellum South. 25 
In addition, the United States had acquired a formal system of 
peonage in 1846, when New Mexico became a territory. Peon is a 
Spanish word meaning foot soldier, but the term was used in the 
colonial system of forced labor applied to native workmen. 
When Spain debarred the use of these feudal tactics in 1811, the 
ruling landlords devised the system of debt slavery. This system 
was recognized by the United States and enforced in its courts 
after 1846.26 In fact, the first antipeonage statute directly refers 
to the territory of New Mexico. 
While New Mexican peonage is often discussed by legal schol-
ars of the late nineteenth century, little mention is made of a 
similar situation which existed in Hawaii. There, under a labor 
control act of 1859, a laborer could be compelled to serve for the 
full term covered by his contract, and if he absented himself 
from work, he could be compelled to serve for a period not to 
exceed double the time of his absence. This provision was up-
held in the courts, even after the passage of the Hawaiian Con-
stitution of 1864, which prohibited involuntary servitude. Once 
again, the system comes into play when dealing with nonwhite 
laborers, in this case the native Hawaiians and the immigrant 
Japanese and Chinese imported by the sugar plantation own-
ers.27 
Despite this background, there is no indication that the peon-
age laws passed in the South had any but a homegrown basis. 
Aside from Texas and Virginia, which essentially drop from 
view in this regard, all the southern states had passed, 
strengthened, and modified contract labor laws by the turn of 
the century.28 Once again, both legal authorities and antipeon-
age authors fail to note fully the widespread extent of these 
laws.29 The Georgia act is typical; it reads: 
Sec. l. If any person shall contract with another to perform for 
him services, with intent to procure money or other thing of value 
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thereby, and not perform the service contracted for, to the loss 
and damage of the hirer; or, after having so contracted, shall pro-
cure from the hirer money or other thing of value, with intent not 
to perform such service, to the loss and damage of the hirer,-he 
shall be deemed a common cheat and swindler. 
Sec. 2. It is provided that satisfactory proof of the contract, the 
procuring thereon of money or other thing of value, the failure to 
perform the services so contracted for, or failure to return the 
money so advanced with interest thereon, at the time said labor 
was to be performed, without good and sufficient cause, and loss 
or damage to the hirer, shall be presumptive evidence of fradu-
lent intent. 30 
37 
It should be noted that the avowed purpose of this law is "not 
to enforce the contract, but to punish the fraudulent procure-
ment of money or other thing of value." 31 "The fraudulent act 
of the promisor in procuring money on his contract to perform 
services does more than create a debt. It also constitutes a crime; 
and the purpose of the act is not to create a remedy for the 
collection of a debt, but to provide punishment for the fraud." 32 
It was on this ground alone that the Georgia Supreme Court 
upheld this law. In general, the courts conceded that the effect 
of the act was to enforce the contract, but they maintained that 
this was merely a side effect. In fact, since enforcement of the 
contract was not significant, a conviction could be had even if the 
contract itself were not civilly valid. 33 This law was upheld 
against a claim that it denied the equal protection of the laws, 
insofar as it provided for punishment for the laborer while af-
fording the employer "absolute immunity from prosecution or 
punishment by reason of any infraction of said contractual obli-
gations." Since, "in the nature of things the master does not 
ordinarily procure advances from his servant . . . legitimate 
classification is not unjust discrimination." It is, said the court, 
not "criminal for a child to abandon its father," but "the aban-
donment of a child by its father is made a misdemeanor." 34 
Where penalties are provided for the employer as well as for his 
employee, however, they must be the same. The case establish-
ing this, in South Carolina, represents the sole instance uncov-
ered in my research in which a contract law was declared uncon-
stitutional by a state court before federal court activity in the 
38 REDEMPTION 
area got started in the early 1900s. Even here, however, the 
legislature had amended the act some weeks before and had 
equalized the penalties. Whether they "got the word" from the 
court beforehand is, like the action of the court itself, a moot 
point. The court's stand did not prevent the laborer from going 
to jail; it was merely declaratory in effect-a warning, as it were, 
not to reenact the old provisions. 35 As employers were never 
prosecuted in any case, it was hardly a courageous judicial blow 
to the system. 
Georgia, which came late into the field, provides the greatest 
number of judicial defenses of the contract laws (and also re-
ports decisions of the appellate courts as well as those of the 
Supreme Court), but the cases reported in the other states pro-
vide roughly similar rationales. 36 
This interpretation (punishing fraud rather than breach), is 
absolutely vital to the validity of these laws, for every state had a 
provision in its constitution barring imprisonment for debt. 
Even in the absence of federal intervention the state courts 
would have had to deny the validity of the contract laws if they 
had been forced to view them as enforcing labor contracts. As it 
was, they worked perfectly. It was in the nature of things that a 
cropper must get some sort of advance in order to raise his crop, 
and, once having done so, he could not leave his employer re-
gardless of the amount of labor he had put in on that crop. 
Further, the provisions which delineate the nature of proof re-
quired to show fraudulent intent are highly significant. Failure 
to perform the services contracted for was presumptive evidence 
offraud.37 
In response to the charge that these laws constituted peonage 
or involuntary servitude, the courts were equally adamant. Es-
sentially the argument ran thus: the employer under these stat-
utes was not able to prevent his employee from leaving his em-
ploy. Neither could the courts: all that could be done was to 
punish him for doing so. The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
was "unable to discover any feature of 'involuntary servitude' in 
the matter. Everyone who undertakes to serve another in any 
capacity parts for a time with that absolute liberty which it is 
claimed that the constitution secures to us all, but, as he does 
this voluntarily, it cannot be said that he is deprived of any of 
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his constitutional rights; and if he violates his undertaking, he 
thereby, of his own accord, subjects himself to such punishment 
as the law-making power may have seen fit to impose for such 
violation." 38 This assessment ignored the fact that the statute 
provided that imprisonment did not relieve the debt; punish-
ment could continue indefinitely until the contract provisions 
had been met. 
After the brief flurry of federal activity in this area, some 
other defenses for these laws surfaced; they will be dealt with in 
a later section. 
The enticement laws, which made it virtually impossible for a 
laborer to leave his employer, also came to their full fruition by 
the end of the nineteenth century. All nine of the states referred 
to above had laws of this type on their books. Some, like Ala-
bama, had had them since Reconstruction; others came later 
into the field but all had them.39 The Florida law is fairly typical, 
though rather more concise than most: "Whoever shall entice, or 
persuade by any means whatsoever any tenant, servant or la-
borer, under contract with another, whether written or verbal, 
to violate such contract, or shall employ any servant or laborer, 
knowing him or her to be under contract as aforesaid, shall be 
punished by imprisonment not exceeding sixty days, or by fine 
not exceeding one hundred dollars." 40 
The effect of such a statute on the labor market is obvious, and 
there is less judicial coyness about the intent of these laws than 
about contract legislation. The Georgia courts said openly in 
1871 that the legislation was intended to prevent "the derange-
ment of an entire system of labor" and was still reiterating this 
line in 1907 _41 Such laws were necessary, "the servant class being 
largely made up of negroes." It was clearly intended to apply 
principally to farm laborers and was so enforced.42 The North 
Carolina statute takes some of its wording directly from that por-
tion of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 relating to harboring or 
concealing a slave, for which term "servant" is substituted. 
It is highly significant that verbal contracts come under the 
aegis of these acts (only Alabama and Georgia required a writ-
ten contract-and in Georgia this was required only if the al-
leged offense took place before the term of the contract began). 
United States Senator Thomas E. Miller of South Carolina de-
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scribed their effect in 1891: "In my State, if the employer states 
verbally that the unpaid laborer of his plantation contracted to 
work for the year, no other farmer dares employ the man if he 
attempts to break the contract rather than work for nothing: 
for down there it is a misdemeanor to do so, the penalty is heavy, 
and the farmer who employs the unpaid starving laborer of his 
neighbor is the victim of the court." 43 
The standards of proof required by these statutes are equally 
interesting. In Alabama, if a servant or laborer is "found in the 
service or employment of another before the termination of 
such contract, that fact is prima facie evidence ... of a violation of 
that section." Further, the rule laid down in Bryan v. State, that 
knowledge of the previous subsisting contract was not essential 
to conviction, was apparently still in force. 44 Other states did not 
go so far, but the only safe defense against such a charge was to 
acquire the written consent of the former master, or to be willing 
to fire your employee immediately upon being informed of his 
previous contract. 
These laws were held constitutional by the courts, against 
charges that they were indirect attempts to enforce contracts, 
and that they were class legislation.45 It should also be noted that 
the fact that the servant in question had abandoned his contract 
before his hiring by the second employer did not absolve the 
latter.46 The statutes were not simply instruments to prevent the 
enticement of labor; they were also intended to "constrain la-
borers and tenants ... to performance of their contracts by ren-
dering it difficult for them to secure employment elsewhere." 47 
Despite protestations that peonage was not a bascially south-
ern practice (see, for example, Justice Jackson's opinion in Pol-
lock v. Williams), the plain fact of the matter is that criminal 
punishment for breach of contract and labor enticement are 
found exclusively on the statute books of the southern states.48 
Kentucky, a former slave-holding state though not a member of 
the Confederacy, had an enticement law on its books, which had 
been enacted "soon after slavery ceased to exist in this state." 
Minnesota and Michigan had laws which punished breach with 
intent to defraud, after "receiving transportation from any point 
in this state to ... a place where he has agreed ... to perform 
labor." 49 Both of these laws were dead letters, however, and 
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there is no record of any case being brought under them. Justice 
Jackson, southern apologists, and left-wing propagandists not-
withstanding, peonage was both sectional and racial. 50 The 
South did not have what C. Vann Woodward called "the heri-
tage of a manumitted slave psychology"; it had a metamorpho-
sized slave psychology.51 It had simply adapted its laws to meet 
the formal strictures of the Civil War amendments, in order to 
retain as much of its old rules of labor control as possible. 
A peripheral comment should be made here about the role of 
the Populists in this context. The southern Populist movement 
has been described as "the most promising experiment in inter-
racial cooperation ... in the history of the South." 52 Richard 
Hofstadter, who excoriates the Populists, still feels constrained 
to note that some Populist leaders "attempted something pro-
foundly radical and humane" in dealing with the racial question. 
To a degree, this sort of statement seems to be drawn from the 
arguments made by Woodward in his various studies of this pe-
riod. However, these views ignore his own caveat in Origins of the 
New South that the gains in racial cooperation "were limited and 
that their significance could easily be exaggerated." Having 
given his warning, however, Woodward proceeds to mute it. He 
lauds the attempts of Tom Watson to emphasize the communal-
ity of economic interests among the races and points to the 
Populist rhetoric on black suffrage. "In their platforms Southern 
Populists denounced lynch law and the convict lease and called 
for defense of the Negro's political rights." 53 
What is most striking about this attitude, however, is Wood-
ward's lack of interest in the real problems the black worker 
faced. He was certainly aware of the incongruity of the situation, 
for he notes, "It is undoubtedly true that the Populist ideology 
was dominantly that of the landowning farmer, who was, in 
many cases, the exploiter of landless tenant labor." However, 
"the lives of the overwhelming majority of Negroes were still [as 
before Emancipation] circumscribed by the farm and the planta-
tion. The same was true of the white people, but the Negroes, 
with few exceptions, were farmers without land." 54 
As the emphasis in the Populist program was on the needs of 
property-owning farmers whose interests were threatened by 
eastern capital, little attention was given to the needs of agrar-
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ians who were caught in the trap of sharecropping or wage la-
bor. This was, of course, precisely the position of the bulk of 
black farmers. It was largely irrelevant how the Populists reacted 
to, or cooperated with, the Negro granges and alliances, for 
these organizations did not, in any case, represent the mass of 
the black population of the South. 
If we are to be shown real evidence of a communality of inter-
ests between black and white farmers in the Populist movement, 
then we need some proof of Populist opposition to labor con-
tract laws, enticement laws, and the rest. If such evidence exists, 
it is not easily uncovered in Populist writings or rhetoric. In 
fact, when the Colored Farmers' Alliance proposed a strike of 
black cotton-pickers (to raise the wage to fifty cents a hundred 
pounds), the Progressive Farmer, a white Populist paper advised 
farmers to "leave their cotton in the field rather than pay fifty 
cents per hundred to have it picked." This (in the paper's eyes) 
was a blatant attempt by blacks "to better their condition at the 
expense of their white brethren." 55 Even with regard to the lien 
laws, the main thrust of Populist criticism was aimed at the mer-
chant's lien, not the landlord's. 
There was one area of real concern to blacks upon which the 
Populists did take a firm stand. This was the subject of convict 
leasing. However, on this issue there was a clear merging of 
black and white interests. Blacks were most often the direct 
victims of the system, but whites were put in difficulty by the 
competition. The labor movement was equally opposed to the 
system. In North Carolina the "Penitentiary has been forced to 
give up shoemaking, as laboring people refuse to buy convict-
made shoes." Also, "The brick making industry around Atlanta 
... has been broken up almost entirely by convict-labor competi-
tion." In short, there was "strong popular feeling against [the] 
competitive employment of convict labor," and it was the com-
petitive aspect that was paramount. 56 One searches in vain for 
similar Populist rhetoric against the short-term hiring out of in-
dividuals for nonpayment of fines. 
Whatever credit the Populists deserve in regard to Negro 
rights lies in their sporadic support for equality of suffrage and 
the right to serve on juries, and in their integration efforts-
including, at times, partially integrated alliance conferences.57 
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That these actions required great courage may be seen in the 
vicious attacks made on the Populists in the 1892 election cam-
paign. Their subsequent retreat in this area, however, was prob-
ably as much due to the racist elements in their own core as to 
the political liabilities. In the end, while still seeking black sup-
port, they acceded fully to the idea of white supremacy. 
Most important, the great agrarian revolt did not focus upon 
the problems affecting the bulk of black agrarian labor. To as-
sume that the black peon could be concerned with, for instance, 
currency reform and free silver, was an absurdity. As Paul 
Lawrence Dunbar (a patent realist who once said "the only good 
thing a 'possum ever did was fill someone's belly") was to write, 
the Populist position on currency reform was a matter of indif-
ference to the Negro; the issue was not what kind of money 
there was, but the fact that the Negro most often had no money 
of any kind. 58 
5 
Peonage and 
the Constitution 
... chained to an ever-turning wheel of servitude. 
U.S. v. Reynolds (1914) 
It is striking that in a discussion of peonage covering a period of 
almost forty years no mention has been made of the role of the 
United States Courts, federal prosecutors, or even, except in 
passing, the Constitution of the United States. This is not an 
oversight, for the plain fact is that, after the federal participation 
in overturning the Black Codes, the United States government 
does not play any role at all in subsequent developments. 1 The 
reasons for this are, of course, beyond proof. The only conjec-
ture I can propose is the same as that presented in the earlier 
sections on the Reconstruction period: namely, that the general 
consensus of all parties was that a system of control over the 
labor of blacks was necessary. The federal authorities, during 
Reconstruction, enforced such a system, and the Reconstruction 
legislatures either supported it or silently acquiesced in it. After 
Reunion, the southern black was left to the tender mercies of the 
Redeemers by a passive North. In any case, nothing was done. 
This is not to indicate that there were no possibilities for ac-
tion. The Constitution provided, in Justice Jackson's felicitous 
phrase, both "a sword and a shield." The "shield" is obvious: the 
state laws enforcing peonage (contract, enticement, private con-
vict leasing, etc.) could have been challenged in the courts. If the 
laws had been found to be unconstitutional, they could no 
longer have provided the legal base for the system. What the 
decision of a Supreme Court which acted as it did in such cases 
as U.S. v. Cruikshank, the Civil Rights Cases, and U.S. v. Harris 
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would have been is questionable, but it never got the opportu-
nity to render one. 2 Again, the reason for this is unclear, but the 
cost of such an appeal, when the victim of the act in question is 
by the nature of the charge in debt, gives us a reasonable clue. 
Few cases of this sort were ever appealed to the higher state 
courts. Only a concerted effort by the federal government could 
have provided a path for such appeals. In the face of federal 
indifference to the matter, nothing of the sort occurred. 
There was, however, also a "sword" in the hands of the 
attorney-general, which provided a tool for the prosecution of 
those who kept the black laborer in bondage. While other stat-
utes came into use at a later date (see chapter 7), the basic statute 
available after the war was an "Act to abolish and forever pro-
hibit the System of Peonage in the Territory of New Mexico, and 
other Parts of the United States." This bill had been passed by 
Congress in 1867 and, as the title suggests, was basically aimed 
at the system of peonage that had been inherited from the days 
of Spanish rule in New Mexico Territory. However, as written, 
it had force anywhere in the United States.3 The operative sec-
tion of the act read as follows: 
That the holding of any person to service or labor under the 
system known as peonage is hereby declared to be unlawful, and 
the same is hereby abolished and forever prohibited in the Terri-
tory of New Mexico, or in any other Territory or State of the 
United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, 
or usages of the Territory of New Mexico, or of any other Terri-
tory or State of the United States, which have heretofore estab-
lished, maintained or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt 
shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly 
or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any 
persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or 
otherwise, be, and the same are hereby, declared null and void; 
and any person or persons who shall hold, arrest, or return, or 
cause to be held, arrested, or returned, or in any manner aid in 
the arrest or return of any person or persons to a condition of 
peonage, shall, upon conviction, be punished by fine not less than 
one thousand nor more than five thousand dollars, or by impris-
onment not less than one nor more than five years, or both, at the 
discretion of the court. 4 
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Clearly, this provision could have served as the basis for fed-
eral prosecution in peonage cases; it is unfortunate that it was a 
dead letter at the time that the system was developed. What the 
consequences might have been, had vigorous prosecution taken 
place in those formative years, is an open question, but one is led 
to suspect they might have been formidable. It is always easier to 
stop a practice before it has become entrenched by custom and 
social acceptance; the difficulty of doing so afterwards is clearly 
exemplified in the impotence of the whole array of the federal 
legal machinery in the area of peonage. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the fed-
eral government did begin to take an interest in the plight of the 
southern peon. The reasons for this sudden interest are lost in 
time, but a variety of suggestions have been put forward. First, 
the president of the United States was a Republican, and it was 
argued that his party had a vested interest in anything that 
would embarrass the Democratic South. (There had, of course, 
been Republican presidents before-a long line of them-but 
the charge was made.) In addition, the Progressive Movement 
was in full cry, and the evil of peonage was just the sort of sub-
ject which had an almost universal appeal to that nebulous and 
vaguely identifiable body of reformers. Ray Stannard Baker, a 
leading Progressive journalist, was writing articles on the subject 
(later to be collected in a highly popular book), and there was 
much agitation over lynchings of blacks in the South. Southern 
Progressives were also touched by the subject and began some 
quiet activities of their own. Finally, the wave of immigration to 
the United States had produced a new situation-whites were be-
ing made peons. Indeed, the assistant attorney general's Report 
on Peonage, published in 1908, deals largely with cases involv-
ing immigrant laborers (mostly jews). The Senate took up the 
cudgels in favor of the immigrants and initiated a study by the 
United States Immigration Commission. It is noteworthy that 
Assistant Attorney General Relative to Peonage Matters Charles 
W. Russell thought it appropriate to argue, "As I have already 
suggested, whether constitutional or not, and whether originally 
intended to be used as they are, these laws have become a trap 
for the enslavement of white workmen as well as black, and 
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ought to be repealed, or amended with that fact in view. Some of 
them are considered to have been passed to force negro laborers 
to work; but if so, they are now affecting other persons, and the 
States formerly depending upon negro laborers exclusively need 
twice as many hands, and are resorting to every means to obtain 
them from Europe, directly or indirectly." 5 In the absence of 
any compelling evidence to the contrary, one is led to conclude 
that it was the horrendous idea of white peonage which pro-
vided the final spur to federal interest in the area. 
Whatever the motivation, suddenly the peonage laws and 
practices of the South were under attack. The first attempt 
(which was something of a nonstarter) had already taken place 
in 1899, before the main thrust of federal action was under way. 
In that case, the United States district court judge examined the 
system of peonage as it existed in New Mexico and said that "no 
such system as this ever existed in Georgia. There could not be, 
therefore, in Georgia any such thing as holding persons under 
the system of peonage." He seemed shocked that such a sugges-
tion should have been made and declared that it would be a 
"perversion of this act to apply it to an ordinary restraint of per-
sonalliberty."6 As this case was not reported until many years 
later, however, it was not considered as a precedent in the inter-
pretation of the act. In fact, the federal officials in the early 
1900s felt they were breaking new ground. 
The leading light of the early antipeonage actions of the fed-
eral government was a pronounced anti-Populist, United States 
Judge Thomas G. Jones. A former governor of Alabama, who 
had beaten the Populist candidate in an election rife with 
charges of fraud (he had swept the Black Belt counties), Jones 
was a true patrician. In the debates in the Alabama suffrage con-
vention, he described his attitude towards blacks through an 
anecdote. It seems Robert E. Lee was once asked why he took 
such interest in the well-being of an apparently worthless sol-
dier. Lee replied that he did so "because he is under me." "The 
Negro race is under us," said Jones. "He is in our power. We are 
his custodians ... we should extend to him, as far as possible, all 
the civil rights that will fit him to be a decent and self-respecting, 
law-abiding and intelligent citizen .... If we do not lift them up, 
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they will drag us down." 7 In true Progressive (as opposed to 
Populist) tradition, Judge Jones combined his patronizing at-
titude with a sincere respect for the use of the law and the gov-
ernment to solve social ills. Following his instincts, he requested 
that agents of the United States Secret Service investigate and 
report on the extent of peonage in the district. This report 
caused the United States district attorney for the area to bemoan 
the situation and state that he had "lived in this state my entire 
life of thirty-seven years and I never comprehended until now 
the extent of the present method of slavery through this peon-
age system." 8 
In 1903 Judge Jones empaneled a grand jury, and in a striking 
charge, he defined the meaning of the law. After outlining the 
history of the New Mexican brand of peonage, he placed the 
Alabama system on a par with it. Voluntary contracts are valid 
only as long as they remain voluntary, and the moment one 
party tries to "withdraw, and then is coerced to remain and per-
form service against his will," the servitude has become peonage. 
Jones pointed out that the basic requirement was that the com-
pulsion be based on debt. It did not matter, however, whether a 
contract was made in consideration of a preexisting debt or a 
loan made at the time of the contract. The fact that a debtor 
might have signed a contract agreeing to such compulsion did 
not affect the legality of the actions, nor did the fact that the 
compulsion was not direct physical force but the use of the 
threat of law. Jones ruled that in cases of false accusation of 
crime (a common practice) where the accused laborer was told 
by an employer that his only escape from prosecution was 
through entering into a service contract, both the employer and 
the participating judge were liable. However, he did uphold as 
legal the practice of "confessing judgment," by which a defen-
dant pleaded guilty and entered into a contract to pay his fine 
and costs. 9 
Jones also laid down rules of proof for the jury. He rejected 
the "reasonable man" rule. (Would the force or threats used by 
the employer be sufficient to constitute coercion of a reasonable 
man under similar conditions?) Instead, in good patrician style, 
the judge reminded the jury that, "as all persons are not of like 
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courage and firmness, the court or jury ... must consider the 
situation of the parties, the relative inferiority or inequality be-
tween the person contracting to perform service and the person 
... [compelling] performance, and determine in view of all the 
circumstances whether the service was voluntary." 10 Jones was 
obviously afraid that the "reasonable man" test would prevent 
convictions in cases where patently absurd threats of prosecution 
had convinced blacks, ignorant of the true nature of the law, to 
sign or fulfill contracts. He also noted that the "custom and hab-
its" of a locality could not be used as a defense for offenders. 
As a conclusion to this impressive performance, the judge de-
clared one of the several Alabama peonage laws (a combination 
contract-enticement act) unconstitutional. "The laborer or rent-
er who once enters into a contract and breaches it, no matter 
how righteously, subjects himself during the whole term of the 
contract to risk of prosecution if he takes like employment with 
others ... [and this] impedes his right to work .... The law pro-
vides no means for determining the justice of his excuse, at any 
time, in any mode, in any tribunal, unless he first risks the pen-
alty of hard labor .... This is not required of any other freeman in the 
land, or exacted from any other debtor. It is a penalty imposed for 
debt." 11 
As a result of all of this, the grand jury found a large number 
of indictments, and "some convictions were had" (four persons 
were convicted, one pleaded guilty). 12 Although Jones had pro-
vided an admirable start in the interpretation of the act, his rul-
ing did not have any immediate or significantly widespread ef-
fect. This probably related to the fact that an early Florida case, 
United States v. Clyatt, which had been tried in 1902, was shortly 
to be decided by the United States Supreme Court. The gov-
ernment apparently was hesitant to push its prosecutions until 
that tribunal had ruled. 13 
The case of Clyatt v. United States was argued before the Su-
preme Court in December 1904. Clyatt had been convicted of 
"returning to peonage" two black laborers, whom he had ac-
cused of being in debt to him. 14 The basic defense consisted of 
three main points. First, Clyatt argued that the statute was in-
tended to apply specifically to the system of peonage as it had 
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existed in New Mexico. The history of the statute was traced, 
and great emphasis was put on the fact that the second part of 
the act had been directed specifically at "all persons in the mili-
tary and civil service in the Territory of New Mexico." 15 The 
second point was related to this same section: namely, that it was 
only in the territory of New Mexico that the act could apply to 
individual action, not supported by state law. If the state did not 
support the individual actions through an authorizing statute, 
there could be no federal charge-this was "private action." 
(This idea had, of course, been successfully used in the eviscera-
tion of the civil rights bills passed by Congress during Recon-
struction, on the grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not reach "private action." 16 Finally, Clyatt argued that there 
was no evidence that the laborers in the case had, in fact, been 
"returned to" peonage. All that had been proved was an unlawful 
arrest, an act with which Clyatt had not been charged. 
In March of 1905, Justice Brewer handed down the majority 
decision of the Supreme Court, and the defenders of peonage 
had won a Pyrrhic victory. Brewer denied that the act was lim-
ited in its extent; it operates "wherever the sovereignty of the 
United States extends." There was no distinction between volun-
tary and involuntary peonage, as "this implies simply a dif-
ference in the mode of origin, but none in the character of the 
servitude ... but peonage, however created is ... involuntary 
servitude." The difference between peonage and free labor lies 
in the fact that "in the latter case the debtor, though contracting 
to pay his indebtedness by labor or service ... and [although] 
subject ... to an action for damages for breach of that contract, 
can elect at any time to break it, and no law or force compels 
performance or continuance of that service." 17 
Brewer dismisses the second argument of the appellant by tak-
ing a remarkably Harlan-like position on the reach of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, which had, 
by expressly empowering Congress to enforce by appropriate 
legislation the prohibition against slavery and involuntary ser-
vitude, created an exception to the general rule, that the ordinary 
relations of individual to individual are subject to the control of 
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the states .... It is not open to doubt that Congress may enforce 
the Thirteenth Amendment by direct legislation ... [and] in the 
exercise of that power Congress has enacted these sections de-
nouncing peonage .... We entertain no doubt of the validity of 
this legislation, or of its applicability to the case of any person 
holding another in a state of peonage, and this whether there be 
municipal ordinance or state law sanctioning such holding. It operates 
directly on every citizen of the Republic, wherever his residence may 
be.ts 
Significantly, Brewer pointed out that "the basal fact of peon-
age" is debt. 19 Debt is the cord that binds the servant to his mas-
ter, and without this factor there is no peonage. This rule was to 
have serious implications for the future, but was not viewed as 
significantly weakening the government's position at the time. 20 
He then went on to clarify the meaning of the terms "holding, 
arresting and returning": if a laborer was held in peonage, ar-
rested with the intention of placing him in peonage or returned 
to peonage after having escaped from such condition, the law 
was violated. Having said this, however, Brewer then ruled that 
no evidence had been introduced to show that the laborers in 
question had ever previously been in bondage. If Clyatt had 
been charged with "arresting," the Court agreed that the convic-
tion would have been upheld. However, as presented, the in-
dictment was faulty, and the conviction was reversed. 
As might have been expected, Justice Harlan, never a man for 
indulging in technicalities, dissented vigorously. He argued that 
the accused had not objected to having the case sent to the jury 
(the point at which objections to the charge would ordinarily be 
raised), and essentially charged his colleagues with nit-picking 
"in a case like this, disclosing barbarities of the worst kind against 
these negroes." 21 
Although Clyatt went free (the two laborers whose testimony 
was the basis for the government's case mysteriously disap-
peared and were never heard of again), the government had 
made its case.22 The constitutionality of the act was established 
and its extent and meaning clarified. The prosecution of cases 
held in abeyance could now proceed apace. Indeed, for the de-
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fenders of the system, it appeared that "one more such victory 
and I am undone." 
Between 1905 and the landmark case of Bailey v. Alabama in 
1911, the Anti-Peonage Act was further defined and explicated 
in a variety of prosecutions at the District Court level. 23 In 
essence, the act was held to apply in all of the following cases: 
1. Whenever a debtor is held to perform service by coercion, 
whether that coercion consists of the threat of violence or of 
prosecution under "some apparent, but void, provision of 
law" 24 
2. Whenever an employer falsely pretends that another is guilty 
of a crime and offers to bribe a prosecutor or judge in order to 
induce a laborer to enter into a contract to reimburse the sum 
paid (or allegedly paid) 25 
3. Whenever an employer causes a servant to be arrested on a 
warrant procured "directly or indirectly by him," and "after 
incarceration of the servant, should go to the jail and procure 
his release after he had promised to return to the employment 
of the master to ... work out a debt" 26 
4. Whenever an employer falsely, or otherwise, accuses a laborer 
of crime in order that he may be convicted and either sen-
tenced to hard labor in the accuser's service, or fined and 
forced to work out his fine in the accuser's service 27 
5. Whenever a magistrate or police official is knowingly involved 
in an arrest or conviction for the purpose of returning or plac-
ing the accused in a condition of peonage.28 The act applies 
even if the officials in question are operating under a state or 
municipal law, and there is no sanctuary in their official 
status.29 
As a counterpoint, the act did not apply where the fear of 
coercion was self-engendered, or where a magistrate or police 
official did not have "guilty knowledge of the unlawful purpose 
of the arrest." 30 
Jones's discussion of the requirements of proof was also rein-
forced. Justice Swayne, in his charge to a grand jury, said: 
Many artful methods for evading the effect of this statute have 
been devised, but none of them will avail if the juries of this coun-
try will discharge their duties fearlessly and impartially. Where it 
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is found that a few hours after the servant is safely lodged in jail, 
the master appears and proceeds to detail to him the severe re-
sults of the prosecution pending against him, and his willingness 
to help him out of his difficulty if he will return to work, produc-
ing on the mind of the servant a condition which leaves him no 
choice but to return to his employment, the master is guilty of the 
crime .... You must regard all the conditions and circumstances 
surrounding the cases, and determine what the motive of the 
prosecution was, whether or not the master directly or indirectly 
caused or procured the arrest, and whether the legal proceedings 
were taken for the purpose of creating a condition of mind in the 
servant whereby little or no choice was left to him in returning to 
the employment ... it makes little difference what outward form 
the proceedings may take, if the intention of the master is ille-
gal. a' 
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Thus, with one Supreme Court ruling, and a variety of district 
court decisions, the initial push of the federal government on 
peonage was well under way. 
The first reactions of the state courts to this attack on the con-
stitutionality of their labor laws were protective ones. The de-
fense rested on a number of legal arguments. First, some of the 
states defended the contract laws as simple punishments for 
fraud. They denied that their purpose was punishment for 
breach and, as noted earlier, simply argued that the state had a 
clear right to punish swindlers and cheats.32 However, this was 
not the only arrow in the quiver. 
Another standard defense lay in the fact that many states out-
side the South had laws on the books which punished "any per-
son who breaks a contract of labor, having reasonable cause to 
believe that the probable consequence of doing so will be to 
endanger human life, cause grievous bodily injury, or expose 
valuable property to destruction." Although these statutes were 
intended to apply specifically to railroad switchmen and signal-
men, drawbridge operators, and the like, they were cited by the 
courts in the South to defend their agricultural contract laws. 33 
Legal experts had often defended the concept that "in the public 
interest, the violation of a contract may, in exceptional cases be 
punished." The courts now declared the violation of agricultural 
contracts to be an "extreme case" and therefore punishable.34 
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This concept had also been recognized in dicta in Clyatt. 35 The 
dissenting opinion in Ex parte Hollman states the position clearly: 
A very prevalent form of labor contract is the share system, in 
which the landowner furnishes land, stock, tools, seed and fer-
tilizers, in whole or in part, and the laborer undertakes to supply 
all the necessary labor, for which he is to receive an agreed por-
tion ... of the crop .... When the busy work time on the farm 
arrives, the laborer is generally in debt to the landowner for ad-
vances secured .... It is then that the dishonest laborer repudiates 
his obligation, and not only fraudulently deprives the owner of 
his property, but frequently brings disaster on the landowner's 
farming business .... The utter futility of mere civil remedies ... 
and the necessity for some remedy, no doubt prompted the act in 
question. 36 
Justice Jones in his charge to the grand jury had dealt with 
this subject admirably in 1903: 
Surely a train dispatcher, indicted for suddenly leaving the ser-
vice without giving orders necessary to prevent the clash of oppos-
ing trains upon a railroad, could not successfully plead, when de-
struction of life and property were brought about by his sudden 
leaving, that he could not be punished, because he did no more 
than breach a contract of service. In these and like cases, the crim-
inal law would be exerted not to compel performance, or to 
prevent quitting the service in a reasonable way, but because, by 
abandoning it in an unreasonable way, the employee has created a 
condition of affairs, the natural, direct and known result of which 
is to endanger life, health or limb, or to inflict grievous public 
injury. This act [the labor act in question] is not planned with any 
such purpose.37 
The final weapon upon which the state courts relied in these 
arguments supporting the laws, was to be found in a Supreme 
Court decision in 1897, revolving around the rights of seamen. 38 
As far back as 1790, statutes had entitled the master of a ship to 
procure a warrant for the arrest of any deserting seaman, and 
had provided for the imprisonment of such men for breach of 
contract. 39 These provisions of federal law (and the foreign 
treaties which provided for reciprocal assistance in such cases) 
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were challenged as unconstitutionally permitting involuntary 
servitude, prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Justice 
Henry Billings Brown upheld the law, stating that the "epithet 
'involuntary' does [not] attach to the word servitude continu-
ously ... [but only] at the inception of the servitude." The "in-
voluntary servitude" referred to in the amendment was in-
tended to be applicable only to "Mexican peonage and the 
Chinese coolie trade" and "was not intended to introduce any 
novel doctrine with respect to certain descriptions of servitude 
which have always been treated as exceptional," such as military 
service or apprenticeship. 40 
Brown's first point-that only servitude \lhich was involuntary 
at its inception was barred-was clearly faulty, and had it pre-
vailed no prosecutions for peonage could have taken place. The 
point was not essential to the decision, however, which could rest 
upon the "exceptional" nature of the employment. Even here 
Justice Harlan, whose service in defense of the broadest possible 
interpretation of the Civil War amendments was famous, dis-
sented thunderously. If this interpretation were to prevail, he 
stormed, "we may now look for advertisements, not for runaway 
servants as in the days of slavery, but for runaway seamen." The 
Court, he said, had added an exception to the amendment by 
'judicial legislation" which defeated the expressed will of Con-
gress. To do so in a case "relating to the liberty of man" was 
reminiscent of "monarchical and despotic governments." (Of 
course, the contract and enticement laws then being enforced 
were still productive of such advertisements "as in the days of 
slavery.") The dissent seemed to carry more weight than the 
majority opinion, for within a year the law was amended to apply 
only to desertion in foreign portsY 
In any case, the state courts continued to uphold the contract 
and enticement laws as valid exercises of state power. In Ala-
bama, Georgia, and Mississippi, particularly, the courts turned 
down appeal after appeal.42 In South Carolina, however, after 
the contract statute was declared unconstitutional by a federal 
court, it took only one year for the state courts to agree. 43 Per-
haps more significantly, the attempts at evading the federal court 
rulings began to get more sophisticated. Florida, immediately 
after the Clyatt decision had come down, amended its contract 
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law. Although the state law had not been specifically discussed 
in that case, the legislators could see which way the wind was 
blowing. Therefore, they reduced the penalties for contract 
violation from one thousand dollars to five hundred dollars in 
fines, and the imprisonment from one year to six months. 44 It 
is, of course, possible that a sudden surge of sympathy for the 
victims of the law had emerged in the legislature. On the other 
hand, the lower fines and penal terms put all such cases in the 
county judges' courts, where there was no requirement that the 
presiding justice have any legal training whatsoever. (Under 
the previous statute, the case had to be tried in a court de-
manding a minimum of a legal degree as a qualification for the 
presiding judge.) Thus, a possible declaration of unconstitution-
ality might have little effect upon the laymen enforcing the law. 
With the exception of the South Carolina case cited above and 
a similar action upon one of the numerous Alabama statutes, no 
other declarations of unconstitutionality were made by any state 
court of the South before 1911.45 Even in those cases, the decla-
rations followed similar statements by the lower federal courts. 
In short, while the federal government was wielding its "sword" 
to some effect, the "shield" was not being equally used. 
The classic test of the contract labor law took place in 1911, 
when the United States Supreme Court handed down its opin-
ion in Bailey v. Alabama.46 Oddly enough, the case did not 
essentially hinge upon the question of peonage, but rather on a 
presumptive evidence clause and a corollary rule of evidence. 
What had happened was fairly clear: the highest appellate courts 
in the South had been laying down relatively strict rules of proof 
in those cases where conviction under the "false pretenses" con-
tract laws had been appealed. The contracts had to be explicit: 
that is, "implied contracts" were not sufficient for prosecution, 
and the terms of the contract (pay, length of service, etc.) had to 
be spelled out. 47 This requirement may seem irrelevant when 
one considers that oral contracts were legally enforceable in 
many states, but the fact was that generally no one bothered to 
introduce evidence demonstrating the specificity of the contract 
at the trials. (This is probably understandable, since convictions 
seemed easy to get, and few cases were appealed.) 
It appears that while the higher courts would not declare the 
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acts in question unconstitutional, they often found a technical 
reason for overturning cases that reached them on appeal. As 
the individuals who were capable of making such appeals were 
usually white, this did not seem to alter the system as it affected 
blacks. Be that as it may, the state legislatures responded by add-
ing a new fillip to the contract laws. This was simply to add a 
proviso to the acts, making failure to complete the contract or 
refund the advance (without regard to the extent of labor per-
formed) "prima facie evidence of the intent to injure or de-
fraud."48 Addenda of this sort (see the Georgia act quoted 
in chapter 4, note 30) were adopted by many of the southern 
states. 49 The Alabama courts had laid down fairly strict rules 
of proof in 1891 (in Ex parte Riley, involving a white man who 
had bound out his son), and the legislature, after a few 
confirmatory cases, had responded with a "presumptive evi-
dence" emendation. 50 
The Alabama statute was the one finally tested in the Supreme 
Court. The facts in the case are fairly well known; a bare outline 
is presented here. 51 Alonzo Bailey, a black man, entered a con-
tract to perform services as a farm laborer for $12 a month. He 
received a $15 advance (to be deducted in monthly installments), 
but quit his job after working for one month and part of the 
next. Bailey was then indicted under the contract law, tried, con-
victed, and sentenced to 136 days at hard labor. (He was fined 
$30-this accounted for 20 days; the additional 116 days were 
added to his sentence for court costs and lawyers' fees.) With the 
help of interested Alabama Progressives, including a Montgom-
ery city court justice, William H. Thomas, the case was appealed, 
first to the Alabama Supreme Court and subsequently, after 
some setbacks, to the United States Supreme Court. 52 
When that Court handed down its decision in 1911, Justice 
Hughes spoke for a seven-man majority. He "at once dismiss[ed] 
from consideration the fact that the plaintiff in error is a black 
man ... [since] the statute on its face makes no racial discrimina-
tion. No question of a sectional character is presented, and we 
may view the legislation in the same manner as if it had been 
enacted in New York or in Idaho.53 This outlook may seem ab-
surd on its face, given the history of such statutes, but the Court 
was in no mood to listen to allegations of the discriminatory ap-
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plication or effects of outwardly nondiscriminatory laws. Socio-
logical jurisprudence had made its first inroads with the "Bran-
deis Brief," but such factual evidence was not accepted in cases 
involving the civil rights of Negroes for another generation. 
Thus, the "equal protection of the laws" argument was not con-
sidered. 
Hughes then went on to consider the "presumptive evidence" 
clause of the statute. He noted that the rule laid down in Ex parte 
Riley had shown that as the intent of the accused can rarely be 
made clear by direct evidence, the jury must ascertain intent 
through inferences from the facts and circumstances developed 
by the proof. In the absence of such inferences, the jury is not 
'justified in indulging in mere unsupported conjectures, specu-
lations or suspicions as to intentions." However, the Alabama 
Supreme Court had declared, "It is no doubt true that the 
difficulty in proving the intent no doubt suggested the amend-
ment ... to the statute." Hughes noted that "the asserted 
difficulty of proving the intent to injure or defraud is thus made 
the occasion for dispensing with such proof." Further, the courts 
of Alabama enforced a rule of evidence which denied the ac-
cused the right to testify "as to his uncommunicated motives, 
purpose, or intention" in such cases. 54 
The sum of all this, in Hughes's eyes, was to make "the case 
the same in effect as if the statute had made it a criminal act to 
leave the service .... To say that he has been found guilty of an 
intent to injure or defraud his employer, and not merely for 
breaking his contract ... is a distinction without a difference to 
Bailey." He dismissed the argument of the Alabama court that 
the jury was not controlled by the presumption-that is, that 
they could find the accused innocent even without rebuttal of 
the presumption. For Hughes, the fact that the "statute au-
thorizes the jury to convict" in such circumstances was enough to 
convert it into a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment's pro-
hibition against involuntary servitude. 
We cannot escape the conclusion that, although the statute in its 
term is to punish fraud, still its natural and inevitable effect is to 
expose to conviction for crime those who simply fail or refuse to 
perform contracts for personal service in liquidation of a debt; 
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and judging its purpose by its effect, that it seeks in this way to 
provide the means of compulsion through which performance of 
such service may be secured .... The words involuntary servitude 
have a "larger meaning than slavery." ... What the state may not 
do directly it may not do indirectly. If it cannot punish the servant 
as a criminal for the mere failure or refusal to serve ... it is not 
permitted to accomplish the same result by creating a statutory 
presumption which, upon proof of no other fact, exposes him to 
conviction and punishment. 55 
Surprisingly the "Great Dissenter," Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, chose to exercise his predilection in this case. Holmes 
simply argued that the statute was no more than a punishment 
for fraud. It did not produce peonage, which required "bodily 
compulsion" by the master. The Thirteenth Amendment did 
not abolish labor contracts, and if an employer might use the 
threat of a civil suit for damages to induce the workman to per-
form service, why could not the state aid in that inducement by 
the imposition of a fine? Both have the same purpose-why 
prefer one to the other? Adding criminal liability to civil liability: 
simply intensifies the legal motive for doing right; it does not 
make the laborer a slave .... I do not blink the fact that the liabil-
ity to imprisonment may work as a motive ... that ... may induce 
the laborer to keep on when he would like to leave .... But it does 
not strike me as an objection to a law that it is effective. If the 
contract is one that ought not to be made, prohibit it. But if it is a 
perfectly fair and proper contract, I can see no reason why the 
state should not throw its weight on the side of performance. 56 
Hughes had argued that the fact that Bailey had worked for 
more than a month showed good faith; Holmes ignored this ar-
gument and stated that "if a man should receive an advance on a 
contract overnight, and leaves the next morning, is that not 
presumptive evidence of fraud?" (Both sides ignored the fact 
that no evidence had been introduced to show that Bailey had 
ever been paid his wages; that is, the odds were that he had just 
about paid off his debt.) It is true, said Holmes, that the statute 
was in more general terms than that, but this was only significant 
if we assumed "that this law is not administered as it would be in 
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New York, and that juries will act with prejudice against the la-
boring man. For prima facie evidence is only evidence, and as 
such may be held by the jury insufficient to make out guilt." 5 7 
Thus, the statute, even with the Alabama rule of evidence, was 
constitutional. 
It is difficult to see how this opinion fits into the general pic-
ture we have of Justice Holmes. He seems contemptuous of the 
majority's claim that they had ignored racial and sectional fac-
tors in making their decision. Had he demanded evidence that 
the law was administered unfairly, it might have been under-
standable. However, we know that Holmes was bored silly by his 
first contact with the "Brandeis Brief'; he had also said, "I hate 
facts." 5 8 That being so, this opinion seems to be a legalistic exer-
cise for its own sake. Holmes, it is true, did have great respect for 
the powers of the states, but (as his later opinions show) not to 
the point of overlooking gross abuses of those powers in regard 
to individual rights. He is undoubtedly correct when he notes 
that a similar decision would not have been likely if the law in 
question had been on the books in New York; the majority was 
really fudging the issue, to avoid the Fourteenth Amendment 
question among other reasons. One is still struck, however, by 
the empty rhetoric of Holmes's ritualism in this case. 
In 1914 the Supreme Court dealt with its last peonage case of 
this period, U.S. v. Reynolds. This case revolved around the 
southern practice of"confessingjudgment"-the criminal surety 
system. These are newer phrases for our old friend, the private 
convict-labor contract, which enabled a convicted criminal to 
work out his fine in the employ of one who paid his fine. Ala-
bama, out in the open with its laws, had gone one step further 
than the other states that countenanced this practice and had 
enacted a surety statute. This law made "failure to perform a 
contract with surety ... [after] confessing judgment for fine and 
costs," a crime, punishable by a fine of "not less than the amount 
of damages which the party contracting with him has suffered 
by such failure or refusal." 59 Of course, this new amount was, 
in practice, simply added to the old, and the laborer could then 
make a new contract with either his old employer or a different 
claimant for his services. 
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It was argued, even by Progressives like Ray Stannard Baker, 
that the surety system enabled the black to avoid jail through the 
kindly intervention of some (white) patron. 60 Baker goes so far 
as to argue that the worst aspect of the system was that it 
encouraged blacks to think that the laws did not really apply to 
them, as they never went to jail for petty crime. In actual opera-
tion these laws served to place the "confessed' felon into a state 
of permanent bondage. 
The legal defense of the statute lay in a simple premise-
namely that the surety had become the agent of the state in ex-
tracting from the convict the fine he owed to the state. The labor 
thus performed, even though coerced, was punishment for 
crime, not forced labor for debt. Because "involuntary ser-
vitude" as a punishment for crime was specifically excluded 
from the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, the system 
was constitutional. 
On the other hand, the state had no interest in the contract; in 
fact the Alabama Supreme Court said, "The state is in no sense a 
party to the contract, it permitted the making of the contract and 
provides a punishment for its breach." 61 Further, the state does 
not proceed against the prisoner for its fine, but rather for the 
damages suffered by the employer. The nature of the labor per-
formed was not prescribed by the statute, nor was it supervised 
either by or for the benefit of the state. 
The Supreme Court brushed aside the arguments of the de-
fense. The statute was, in the court's mind, nothing more than a 
means of ensuring performance of a contract of service. The 
relation of debtor to creditor was created, and punishment was 
provided for breach of a contract based on that relation. "Com-
pulsion of such service by the constant fear of imprisonment 
under the criminal laws renders the work compulsory." 52 
Furthermore, had the convict chosen to work out his fine in 
the county workhouse, he would have earned seventy-five cents 
per day; in the instant case, he had contracted to work for six 
dollars a month. Since the new fine for breach could be worked 
out under a new surety contract, a breach of this latest contract 
would again be prosecuted in a similar manner. Thus, "under 
pain of recurring prosecution, the convict may be kept at labor 
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to satisfy the demands of his employer. The convict is thus kept 
chained tc an ever-turning wheel of servitude to discharge the 
obligation which he has incurred." 63 
Justice Holmes, concurring separately, was malleable but un-
repentant. He reiterated that there was no reason a state could 
not call such actions fraud, but agreed that people are "impul-
sive" and will "relieve present pain" by engaging to suffer future 
agonies. Simply to prevent this, he rather condescendingly 
agreed to the decision, if not the reasoning, of the Court. 64 
Alabama had gone further than other states in promulgating 
this particular law. Although the supportive law itself was 
unique, the system was widespread and it seemed to work well 
without the aid of a surety law. The private convict-labor con-
tract, as noted earlier, had been around for quite some time. 
What might have happened to the system had extensive chal-
lenges been made to its standard operation is an interesting, if 
unanswerable question. For with this case, the Court got out of 
the peonage business for almost thirty years. The first thrust 
against peonage by the federal government was over. 
6 
After Bailey 
Thus it appears that Cook was arrested ... solely on account of his 
failure to comply with his contract . ... Even if this is true ... 
defendants cannot be convicted ... of peonage. 
Taylor v. U.S. (1917) 
The decision in Bailey v. Alabama had been hailed as a marked 
step forward in the battle against peonage. By Ray Stannard 
Baker it was seen as a second Dred Scott case, a start for a great 
push against an obnoxious practice. It was confidently expected 
that similar statutes on the books of other states would now be 
declared invalid and that sinister operation of the peonage sys-
tem would soon cease. 1 
However, several factors militated against this happy result. 
First among these was the fact that only one sort of peonage law 
had been declared unconstitutional-the sort containing the 
presumptive evidence clause. A state that dropped this clause, or 
did not have it, could still prosecute debtors for accepting ad-
vances fraudulently. (As an additional fillip, since the Alabama 
rule of evidence regarding the defendant's testimony had played 
a significant part in the Bailey decision, the state courts could still 
distinguish their statutes from the Alabama law on that basis.) 
Further, the only sort of peonage which had been attacked 
was that which involved debt, "the basal fact of peonage" in the 
narrow definition given to it by the Supreme Court. There were 
other sorts of forced labor, closely akin to this, which were not 
covered by this definition. Assistant Attorney General Russell 
had anticipated this problem as far back as 1907 and had 
suggested passage of a new law forbidding "involuntary ser-
vitude and all attempts at it," abandoning use of the word peon-
age altogether. 2 This advice had not been taken by the Congress. 
No attack had been made on the labor-enticement laws either, 
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and these remained untouched by the flurry of federal anti-
peonage activities. 
Perhaps more important, the push behind the federal gov-
ernment's interest in the area was dissipated. With the election 
of Woodrow Wilson as president, the emphasis placed on peon-
age by Roosevelt and Taft was shifted to other areas. Complaints 
of peonage were still received, but few prosecutions were 
brought. It is doubtful that Georgia, for instance, would have 
been able to "finesse" the Bailey decision without the indifference 
of the federal government. Perhaps the neglect was "benign" in 
nature, from the government's point of view; a noncontempo-
rary can never know. Certainly, the effect was not-from the 
viewpoint of the helpless black laborer. 
None of this should be taken to indicate that the decisions of 
the Supreme Court had had no effect. Alabama's laws had, of 
course, been struck down. Within months the legislature had 
placed a new law on the books, but without a "presumptive evi-
dence" section. South Carolina, in an apparent response to 
Bailey, dropped its presumption clause. In Mississippi and North 
Carolina the state courts declared their respective laws uncon-
stitutional. 3 It should be clear that none of these actions really 
reduced peonage; they simply made it more difficult to prove 
fraudulent intent in the few situations where both trial and ap-
peal took place. The threat of trial was usually sufficient, and 
there was almost absolute certainty of conviction at the trial 
court level. If the rules of proof set down by the state supreme 
courts had been applied, of course, most of these cases would 
have been dismissed. But the likelihood of appeal (and reversal) 
was so slight, given the circumstances of the accused, that no one 
seemed to worry about it. However, these states did, at least 
formally, comply with the rulings of the Supreme Court. 
Georgia and Florida, on the other hand, were almost openly 
defiant. Georgia's contract law was essentially on a par with that 
of Alabama. 4 It contained a similar presumptive evidence clause 
and was otherwise on all fours with it. The Georgia courts had, 
of course, vehemently defended this law in the past.5 Now, the 
question was, how would they react to the Bailey decision? 
In the first case to deal with the question, Latson v. Wells, the 
Georgia Supreme Court was able to escape without a hand being 
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laid on it. The Bailey decision was raised by the plaintiff in error, 
but the courts had a defense tactic available. First, the court de-
scribed the act as one intended only to punish fraud, and, there-
fore, clearly free of the taint put on the Alabama statute by the 
Supreme Court. Further, the Bailey case had hinged upon the 
presumptive evidence clause. Georgia, it was conceded, did have 
a similar clause, but its constitutionality was not relevant, as Lat-
son had pleaded guilty to the charges, intending to test the law 
itself. Since the facts had never gone to the jury, the constitu-
tionality of the second clause was not in question. The two sec-
tions were dearly separable, said the court; one set out the na-
ture of the offense; the second, the rules of proof to be used 
in a trial. Latson could not "properly contend that he pleaded 
guilty because if he had gone to trial, an unconstitutional act re-
lating to a rule of evidence would have been used against him," 
for, if the rule were unconstitutional, "it is presumed the court 
trying him would have so dedared." 6 Heaving a sigh of relief, 
the justices confirmed the conviction. 
In Wilson v. State, however, no such easy way out was pre-
sented. The accused had been tried, using the presumption sec-
tion of the act. Furthermore, like Alabama, Georgia also had 
a rule about the testimony of the defendant in such cases. It did 
not prevent him from testifying about his motives, as in Bailey; it 
prevented him from testifying altogether. 7 If the Georgia law was 
to be sustained this time, the court would have to work to sustain 
it. Yet it had, it seems, little difficulty in meeting the challenge. 
As a start, the court reiterated its earlier interpretation of the 
meaning of the first section: that it was intended only to punish 
fraud and was dearly constitutional. As an additional precedent, 
of course, it now used the Latson case. Again, using Latson, the 
entire second section was declared a mere "rule of evidence" and 
thereby wholly severable from the first. 8 Therefore, even should 
this latter section, at some time in the future, be declared invalid, 
it would have no effect on the former, which could "stand inde-
pendently of the latter." Having covered the bases in case of a 
future United States court reversal, the Georgia court now pro-
ceeded to uphold the second section. Ignoring Hughes's stric-
tures in Bailey, the court argued that there was no reason why 
the state could not prescribe the elements of proof to be used in 
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a trial. The court cited a sentence from Hughes's opinion, but 
pointedly ignored the fact that he had demolished that argu-
ment in the next three paragraphs. What had been a "straw 
man" for Hughes, became gospel in Wilson v. State. The discus-
sion in Bailey of the Alabama rule of evidence, although not basic 
to the decision, now bore bitter fruit. The presumption clause 
was therefore ruled valid, unless there was a similar rule of evi-
dence attached to it. 
Since Georgia did have a similar rule, the problem of distin-
guishing Bailey now arose. (It had been mentioned only briefly in 
the major portion of the opinion.) The court proceeded to do so. 
"In the first place, the Alabama statute provided that 'Any per-
son who with intent to injure or defraud his employer,' etc." The 
Georgia statute punished only those who intended to defraud; 
"We do not stop to discuss whether the mere attempt to injure 
may be different from the intent to defraud,'' the court declared, 
but it did stop to make it a distinguishable point. 9 Secondly, the 
Alabama statute gave half the fine to the employer; the Georgia 
statute did not. A truthful if wholly insignificant point, it was 
not discussed in Bailey. Finally, the court declared that the 
essence of the Bailey decision rested on the Alabama rule that 
barred testimony on intent by the accused. The Georgia rule did 
not permit the accused to testify at all, but he was permitted to 
use the old common law right to make a statement, not under 
oath, to the court. 10 This statement was to have "such force as 
the jury may think right to give it and 'they may believe it in 
preference to the sworn testimony in the case.'" If this last line (a 
quotation from Bailey) sounds familiar, it should be remembered 
that Hughes had found himself "not impressed with the argu-
ment that ... the jury is not controlled by the presumption, if 
unrebutted, and still may find the accused not guilty." 11 The 
Georgia court, however, apparently was impressed by its own 
reasoning and declared the statute distinguishable and valid. 12 
It seems doubtful that anyone expected this juridical pap to 
stand up in the Supreme Court. The case notes call the approach 
"interesting," but question whether it could stand, considering 
the nature of Justice Hughes's opinion in Bailey. 13 The time and 
effort put in by the Georgia court to declare the two portions of 
the statute severable indicate that even the justices themselves 
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held out no great hope for their ruling. The ruling remained in 
force for thirty years. Wilson was never appealed to the federal 
courts, and the Georgia statute was safe. 
In Florida, on the other hand, the legislature simply defied 
both the federal and the state courts-and won out by sheer per-
sistence. It is true that, after the early Florida peonage cases, the 
legislature had dropped its contract-labor laws from the books. 
However, in 1913 a new statute was passed. It tried to take the 
Bailey decision into account, at least as far as the presumption 
clause went, but it did so abominably. In the first place, its com-
position was so careless that it seemed to have been written on 
the back of an old envelope or some other piece of scrap paper, 
for it contained such phrases as "fail or refuse to pay for the 
money ... received." 14 Secondly, it tried to make the failure to 
fulfill a labor contract presumptive evidence of guilt without say-
ing it in so many words. This statute came before the Florida 
Supreme Court four years after passage in Goode v. Nelson, and 
that body had no difficulty in wiping it off the books. The court, 
citing Bailey and Clyatt, declared that the act did not punish 
fraud, but rather refusal to perform service. It was, therefore, 
on all fours with the Alabama statute invalidated in Bailey and 
violative of "the organic law"-that is, the United States Con-
stitution. 15 The court distinguished attacks on real fraud, such as 
cases of embezzlement, from criminal punishment for simple 
breach of contract-in brief, a model opinion in the circum-
stances. 
The legislature was not to be denied, however, and passed 
another law in 1919. This time it dropped all pretense and 
virtually copied the Alabama statute. Section 1, however, did not 
include any reference to a refusal to perform service, it simply 
described a fraudulent receipt of advances, "under and by rea-
son of a contract or promise to perform labor." 16 Section 2 con-
tained the usual prima facie evidence section, resurrected from 
the act dropped after the Clyatt decision, and on a par with the 
statute revoked in Bailey. 
When this act was challenged in 1922, it seemed to stand little 
chance of survival since four of the five justices of the Florida 
Supreme Court then sitting had participated in the earlier case 
of Goode v. Nelson in 1917_17 Any such conjectures proved to be 
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premature, however, for in Phillips v. Bell, the court upheld the 
statute. First the justices indulged themselves in citing some 
supposedly significant distinctions between the Florida and 
Alabama statutes. After this ritual they declared that the two 
sections of the act were clearly separable. They did not even at-
tempt to defend the latter section (in fact they gave every indica-
tion that it was unconstitutional), but declined to rule upon it. 
"As none of the testimony introduced in County Judge's Court is 
brought here ... there is nothing on record to show that in the 
trial, the rule of evidence [the prima facie clause] laid down in 
Section 2 was applied." 18 Thus, since there was nothing to show 
that "satisfactory proof of a fraudulent scheme was not ad-
duced," the court could duck the issue of the validity of the sec-
ond section. 19 The conviction of Phillips was upheld and the 
statute stood until 1944. 
Both Phillips and Goode were unanimous decisions-how the 
same personnel could reach such diverse conclusions on the val-
idity of reasonably similar statutes is something of a mystery. 
Was it simply the persistence of the legislature? The rapidly 
building evidence of federal indifference? Had political pres-
sures on the justices built up over the years? Whatever the rea-
sons, the reversal was complete, and Florida joined Georgia in 
defying the Supreme Court in words as well as substance. The 
maneuvers of the Florida legislature in regard to the qualifica-
tions of judges sitting on contract-labor cases should be recalled. 
This sort of judicial activity was the exception, not the rule. In 
most of the South, the appellate courts either reluctantly fol-
lowed the lead of the Supreme Court and declared peonage laws 
unconstitutional, or so modified the laws under challenge as to 
bring them into line with the Constitution through judicial 
amendment. In Louisiana the courts tried to put off meeting the 
challenge for some time, and in this they were aided by a pecul-
iarity of state law. The appellate jurisdiction of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court was limited to two classes of criminal cases, one 
"whenever the punishment of death or imprisonment at hard 
labor may be inflicted," and the other whenever "a fine exceeding 
three hundred dollars, or imprisonment exceeding six months, 
is actually imposed." 20 Thus, unless the trial judge exceeded 
those limits of punishment in his sentence, declared the law un-
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constitutional, or quashed the indictment himself, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court could avoid such issues. As no trial judge had 
done any of these things up to 1918, the contract-labor statute 
still was untouched at that time.21 However, during that year two 
justices, Judge W. W. Bailey of the Seventeenth Judicial District 
and Judge W. S. Rownd of the Twenty-fifth, quashed indict-
ments brought under the contract-labor statute. 22 For some rea-
son, perhaps the double-barreled nature of the attack, the state 
appealed, and the Louisiana Supreme Court had to face the is-
sue. Once forced to this extreme, the court saw no alternative to 
declaring the statute unconstitutional. Citing Bailey, an admira-
bly brief opinion reversed the earlier controlling case, State v. 
Murray, and invalidated the act.23 
In brief, except in Georgia, Florida, and parts of North Caro-
lina, the contract-labor laws had to operate on the basis of fraud-
ulent intent and without the presumptive evidence clause. 24 On 
the other hand, the enticement statutes had never undergone a 
serious challenge. They were brought to the appellate courts in 
the post-Bailey period, but their constitutionality was always up-
held.25 Ten states of the South had enticement statutes on their 
books in this period, and they were unique to the region. 26 
Although the state courts upheld the constitutionality of the 
enticement laws, they followed the now familiar pattern of treat-
ing those cases that reached the appellate level with great cau-
tion. In two states the statutes were essentially amended by judi-
cial construction. In South Carolina the question was raised in 
Shaw v. Fisher. 27 An employee of the plaintiff, a cropper named 
Carver, had left the plantation after five months of labor and 
had subsequently been hired by the defendant (and others in the 
community). Carver had signed a contract to work for a year, 
and the defendant had been successfully sued for damages in 
the lower court for committing the common law tort of employ-
ing or harboring a runaway servant. 28 The case revolved around 
the question of whether a subsequent employer (or harborer) of 
such a servant was liable even if the termination of service had 
been a voluntary and independent act on the part of the laborer. 
Both statute law and a long line of precedents supported such 
claims of liability. However, the South Carolina Supreme Court, 
after a review of Bailey and Clyatt, declared that the Thirteenth 
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and Fourteenth amendments had "superseded" and annulled all 
statutory or common law in conflict with them. Thus the com-
mon law had been modified to bar actions in cases where no 
enticement had taken place. As long as the termination of ser-
vice by the laborer was voluntary, the second employer was free 
to hire him without threat of legal redress by the original em-
ployer.29 
In Mississippi the statutory law underwent similar judicial 
emendation. The controlling case had been Armistead v. Chatters, 
in which the enticement statute had been upheld and its punitive 
provisions liberally applied against the subsequent employer.30 
In Beale v. Yazoo Yarn Mill, however, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court required that proof of actual enticement must be shown in 
order to convict, and thus, in 1921, distinguished Armistead. Five 
years later the court added a demand that knowledge of the la-
borer's previous contract must be proved. Finally, in Thompson v. 
Box, the Armistead case was overruled.31 Citing Bailey, the court 
held that unless a strict and "reasonable" construction were 
placed on the statute, it might be in conflict with the United 
States Constitution. If the Armistead precedent were followed, 
"the darkies in the case at bar," having abandoned their service, 
would find "the hand of every man" against them, and would be 
forced to "stay or starve." This might be seen as a form of slav-
ery, and the statute could then be put in jeopardy. It was, in the 
court's mind, "our duty to uphold a statute, if possible, by plac-
ing a reasonable construction thereon which would render said 
statute harmonious with both the federal and state constitutions . 
. . . The construction we have placed upon the statute leaves it 
on our books, freed from constitutional objection." 32 
It was, of course, equally true (if unstated) that such construc-
tion essentially permitted the law to operate in the real world just 
as it had done in the past. The statute remained on the books; it 
read just as it had before. The likelihood that local justices of the 
peace or laborers (or employers for that matter) would be aware 
of such judicial legislation was slim indeed. Thus the court had 
successfully manipulated the enticement statute into a safe ref-
uge from constitutional attack, while enabling the coercion to 
continue as usual except where decisions were appealed. Fur-
ther, the laws themselves were only statements of the unwrit-
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ten rules of the game, which gave a social stigma to those who 
hired the laborers of another; the code of the planter forbade 
it.33 These judicial emendations of the law provided relief only 
for those select few who could reach the higher courts; they did 
little for the average farm laborer. 
Despite the general indifference to peonage, there were sev-
eral exposes of the practice which drew widespread publicity. 
The most spectacular of these was the infamous "murder farm" 
trial in Jasper County, Georgia. Two federal agents had been 
investigating charges of peonage at the plantation of John Wil-
liams, a Georgia planter. 34 Williams specialized in using the 
criminal surety system to provide himself with cheap labor. 
After the agents left his farm, Williams (quite understandably, 
since he ran a brutal slave farm) feared possible federal prosecu-
tion for peonage. He therefore silenced the potential witnesses 
against him (his peons) by the simplest of means-he had them 
murdered. (Farmer Williams was unduly alarmed, for the fed-
eral agents had been convinced by his "frankness" and reported 
the charges unfounded.) The subsequent trial (by the state) on 
murder charges, produced sensational headlines and revela-
tions. After Williams was convicted of murder, Hugh M. Dorsey, 
a former governor of Georgia, published a pamphlet delineating 
southern lawlessness towards the black laborer. It was a stunning 
expose of peonage, lynchings, and so forth. 35 Although the trial 
itself had brought forth much popular outcry against an isolated 
instance of brutality and peonage, this sort of general attack on 
the practice produced a wholly different reaction. Dorsey was 
vilified as a slanderer and a villain who "defiles his mother-
Georgia."36 The pamphlet, and the expose, soon disappeared 
into limbo. 
The last major incident of the twenties bringing peonage to 
public attention was the Mississippi flood of 1927. The rising 
waters forced hundreds of thousands of refugees to take shelter 
in emergency camps all along the river delta. The relief efforts 
were coordinated by the then secretary of commerce, Herbert 
Hoover, with the assistance of the American Red Cross and simi-
lar agencies. 37 Before the flood waters had subsided, the camps 
had become peonage centers for the blacks. Compelled to live in 
unbelievable conditions, they became a source of forced labor 
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for anyone who wanted them. They, and they alone, had to work 
on the levees, but more significantly, the National Guard also 
forced them to work for plantation owners and others. The "re-
lief" camps became employment agencies for the agricultural 
entrepreneur. Although the conditions were investigated (by a 
Colored Advisory Commission), the report was suppressed. The 
state and federal agencies involved worked hand in hand to 
maintain "the system," and only the rather impotent and pa-
thetic outrage of the NAACP caused the slightest upset. 
In the thirties, there appeared a variety of exposes of black 
sharecropping and tenantry, but most of these were more 
sociological than legal in nature. 38 They did expose the condi-
tions of southern agriculture, however, and made clear the need 
for legal action, particularly on the part of the federal govern-
ment. 
Such prodding was clearly necessary, for in the Department of 
Justice, once a hotbed of antipeonage activity, the attitude to-
wards peon masters seemed to be live and let live. The Georgia 
"murder farm" incident was typical; government agents had in-
vestigated the complaint and reported it unjustified. The fact 
that the very threat of the investigation had caused the planta-
tion owner to murder eleven potential witnesses against him was 
embarrassing, but it seemed to cause no great change in the de-
partment's operations. This general laxity seems to go back to 
the Wilson era, when southern influence had become more 
noticeable. It is in this period that the short-lived federal interest 
in peonage was blunted and de-emphasized. Clearly, Wilson's 
administration had little desire to embarrass its southern allies. 
The special peonage section of the Justice Department was al-
lowed to lie fallow and eventually disappear. Further, the 
severest judicial blow to the government's attack on peonage also 
occurred in this period, in Taylor v. United States, with the appar-
ent acquiescence of the administration. 39 
The facts of the case were simple. They involved a "young, 
white man" named Willie Cook. (This is one of the rare instances 
in which all parties in the case were white, which perhaps ex-
plains why the case was appealed.) Cook went to a farmer named 
J. G. Taylor and borrowed thirteen dollars from him in order to 
get married. At the same time, he signed a contract to labor for 
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Taylor for a period of one year at the rate of ten dollars per 
month. (Even in those days, this was an incredibly low wage.) 
Cook worked for two months and then, finding himself unable 
to live on his salary, went to see his father-in-law. The two men 
went to Taylor in order to try to free the young husband from 
the contract. Taylor at first declined, but then agreed to release 
him if he would pay back the loan and an additional twenty-five 
dollars for "damages." Before any payment was made, however, 
Taylor went to a local magistrate, one Ioor Hayes, and got him 
to write a letter to Cook which threatened prosecution if he 
failed to return to work. Hayes told the two men, when they 
came to see him, that he could do nothing for them; they must 
"fix it up with Taylor." After some discussion, an agreement was 
reached. Cook pleaded guilty to violation of section 492 of the 
South Carolina Criminal Code: "Any person who shall contract 
with another to render ... personal service of any kind, and 
shall thereafter fraudulently, or with malicious intent to injure 
his employer, fail or refuse to render such service as agreed 
upon, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor." 40 
Hayes accepted twenty-five dollars in payment from Cook's 
father-in-law and the matter seemed closed. However, five days 
later, Hayes issued a warrant for Cook's arrest and announced to 
the distraught defendant that he must either work for Taylor or 
serve "on the chain gang for the rest of the year." (This double-
cross was probably a result of the fact that Hayes did not turn 
over the money to Taylor but considered it a fine.) Cook refused 
and was sentenced to thirty days at hard labor. At the end of this 
period, Hayes announced that, although the contract was for a 
year, the wages were paid monthly, and he considered the con-
tract a monthly one. Therefore he would issue a fresh warrant 
every month, with a similar sentence, unless Cook returned to 
Taylor's farm. At this point, the federal government intervened 
and tried both Taylor and Hayes for violation of the Anti-
Peonage Act ("returning . . . to a condition of peonage") and 
conspiracy to do soY They were convicted, but appealed to the 
Circuit Court, which promptly overturned the convictions. 
The court found that there was no element of debt in the case, 
and debt was "the basal fact" of peonage.42 It was conceded that 
part of Taylor's original claim was based on the debt of thirteen 
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dollars, but the court found that this debt had been extinguished 
by the payment of twenty-five dollars to Magistrate Hayes. Al-
though Hayes himself had treated this sum as a fine and even-
tually turned it over to the county treasurer, the justices found 
that Hayes, in that instance, had merely acted "as the agent of 
Taylor" in accepting the sum. Thus, the subsequent conviction 
and sentencing of Cook had been purely on the basis of his fail-
ure to fulfill his contract. (The fact that this had been either an 
unconstitutional application of the law, or the application of an 
unconstitutional law, was not considered germane to the case.) 
"An obligation to work, we think, cannot be reasonably con-
strued to mean a debt as contemplated by the peonage statute." 
Even if Hayes had entered into some agreement with Taylor 
to force Cook to work for him, he was not liable to prosecution, 
"inasmuch as it clearly appears that ... Cook had paid every cent 
of the money that he owed Taylor." 43 The defendants might be 
guilty of something, the court was not sure what, but they were 
not guilty of peonage. 
This was a split decision, the court dividing two to one Q ustice 
Woods dissented). The reasoning of the majority seemed a bit 
shaky and open to challenge. However, the efforts of United 
States Attorney Francis H. Weston, who had argued the case 
before the Circuit Court, to appeal, were unavailing. President 
Wilson's solicitor general, john W. Davis, scotched this plan, say-
ing that a "technicality," whose nature he did not state, pre-
vented appeal.44 The extremely narrow definition of peonage 
given in Taylor was thus ensconced as a valid precedent-not so 
significant in terms of law as it proved to be in offering an excuse 
for federal agents to dismiss complaints as unfounded. 
Justice (both in the sense of the Department and of the con-
cept) was no longer much concerned with the practice of peon-
age. To be sure, there are a scattering of federal indictments and 
convictions in the thirty years after Bailey, but they are the rare 
exceptions to the rule of indifference. However, as the thirties 
drew to a close, new pressures caused both a revival of federal 
interest and a resurrection of some Civil War statutes, resulting 
in a second thrust against peonage. 
7 
The Civil Rights 
Section 
If such statutes have ever on even one occasion been put to a wor-
thier use in the records of any state court, it has not been called to 
our attention. 
Pollock v. Williams (1944) 
Shortly after his appointment as attorney general of the United 
States in 1939, Frank Murphy announced the establishment of a 
special unit in the Criminal Division of the Department of Jus-
tice. The Civil Liberties Unit was given the responsibility to "di-
rect, supervise and conduct prosecutions of violations of the 
provisions of the Constitution or Acts of Congress guaranteeing 
civil rights to individuals." 1 The creation of this unit was the 
result of a period of internecine warfare within the department 
-a tale too complicated for inclusion here. The new unit was 
placed under the direction of Henry A. Schweinhaut, who had 
been a leading light in the unsuccessful (but significant) prosecu-
tions in the Harlan County Labor Trial. The unit's title was soon 
changed to the Civil Rights Section (CRS). 
One of the first tasks assigned to the CRS was to examine and 
study the legal problems arising from civil rights statutes, and 
one of the first issues listed for review was peonage. 2 The section 
was determined to attack the problems of forced labor, but in 
order to do so it had to clarify the legal tools with which it could 
work. 3 Just how difficult a task this would be was presaged by the 
fact that even the initial memorandum describing what was to be 
done gave an incorrect definition of peonage. 4 
Assistant Attorney General Brian McMahon, the author of 
the memorandum, managed to uncover three successful prose-
cutions in the period 1936-1939 to list under the heading of 
peonage. However, one of the three was the case of U.S. v. 
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Peacher (E.D. Ark. 1937, unreported) in which a conviction was 
gained on a charge of slavery. The difference in definition was 
one of the problems that had to be dealt with. It was, perhaps, 
even more discouraging to note that the fourth (and last) item 
under this heading was a report of a federal investigation into 
peonage in Alabama. The assistant to the attorney general 
found conditions "to be very bad," succeeded in convincing the 
governor to pardon a number of wrongfully convicted peons-
and concluded by saying that his personal investigations had 
proved the complaints to be groundless! 
The first problem lay in the wording of the traditional tool-
the Anti-Peonage Act. As written, it punished anyone who 
"holds, arrests, returns ... any person to a condition of peon-
age."5 No one was quite sure how the preposition "to" was sup-
posed to fit in the sentence; it seemed to be intended to follow all 
three verbs. What did holding or arresting "to" peonage mean? 
One conviction had already been overturned by the phrasing of 
"returning to" peonage (Clyatt v. United States) and it was neces-
sary to determine whether or not the other two phrases applied 
where the individual had not previously been placed in a condi-
tion of peonage. 6 
The most vexing problem of all with regard to this statute was 
the fact that a peonage charge must contain an element of 
debt-the "basal fact" of peonage. As far back as 1907, Assistant 
Attorney General Russell had argued that the Supreme Court, 
in the Clyatt case, had misconstrued the act by borrowing its 
definition from an 1857 case in New Mexico. As a realist, how-
ever, he had also suggested that a new law barring involuntary 
servitude, regardless of debt, be passed. As this had aroused no 
response, Russell then anticipated his successors and tried a 
peon master for slavery. 7 
It was this idea that struck the CRS researchers as an alterna-
tive means of conviction where no debt could be shown. In 1936 
Paul D. Peacher, an Arkansas sheriff, had been convicted of 
violation of the 1866 Slave-Kidnapping Act. The Southern Ten-
ant Farmers' Union had applied enough pressure to help force 
an indictment, and the government had taken the unusual step 
of trying the case under this act. 8 This success seemed to give the 
section a new tool, but it was shrouded in obscurity. The act 
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punished anyone who "kidnaps or carries away" any person, 
with the intent that he "be sold into involuntary servitude, or 
held as a slave." 9 The problem lay in the definition of the word 
slave. If the Court interpreted the language broadly, almost any 
person held in detention (except upon lawful conviction for a 
criminal act) would be covered. If, however, the term was re-
stricted to individuals held as personal property, the act would 
be virtually useless. At this time, the only judicial definition of 
slave had been given in the strikingly unsuccessful case of U.S. v. 
Sabbia. The question was thus left open, but the CRS determined 
to use the statute. 
In addition, the CRS could call upon sections of Title 18, which 
punished conspiracy to deprive citizens of their civil rights (Sec-
tion 51), and participation of public officials in such deprivations 
(Section 52). Finally, Section 88 of Title 18, a general conspiracy 
statute, might be employed. In 1941 Attorney General Francis 
Biddle issued instructions to all United States attorneys that the 
Slave-Kidnapping Act and Sections 51, 52, and 88 should be 
used in preference to the Anti-Peonage Act. This was indicated 
by "a survey of Department files on alleged peonage violations" 
which disclosed wholesale instances where prosecution was de-
clined by the United States attorney .10 If debt was so difficult to 
prove, Biddle reasoned, forget it and use involuntary servitude 
in its stead. 
While this maneuvering was going on, peonage was getting 
increased publicity. In addition to the NAACP and the Southern 
Tenant Farmers' Union (old friends to the cause), the Inter-
national Labor Defense (ILD) now formed the Abolish Peonage 
Committee of America. (The ILD had been organized by the 
Communist party in 1925.) The Abolish Peonage Committee 
was applying pressure for the prosecution of a peon master 
named Cunningham. The Justice Department at first refused to 
prosecute the case, Attorney General Jackson declaring that 
there was no violation of the peonage statute. In the end Cun-
ningham was indicted under the general conspiracy statute, but 
the charge was vacated by a federal judge in Georgia. 11 
In 1941 all this activity finally bore fruit. The Georgia labor-
contract statute had been challenged, and the Georgia courts 
had continued to maintain its validity. In Taylor v. State the 
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Georgia Supreme Court rather contemptuously dismissed the 
appeal. 12 It simply cited the line of state cases which preceded-
the Bailey decision and then concluded with a special mention of 
Wilson v. State. (This last, it will be recalled, was the 1912 case in 
which the court had denied the applicability of Bailey to the 
Georgia law.) In this case, however, an appeal was taken to the 
United States Supreme Court, and the modern observer finds 
himself struck with a distinct sense of deja vu. Fully thirty years 
after the Bailey decision was handed down, the case is essentially 
reargued. The same tired claims that the statute does nothing 
more than punish fraud, that the presumptive evidence clause is 
merely a rule of evidence, and so on, are made again by the state. 
Fortunately, if only for the sake of sanity, the decision of the 
Court was equally reminiscent. 
Justice James F. Byrnes, a southerner himself, wrote the opin-
ion for a unanimous Court in Taylor v. Georgia. If the Georgia 
court had dismissed the appeal with a casual listing of largely 
pre-Bailey precedents, the Supreme Court was just as casual in 
dismissing Georgia's arguments. 
It is argued here, just as it was in the Bailey case, that the purpose 
of #7408 is nothing more than the punishment of a species of 
fraud .... And the presumption created by #7409 is said to be 
merely a rule of evidence for the trial of cases arising under 
#7408. Actually, however, #7409 embodies a substantive prohibi-
tion which squarely contravenes the Thirteenth Amendment and 
the Act of Congress of March 2, 1867 ... [the Anti-Peonage 
Act]. There is no material distinction between the Georgia stat-
utes challenged here and the Alabama statute which was held to 
violate the Thirteenth Amendment in Bailey v. Alabama. 13 
Byrnes dismissed the Wilson precedent with dispatch: the 
Georgia court had given it validity because of "a misconception 
of the scope of the Bailey decision." 14 The parallels between the 
Georgia and Alabama laws seem as obvious to the casual reader 
as they did to the Supreme Court; one is led to wonder why the 
statute had been permitted to rest unchallenged for thirty years. 
In any case, the period of neglect at this level was now over. 
However, the capacity of the federal courts to overturn state 
laws that enforced peonage had never been in question; what 
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had happened to the somewhat limited and insecure legal arse-
nal the CRS had created for positive action? In United States v. 
Gaskin, the "sword" aspect of the Anti-Peonage Act received 
further judicial construction. The question to be resolved was 
whether or not the mere seizure of an individual for the purpose 
of placing him in peonage was covered by the 1867 law. Gaskin 
had arrested a black man who, he claimed, owed him twenty 
dollars, and had transported him to his turpentine farm in 
northern Florida. The black, one Johnson, escaped before he 
had been forced to perform any labor. As a result of the escape 
(and the telling of the tale), Gaskin was indicted on a charge of 
arresting Johnson "to a condition of peonage." A United States 
District Court quashed the indictment on the grounds that the 
Anti-Peonage Act did not punish an arrest to compel service un-
less the person arrested actually does render such service. In an 
eight-to-one decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the act did 
cover such actions even where the intent is not achieved. The 
Court conceded that the language of the statute was "inartistic. 
The appropriate qualifying preposition for the word 'holds' is 
'in.' An accurate qualifying phrase for the verb 'arrests' would be 
'to place in or return to' peonage. But the compactness of phras-
ing and the lack of strict grammatical construction does not 
obscure the intent of the Act." The Court reviewed the history of 
the statute and the holding in Clyatt, and it concluded that the 
principle of strict construction of the law "does not require dis-
tortion or nullification of the evident purpose of the legisla-
tion.'' 15 
Both the argument and the history cited are compelling; it was 
all the more striking that the lone dissenter was Justice Frank 
Murphy, who had acquired a close following of liberals on the 
grounds that he was "a guy who votes right." As if to refute his 
dissent in the Screws case, where he bitterly objected to a reversal 
of a conviction on narrow technical grounds, Murphy, for some 
reason, decided to emulate Justice Frankfurter's stance in other 
cases and denied that the statute prohibited unsuccessful seizure 
for peonage. He called the majority opinion an "apologia for 
inadequate legislative draftsmanship" and, ignoring the decision 
in Clyatt, argued that no one could reasonably be expected to 
understand the statute to cover "an arrest not followed by actual 
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peonage." 16 (Murphy's pleas for the application of common 
sense in the Screws case seem totally appropriate here. Whether 
or not his strictures were accurate, when the United States Code 
was revised in 194 7 the wording of the statute was changed to 
follow the more "appropriate" phrasing suggested by the major-
ity.) 
Four months later the Supreme Court handed down a far 
more significant decision in Pollock v. WilliamsY At the state 
court level, this case, like Taylor v. Georgia, was reminiscent of the 
cases of the immediate post-Bailey era. In Williams v. Pollock, the 
Florida Supreme Court had simply reiterated the arguments 
made in Phillips v. Bell, over twenty years before. 18 The state 
argued that the guilty plea precluded any consideration of the 
presumptive evidence clause, and that the two sections of the act 
were severable, in any case. No defense of the presumption sec-
tion was offered at all. 
The decision of the United States Supreme Court was handed 
down by Justice Robert Jackson, who, as attorney general, had 
aroused the wrath of the Anti-Peonage Committee for his luke-
warm enforcement of the antipeonage laws. Now Jackson dem-
onstrated what a difference a robe makes. First he reviewed 
the history of federal peonage legislation and introduced his 
famous analogy of"a shield and a sword." He then examined the 
history of peonage in Florida. Jackson noted the variety of 
violations of the federal statutes that had occurred in that state 
and the fact that at least four different contract-labor statutes 
had been enacted by the legislature over the years. Since "the 
present Act is the latest of a lineage," Jackson found it necessary 
to shift the burden of proof to the state. 19 Thus the state was 
required to demonstrate that the presumption section did not 
contribute to exacting the guilty plea. (The state had earlier, of 
course, simply argued that there was no evidence to the con-
trary.) The inference Jackson drew was simple: "The Florida 
legislature has enacted and twice re-enacted it [the prima facie 
evidence section] since we [decided Bailey]. We cannot assume it 
was doing an idle thing. Since the presumption was known to be 
unconstitutional and of no use in a contested case, the only ex-
planation we can find for its persistent appearance in the statute 
is its extralegal coercive effect in suppressing defenses." 
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He then went on to describe how this section would affect a 
prosecution, especially in a court presided over by a layman, who 
was not likely to declare it unconstitutional. 20 At this point, how-
ever, Jackson began to enter virgin territory in the battle against 
peonage. Bailey had been widely assumed to have hinged on the 
presumptive evidence clause. Jackson now construed it, 
seemingly, to bar all contract-labor statutes: 
Where peonage has existed in the United States it has done so 
chiefly by virtue of laws like the statute in question. Whether the 
statute did or did not include the presumption seems to have 
made little difference in its practical effect .... It is a mistake to 
believe that in dealing with statutes of this type we have held the 
presumption section to be the only source of invalidity. On the 
contrary, the substantive section has contributed largely to the 
conclusion of unconstitutionality of the presumption section. 21 
Jackson also contemptuously dismissed the arguments that the 
statute was merely intended to punish common fraud. It was 
possible, he conceded, that a laborer might collect advances 
from several employers with no intent to perform service, or 
perhaps continue to hire himself out and collect advances in 
perpetuity: 
But in not one of the cases to come before this Court under the 
antipeonage statute has there been evidence of such subtlety of 
design. In each there was the same story, a necessitous and illiter-
ate laborer, an agreement to work for a small wage, a trifling ad-
vance, a breach of contract to work. In not one has there been 
proof from which we fairly could say whether the Negro never 
intended to work out the advance, or quit because of some real or 
fancied grievance, or just got tired. If such statutes have ever on 
even one occasion been put to a worthier use in the records of any 
state court, it h~ not been called to our attention. If this is the 
visible record, it is hardly to be assumed that the off-the-record 
uses are more benign. 22 
It is doubtful that the emptiness of the argument made in de-
fense of contract-labor laws could be more clearly demonstrated 
than it is in this one paragraph. Unfortunately, Jackson blurs 
82 CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION 
somewhat an otherwise laudable opinion with a misreading of 
history. He maintains that peonage was neither a sectional nor a 
racial evil. How he arrived at this conclusion is not clear; perhaps 
the 1911 report of the Immigration Commission, which he 
quotes, misled him. There were some nonsouthern instances of 
peonage involving immigrants, just as Michigan and Minnesota 
had enacted (but never used) peonage laws. However, to draw 
from this skimpy list the conclusion that peonage was not tra-
ditionally both southern and racial is to fly in the face of the 
overwhelming mass of the evidence. Perhaps the interpretation 
arose from a desire to reassert concepts of national unity and 
downplay anything that might foment sectional disputes in time 
of war. One cannot tell, and perhaps it is petty to harp on what 
appears to be a side issue when the bulk of the opinion is of such 
high quality. However, the regional and racial nature was not 
only a part of the history of peonage, it was (and is) part of the 
problem in destroying it, and any solution that ignores or 
obscures this plain fact is likely to fail. 
Pollock was the last peonage case to come before the Supreme 
Court, and it capped a brief period of significant federal interest 
in the practice. The CRS and the Supreme Court had created the 
legal instruments through which, it was felt, peonage could be 
destroyed. It was true that the slave-kidnapping statute had not 
yet been construed, but this was remedied in a 194 7 circuit court 
decision. In United States v. Ingalls, slavery was defined as 
"enforced compulsory service to another"-as broad a definition 
as the Civil Rights Section could have asked. 23 (Further, as noted 
above, the revision of the United States Code had removed all the 
ambiguities in the language of the Anti-Peonage Act.) 
With the end of the war, the new tools were permitted to rust. 
Although such organizations as the Workers Defense League 
continued to expose instances of peonage, few federal prosecu-
tions resulted. In the early fifties a congressional investigation 
into labor conditions in Georgia disclosed that the law struck 
down in the Taylor case was still being used. 24 Perhaps more sig-
nificantly, the Justice Department seems to have given up the 
ship. The 1961 Report of the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights notes that although there were sixty-seven complaints of 
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peonage or slavery between 1958 and 1960, "no prosecutions 
were brought, apparently because none of those complaints was 
deemed valid." The department also reported evidence that the 
law declared unconstitutional in Taylor was still being used in 
Georgia, but again without recommendations for prosecution.25 
Harry H. Shapiro reviewed peonage complaints to the Justice 
Department from 1961 through 1963. Of a total of 104 com-
plaints, only 2 resulted in prosecutions. 26 
When the New Republic published an article on peonage in 
Florida in 1969, the descriptions of the status of the peon could 
easily have been taken from reports in the days of the Black 
Codes. 27 Through the tumultuous sixties, in the teeth of the 
"civil rights revolution," peonage continued as before-perhaps 
reduced in magnitude by changing economic conditions, but still 
alive and kicking its victims as brutally as ever. 
On the other hand, while there may be fewer peons in the 
South, the practice is spreading. It seems to have served best 
wherever the conditions of labor are worst. Thus Shapiro's 
statistics show an alarming rise in complaints from California, 
where, of course, the use of migrant Mexican laborers-a class 
easily open to exploitation-is more and more commonplace. 
The inadequacy of the Justice Department in dealing with the 
problem is evident, and, despite all protestations to the contrary, 
one is led to doubt its good faith. To give the devil his due, how-
ever, good intentions and even vigorous investigations and pros-
ecutions of complaints would not be likely to destroy the prac-
tice. As the Civil Rights Commission pointed out, "The victims of 
peonage and involuntary servitude are even less likely than the 
usual victims of police brutality and private violence to be articu-
late in protesting-especially iflocal officials cooperate with their 
'masters."' 28 One would like to see the department give it more 
of a try anyway; it is difficult to see who could lose by it, except 
the peon masters. 
Conclusion 
The natural operation of the statute ... furnishes a convenient 
instrument for coercion ... an instrument of compulsion particu-
larly effective as against the poor and the ignorant, its most likely 
victim. 
Bailey v. Alabama (1911) 
. . . but no prosecutions were brought. 
Justice, 1962 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the study of peonage is the 
boundless resilience of the institution. Created as a stopgap mea-
sure to reduce the effects of the abolition of slavery, it has sur-
vived all attempts to suppress it. Neither of the two great "civil 
rights revolutions"-Reconstruction and the post-Brown v. 
Board period of the late 1950s and 1960s-seems to have suc-
ceeded in producing changes. Indeed, there seems to have been 
little interest in doing so, to the degree that even the academic 
revolution in historiography fails to pay attention to the subject. 1 
Considering the nature of the subject, its similarities to slavery, 
its brutality, and so forth, one is led continually to ask oneself, 
why? Why should a brutalizing and deceitful practice, which for 
much of its history held a majority of the black population of the 
South in thrall, be largely ignored by activist, reformer, and his-
torian alike? Obviously no definitive answer to this question is 
possible. However, it seems appropriate at this point to make 
some co~ectures on the subject. 
Clearly the Reconstruction period is a key starting point-a 
jumping-off place for answers. This is true not only because it 
was in this period that the system got started, but also because 
this was probably the period in which it could most readily have 
been brought to a halt. Once peonage became firmly established 
and was allowed to flourish over a period of years, its capacity to 
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endure was greatly enhanced. Once a practice, no matter how 
obnoxious, becomes a norm, its destruction is a formidable task. 
As in "legislating morality," the odds are against the innovator; 
inertia itself becomes a potent factor, and vast expenditures of 
energy are required. 
In the chaos which was the South after the war, social change 
was clearly on the horizon. After the brief period of "presiden-
tial" Reconstruction, a righteous (and self-righteous) Congress 
interposed a significant federal presence into the area. The army 
and the Freedmen's Bureau did not do a perfect job, but they 
did produce some radical changes in the social system. The 
freedmen were sufficiently well protected in their civil rights that 
they were capable of casting votes, running for office, and being 
elected. In several states blacks made up about half of the state 
legislature. In short, while there were many setbacks, and the 
gains were often only temporary, the federal government suc-
ceeded to a degree in making over the political system of the 
South. As has been noted in the preceding chapters, however, 
that same government was a primary source of the coercion of 
Negro labor. Even the "radical" governments themselves were 
supportive of the practice, and although it is true that these legis-
latures were by no means really radical, they did take fairly 
strong action in such areas as voting rights and jury service. 
Why, alone among black rights, was the area of peonage never 
a matter of serious controversy? 
No answer springs immediately to mind, but some conjectures 
seem more reasonable than others. First, the right to vote had 
(and has) great symbolic appeal. To Americans brought up on 
the litany of democracy and the Constitution, it is the vital ques-
tion, the cornerstone of citizenship and freedom. To the degree 
that the Civil War was fought over the issue of slavery, the 
victors must have felt the need to ensure the full citizenship of 
the freed slave. The universal appeal of voting rights was, then, 
a strong argument for placing it first on the list. Additionally 
theorists, then and now, have argued that once you have the 
vote, all other civil rights flow naturally from it-that is, a group 
that can be a potent force in elections cannot be trifled with by its 
governors. This theory, while impressive on its face, is chal-
lenged by the events of the Reconstruction period, when the 
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freedman did get the vote, but all the freed agricultural laborer 
got was peonage. Questions of jury service and equal treatment 
in the courts also provide an impressive repertoire of rhetoric-
"equal justice under law," "a nation of laws," and so forth. These 
rights, too, are useful symbols of citizenship, easily defensible to 
all. 
What then, of the right to be free from coercion in labor? A 
battle cry of "free labor" or "labor rights" would clearly have 
fallen flat in postbellum America. Once the onus of the word 
slavery is removed from the labor system, it might seem "radical" 
to push for true freedom of labor. The Black Codes, it is true, 
caused an uproar in the North, but they were openly dis-
criminatory; and they were passed by the "unreconstructed 
legislatures" of the Old South, who were, after all, the "enemy." 
When the same system was imposed by the federal government 
or by the new legislatures (without open designations of color) 
they were accepted with ease. 
It seems unwise, however, to place too much reliance on the 
symbolic aspect of the issue, for there was another major factor 
to distinguish peonage from other rights of freedmen. That is, 
of course, the factor of economics. The destruction of no other 
discriminatory system would cause the monetary losses that 
would occur upon the destruction of peonage. The South's 
economy was based on agriculture, and its agriculture was based 
on the plantation. The creation of a system of forced labor to 
replace slavery was the method least likely to disrupt that 
economy. The ex-slave had a contract and theoretically was paid 
wages; there was thus no overt basis for effective rhetoric, and 
the economics of agriculture could remain as undisturbed as 
possible in the circumstances. 
Once the Reconstruction period is past, the prospects for the 
destruction of the practice are greatly lessened, for subsequent 
reform attempts must deal with new and difficult problems. 
Once the substitute for slavery had acquired the status of a social 
custom, enforcement of the antipeonage laws became extraor-
dinarily tedious. A jury will be reluctant to convict a man on trial 
if many of his neighbors are equally guilty. In brief, the prob-
lems of enforcing those laws become similar to the problems 
faced by the enforcing of Prohibition laws. 
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In an article discussing the question of "legislating morality," 
John P. Roche and Milton M. Gordon set up a model by which 
the difficulties of taking effective action may be examined. Four 
areas of critical consideration are set up: the amount and geo-
graphical spread of opposition to the law, the intensity of oppo-
sition, the degree to which sanctions can be administered, and 
the diligence of enforcement. 2 (In the discussion below, I take 
some liberties with these criteria, and they form only a basic 
framework from which to carry on the discussion.) 
In the first area, the geographical distribution of the opposi-
tion, peonage reform is subject to the same problems as any 
other civil rights activity in the South: the opposition is concen-
trated in those places where the violations are most numerous. 
At the turn of the century, for instance, peonage was widespread 
throughout the South, and while the opposition to change did 
not represent a majority of the nation, it did constitute an over-
whelming percentage in that region. In later years, after eco-
nomic changes had taken their toll of peonage, the opposition 
remained concentrated in those areas where peonage was still 
operating. Thus local governmeut, juries, and law enforcement 
agencies were likely to be under opposition control. 
To take a tack away from the Roche-Gordon position for a 
moment, the geographical question is also relevant in terms of 
the pro-reform forces, inasmuch as it may provide a partial an-
swer to the lack of interest in peonage during the "civil rights 
revolution" of recent years. When civil rights leaders talk of vot-
ing rights, they appeal to a large constituency: all blacks are 
encompassed in the battle. Peonage, on the other hand, affects at 
this point only a fairly small percentage of the potential "sup-
port" community, and is thus less appealing as an issue. 3 
The intensity of the opposition also militates against effective 
reform. This is not true so much in the Roche-Gordon sense of 
the significance of "opinion-formers" (ministers, newspaper 
editors, etc.) as in the fact that what is being attacked is the oppo-
sition's pocketbook. 4 It is not ministers but plantation owners 
who oppose reform; not editors but turpentine camp operators. 
Few areas produce such vehement defenses as those made in 
behalf of one's livelihood. Not only will the opposition be intense 
in nature, but the successful peon master is likely to wield con-
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siderable economic power, even over the "opinion-makers."5 
(Further, this economic power is likely to affect the administra-
tion of justice; a sheriff who derives much of his income from a 
successful peonage operation in his district is unlikely to be 
eager to destroy the practice.) 
The degree to which sanctions may be administered is one of 
the great stumbling blocks in enforcement of anti peonage legis-
lation. Several highly significant factors come into play. First, the 
potential area of legal oversight is so diverse as to make effective 
enforcement extremely difficult. The voting rights enforcement 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1965 probably represent the 
best example of a reasonably successful governmental intrusion 
for the protection of civil rights. When federal examiners were 
sent in to recalcitrant southern areas, the percentage of the black 
population registered to vote rose from 11.9 percent before 
their arrival, to 61.0 percent afterwards. The effect of the exam-
iners' presence was so great that it had the effect of raising black 
registrations in adjoining nonexaminer areas (from 30.2 to 52.5 
percent). 6 The marked success of this venture is striking; it is 
clearly the most effective action of its type ever taken by the fed-
eral government (and was almost instantaneous in that effect). 
However, this effort, massive as it was (fifteen hundred federal 
officials were active in the southern elections of 1966 and 1967), 
would be dwarfed by the force required to eradicate peonage 
effectively. Voting examiners have central locations to supervise, 
and these only at certain times. On the other hand, peonage may 
be taking place wherever one man employs another. The sheer 
size of the supervisory force necessary makes effective action 
highly unlikely, as long as the onus rests upon the federal gov-
ernment. The problem is akin to that facing the Department of 
Labor in enforcing wage-and-hour law provisions. In this case, 
however, there are no unions to assist, and violent retribution 
for those who might dare to complain is far more probable. In 
brief, the number and diversity of locations to be monitored 
militate against the efficient administration of the law. 
The analogy just drawn relating to the enforcement of labor 
laws is perhaps appropriate in other ways-that is, the general 
difficulties in getting compliance with economic legislation may 
be relevant to the difficulties in the area of peonage. Laws that 
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regulate some aspect of economic life are often felt to be less 
binding on the individual than other criminal laws. 7 Often the 
most vehement supporters of strict enforcement of laws against 
burglary or embezzlement will be forgiving to violators of trade 
practices regulations or wage-and-hour laws. There is far less 
social stigma attached to disobedience to the law in such cases. 
Violations of anti peonage laws would easily fall into this category 
except for one factor: that of violence. The intrusion of violence 
may make the peon master less acceptable to local society, and 
prosecutors tend to play up this factor whenever possible. Where 
evidence of violence is difficult to produce, as is often the case, it 
becomes difficult to get convictions. Clearly the racial element is 
significant here as well; as long as the justificatory rhetoric of the 
peon master is believed ("You can't get 'those people' to work 
unless you force them"), the social opprobrium for those who 
practice peonage will be slight. The idea of forcing lazy and re-
calcitrant workers to perform useful labor is attractive: witness 
the consistent political appeal of "getting those welfare chiselers 
out on a job." It may be stretching the point to draw analogies 
between general labor legislation and antipeonage laws too 
closely, but a degree of similarity does exist. 8 
One additional factor that makes sanctions unlikely to be ad-
ministered effectively relates to the inherent difficulties federal 
courts must face in areas like peonage. Given local levels of op-
position, the main thrust against the practice must come from 
two areas of the federal structure-the Department of Justice 
and the courts. The courts have a variety of difficulties in this 
regard. First, they have no "self-starter" mechanism; they must 
rely on other parties to initiate action. Before the decision in 
Wilson v. State was appealed, for example, there was no way for 
its specious arguments to be dismissed. Secondly, certain areas 
of activity are relatively unsuitable for court control: for exam-
ple, areas that require constant supervision and a continuous 
flow of information. There is a lack of control over all of the 
relevant parties to the particular problem along with a basic in-
adequacy of "implementation procedures" beyond the instant 
case. 9 Federal courts have additional difficulties when state 
courts do not follow their lead; this recalcitrance is the classic 
check on higher-court power. In sum the federal courts, by 
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themselves, are relatively helpless without a high degree of 
cooperation from the prosecutorial arm of the government. 
This last statement brings us back to the last of the Roche-
Gordon considerations--diligence of enforcement. The key 
point for diligent application of the law is seen to be in the "in-
itial period when public attitudes ... are in the process of forma-
tion."10 Clearly, this criterion is not met; the Reconstruction era 
was the "initial period," and it was at this point that the govern-
ment was espousing and enforcing peonage. In view of the 
difficulties in enforcing antipeonage laws after this period, only 
an extremely dedicated and consistent attack on the practice 
could have succeeded in making even a dent, let alone a breach, 
in its walls. It is difficult to see any real evidence of such a com-
mitment. There were, certainly, especially in the two great pe-
riods of federal interest, many sincere and hardworking mem-
bers of the justice Department who were so committed. This was 
not the general trend, however, and indifference was far more 
common. The inadequacies of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion in such areas has been widely discussed for many years; its 
record with regard to peonage does little to change such percep-
tions. 
To conclude, the best chance for effective action on peonage 
was clearly at its inception. Failing that, the difficulties inherent 
in attacking an entrenched social custom would have required a 
massive and concerted effort in order to create change. In the 
atmosphere that existed, the efforts of those who were dedicated 
to the eradication of peonage were swallowed up, having only 
peripheral effects on the practice. 
Neither the sins of capitalism nor the evil influence of racism 
can be seen as the whole answer to the dogged resilience of 
peonage. In the North, where racism was hardly unknown, the 
black laborer was not subjected to this sort of control. The 
South, at least as devoted to capitalism as the rest of the nation, 
rarely made peons of its white laboring force. Even that univer-
sally downtrodden and exploitable class, agricultural labor, was 
not so feudally bound to the land outside the South. Thus, black 
forced labor remained a legal and social construct specific to the 
southern situation, and clearly was as "peculiar" an institution as 
slavery itself. 
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Peonage clearly violates fundamental human rights. Its initial 
survival, under the aegis of law, was grotesque. Its continued 
occurrence, however sporadic and illegal, to the present time, 
reflects shamefully on the American system of justice. 
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Slocum (Miss.), Canby (La.), quoted in Sefton, U.S. Army, pp. 42, 43, 
and passim; and U.S., Congress, House Executive Documents, 39th Cong., 
1st sess., 1866, 70, pp. 23, 65, 66. 
5. See, for example, the first portion of Chief Justice John Marshall's 
opinion in Fletcher v. Peck 6 Cranch 87 (1810); John P. Roche, 
"Entrepreneurial Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment," Labor His-
tory 4 (1963): 3-10; Benjamin F. Wright, The Contract Clause of the Con-
stitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), passim; 
Edward S. Corwin, "The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional 
Law," Michigan Law Review 12 (1914): 63-83. 
6. See George R. Bentley, A History of the Freedmen's Bureau (Philadel-
phia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955), pp. 80-84; McFeely, 
Yankee Stepfather, chapter 8, passim. 
7. Bentley, Freedmen's Bureau, pp. 80-81; see also John A. Carpenter, 
Sword and Olive Branch: Oliver Otis Howard (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1964). 
8. House Executive Documents, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, 70, p. 263. 
This series of documents provides an accurate selection of bureau circu-
lars, orders, and reports (see also ibid., 11, 19, 118, 120). Although not 
comprehensive the series has been commonly reproduced on mi-
crocards and represents a highly convenient source for bureau mate-
rials. 
9. See Wilson, Black Codes, p. 58 and chapter 2, passim. 
10. Vernon L. Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947), pp. 90, 91; Sefton, U.S. 
Army, p. 71. 
11. Martin L. Abbott, The Freedmen's Bureau in South Carolina, 1865-
1872 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), p. 69 and 
chapter 5, passim. 
12. Ibid., p. 73; Wilson, Black Codes, pp. 75, 83. 
13. Quoted in Wilson, Black Codes, p. 84. See also Abbott, Freedmen's 
Bureau, p. 73. Abbott, whether by design or not, describes Sickles's and 
Scott's orders as requiring that the disobedient will be "removed from 
the land"-he makes no mention of arrests for vagrancy or the hiring 
out of labor. Wilson, on the other hand, describes Sickles as a repre-
sentative of the bureau. This latter error is more understandable, how-
ever, as officials of both the army and the bureau held military titles. 
Both organizations, in fact, seem to have been staffed exclusively by gen-
erals, and a modern observer is led to wonder if their efficiency might 
not have been increased dramatically by the inclusion of a private or 
two to carry out orders. 
14. From General Order no. 12, quoted in Elizabeth Bethel, "The 
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Freedmen's Bureau in Alabama," journal of Southern History 14 
(1948):54-55, 57. 
15. House Executive Documents, 39th Cong., 1st sess., 1866, 30, p. 13. 
See also Bethel, "Freedmen's Bureau in Alabama," pp. 57-58; and Wil-
son, Black Codes, pp. 59, 76. 
16. Bethel, "Freedmen's Bureau in Alabama," pp. 52-55. 
17. Bentley, Freedmen's Bureau, pp. 23, 58. 
18. Charles Kassel, "The Labor System of General Banks-A Lost 
Episode of Civil War History," Open Court 43 (1928):41-45. See also 
McFeely, Yankee Stepfather, pp. 170-71, for a bitter denunciation of 
Banks, and John C. Engelsman, "The Freedmen's Bureau m 
Louisiana," Louisiana HistoricalQ]tarterly 32 (1944):175-76. 
19. Engelsman, "Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana," p. 176. 
20. Ibid., pp. 178, 171; "Schurz Report" in U.S., Congress, Senate 
Executive Documents, 39th Cong., lst sess., 1866, 2, pp. 90-92; McFeely, 
Yankee Stepfather, pp. 171-72; House Executive Documents, 39th Cong., lst 
sess., 1866, 70, p. 18. 
21. Bentley, Freedmen's Bureau, pp. 70, 71, 107-9; McFeely, Yankee 
Stepfather, p. 178. 
22. Engelsman, "Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana," pp. 178-87, 217; 
see also McFeely, Yankee Stepfather, pp. 179-80. 
23. Georgia, Laws, 1866, no. 195; House Executive Documents, 39th 
Cong., lst sess., 1866, 70, p. 65. 
24. Sefton, U.S. Army, p. 71; Wilson, Black Codes, p. 84. 
25. Quoted in Wilson, Black Codes, p. 84. (The problems inherent in 
dealing with laws nondiscriminatory on their face are made clear in this 
case. Terry was somewhat embarrassed by the revelation that the 
Virginia legislature had copied its law from the Pennsylvania statute 
then in force. He was undoubtedly correct as to the intent and probable 
application of the law, but the congressional conservatives enjoyed the 
anomaly.) See U.S., Congress, Congressional Globe, 39th Cong., lst sess., 
pt. I, p. 603. 
26. Quoted in Wilson, Black Codes, pp. 83-84; Bentley, Freedmen's 
Bureau, p. 84. 
27. Bentley, Freedmen's Bureau, pp. 84, 155-56; see Joe M. 
Richardson, "The Freedmen's Bureau and Negro Labor in Florida" 
and "Evaluation of the Freedmen's Bureau in Florida," Florida Historical 
Qy,arterly 39 (1960) and 41 ( 1963). 
28. Charles Ramsdell, Reconstruction in Texas (New York: Longmans, 
Green, 1910), p. 101; quoted in McFeely, Yankee Stepfather, p. 153; 
Bentley, Freedmen's Bureau, p. 149; order quoted in McFeely, Yankee 
Stepfather, p. 154. 
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29. It is fascinating to note that McFeely, a revisionist, draws his 
newspaper quotations almost exclusively from the radical New Orleans 
Tribune, while Engelsman relies totally on the New Orleans Times, Daily 
Picayune, and Price-Current. The situation in Louisiana is gone into in 
somewhat greater detail as it provides the basis of McFeely's denuncia-
tions. 
30. See, for example, the facts of the case in Lee v. West 47 Ga. 312, 
where bureau agents removed black laborers from a jail to which they 
had been brought by a planter and his "heavies." 
31. Bentley, Freedmen's Bureau, chapters 8-10, passim. 
Chapter 3 
1. See, for example, the conclusions in the Report of the Commissioner of 
Agriculture for the Year 1867 (Washington, D.C., 1868), pp. 412-28, de-
scribing production in the South despite disastrous weather and the 
introduction of the new systems oflabor. Wages, it should be noted, had 
dropped significantly between 1867 and 1868. 
2. Louisiana, Acts, 1869, no. 28; see above, chapter 1, n. 15. 
3. Sheppard's indexes to cases and statutes, for instance, relied on 
with fundamentalist faith by the modern legal scholar, are almost totally 
useless for this period. Further, the state codes often fail to list statutes 
seemingly enacted and signed. 
4. South Carolina, Acts, 1869, sec. 4, p. 227. This act is quoted, among 
others, in full in La Wanda Cox and John Cox, eds., Reconstruction, the 
Negro, and the New South (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
1973), as an example of the comparatively radical makeup of the South 
Carolina legislature. 
5. This portion of the statute was declared unconstitutional in State v. 
Williams 32 S.C. 123 in 1890, in a decision based on the discrimination 
in punishment. However, as the legislature had conveniently amended 
the statute in 1889, equalizing the penalties, the new statute took effect 
without any disruption of the system. 
6. George R. Bentley, A History of the Freedmen's Bureau (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955), p. 159. 
7. C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1951), p. 180. 
8. South Carolina, Revised Statutes, 1873, pp. 557-58; South Carolina, 
15 Statutes at Large 884. 
9. South Carolina, Revised Statutes, 1873, p. 433. 
10. See Century Digest, "Statute of Frauds," vol. 23-24, sec. 5, nos. 
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68-75, passim, for a review of all reported cases throughout the nation 
on the subject. 
11. Hair v. Blease 8 S.C. 63 (1876); Daniel v. Swearengen 6 S.C. 297 
(1875). 
12. See the history of the statutes given by Justice McGowan in Car-
penter v. Strickland 20 S.C. 1 (1833); also Huff v. Watkins 15 S.C. 82 
(1881), and Kennedy v. Reames 15 S.C. 548 (1881). 
13. Daniel v. Swearengen 6 S.C. 297,300 (1875). 
14. Mississippi, Laws, 1870, pp. 73, 95, 374-75. 
15. Mississippi, Revised Code, 1871, sec. 2836. 
16. Vernon L. Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947), pp. 94-95. 
17. Ibid., p. 95. 
18. Mississippi, Digest of Cases. 
19. Wharton, Negro in Mississippi, p. 238. 
20. Mississippi, Laws, 1872, pp. 67-86; ibid., 1875, pp. 107-8. 
21. Ibid., p. 107. 
22. Mississippi, Laws, 1867, p. 569; ibid., 1872, p. 131. 
23. See opinion in Doty v. Heath 52 Miss. 530 (1876); Betts v. Ratliff 50 
Miss. 561 (1874); Mississippi, Laws, 1873, p. 79. 
24. See Betts v. Ratliff 50 Miss. 561 (1874), Cayce v. Stovall 50 Miss. 396 
(1874), and Arbuckle v. Nelms 50 Miss. 556 (1874). 
25. Buck v. Payne 52 Miss. 271-73 (1876). 
26. Kerr v. Moore 54 Miss. 286 (1876). 
27. Alabama, Laws, 1866-1867, p. 504. See, for example, Boulo v. 
State 49 Ala. 22 (1873). Elizabeth Bethel, in "The Freedmen's Bureau in 
Alabama," journal of Southern History 14 ( 1948), for example, claims that 
the legislature repealed the law because of adverse reaction to it (p. 67). 
28. See Colly v. State 55 Ala. 85 (1876) and Sandy v. State 60 Ala. 58 
( 1877). 
29. 44 Ala. 367 ( 1870). 
30. See Labatt, Master and Servant ( 1913), 4: 8068, for this interpreta-
tion. See also, Turner v. State 48 Ala. 549 (1872) and Roseberry v. State 50 
Ala. 160 (1874). 
31. Alabama, Laws, 1868, p. 365; ibid., 1872, p. 78. 
32. Alabama, Laws, 1868, pp. 455-56; ibid., 1871, p. 19; Gafford v. 
Stearns 51 Ala. 434 (1874). 
33. Howard A. White, The Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970), p. 122; Louisiana, Laws, 
1868, no. 97. 
34. State v.J. H. Sypher and]. L. Petit 19 La. Ann. 71 (1867). This case 
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also provided one of those charming coincidences which lighten a re-
searcher's task. Mr. Sypher, one of the defendants in this case, appar-
ently also supplied himself with freedmen by outright kidnapping by 
his band of overseers. He was also charged with jumping bail (see the 
facts in the case). I came across his name again in Ella Lonn, Reconstruc-
tion in Louisiana (New York: Putnam, 1918), p. 346. Professor Lonn, an 
ardent "Dunningite," was describing the outrageous conduct of the 
freedmen during Reconstruction. White women, it appears, were afraid 
to go out without a pistol. "They dared not leave the plantation," and at 
night one could hear the horses resist when the Negroes borrowed 
them for joyridl?s. Only when the lynching of a black in the township 
"had a salutary effect" was order restored. The helpless victim of these 
gross misdeeds (which also included the theft of salt from saltshakers 
and buttons from clothing) was none other than Mrs. ]. H. Sypher. 
Perhaps if Mr. Sypher had spent less time on the road capturing la-
borers, his gang of overseers could have controlled this sort of black 
revelry. 
35. See Moore v. Gray 22 La. Ann. 289 (1870). 
36. See Bryan v. State 44 Ga. 328 (1871) and Wharton v. Jossey 46 Ga. 
578 (1872). 
37. Hodgins v. State 126 Ga. 639 (1906) at 640-41. 
38. See the facts in Lee v. West 47 Ga. 312-15 (1872). 
39. Ibid., pp. 317-18 (emphasis added). The judge goes on to ex-
coriate the bureau for interfering in the matter. 
40. Ryan v. State 45 Ga. 128 (1872). 
41. Ratteree v. State 77 Ga. 774. This attempt was also foiled by the 
court, and as a result the Georgia legislature promptly passed a con-
tract law. See history in Lamar v. State 120 Ga. 312. 
42. A. F. McKelway, "The Convict Lease System of Georgia," Outlook 
90 (1908):68. 
43. Georgia, Laws, 1874, p. 29 (title 6, no. 25). 
44. See Alexander v. Glenn 39 Ga. 1 (1869), Saulsbury v. Eason 47 Ga. 
617 (1872); Georgia, Revised Code, 1873, sec. 1978; Georgia, Laws, 1875, 
p. 20 (title 4, no. 18). 
45. State v. Custer 65 N.C. 311 (1871). 
46. Haskins v. Royster 70 N.C. 481 (1874) (emphasis in the original); 
see opinion in State v. Shaft 78 N.C. 464. 
47. See, for example, Hunt v. Wing 57 Tenn. (10 Heisk.) 139 (1872) 
and Lewis v. Mahon 68 Tenn. (9 Baxt.) 374 (1878) on liens; see also the 
enticement law in Tennessee, Acts, 1875, p. 168; Taylor v. Hathaway 29 
Ark. 597 (1874); Burgie v. Davis 34 Ark. 179 (1879) and Alexander v. 
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Pardue 30 Ark. 359 (1875); Ruffin v. Commonwealth 21 Grat. (Va.) 790 
(1871); Ex parte Stubblefield 1 Tex. App. 757 (1877) for a sampling of 
cases and statutes of the period. 
Chapter4 
l. South Carolina, 16 Statutes at Large 265, 410, 713, 743; Columbia 
Daily Register, December 5, 1877, quoted in George B. Tindall, South 
Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1952),p.109. 
2. Quoted in C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951 ), p. 180. 
3. Ibid., p. 181. 
4. Almost all breach of contract, parol contract, and parol lien cases 
reported in the period deal with "colored men," "negroes," or "dark-
ies," and, to repeat, only those cases carried to appellate court are re-
ported. 
5. See Oscar Zeichner, "The Transition of Slave to Free Agricultural 
Labor in the Southern States," Agricultural History 13 ( 1939): 22-32; Re-
port of the Commissioner of Agriculture, (1867), p. 417; U.S., Census Office, 
Tenth Census, 1880, Report on Cotton Production in the United States, 
6: 61; Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, p. 106. 
6. Some states had no penitentiary tradition, having largely relied on 
county systems in which corporal punishment (whipping, stocks, etc.) 
had been the rule. See Blake McKelvey, "Penal Slavery and Southern 
Reconstruction," journal of Negro History 20 (1935): 154-55. 
7. Ibid., pp. 156-60. 
8. George Washington Cable, The Silent South together with the Freed-
man's Case in Equity and the Convict Lease System (New York: Scribner's, 
1889), p. 152. 
9. Georgia, Laws, 1875, p. 26 (title 4, no. 29); Mississippi, Revised Code, 
1880, sec. 2901. 
10. Vernon L. Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947), p. 239; Second Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of Labor, 1866: Convict Labor (Washington, 
D.C., 1877), pp. 300-303; Tillman quoted in Tindall, South Carolina 
Negroes, p. 267. 
11. Wharton, Negro in Mississippi, p. 235; Alabama, Laws, 1882, sec. 5, 
p. 134. 
12. Louisiana, Revised Laws, 1884, sec. 2862; North Carolina, Revised 
Code, 1883, sec. 3422; Mississippi, Acts, 1882, c. 40, sec. 3; South 
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Carolina, Revised Statutes, 1882, sec. 2729; Tennessee, Revised Code, 
1884, sec. 6367. 
13. See J. C. Powell, The American Siberia; or, Fourteen Years' Experience 
in a Southern Convict Camp (Chicago: H. J. Smith, 1891), p. 332. (Powell 
was the warden of Florida's lease camp system.) 
14. C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson; Agrarian Rebel (New York: 
Macmillan, 1938), p. 25; U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 47th 
Cong., 2d sess., 1883, 14, p. 2493; Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, p. 
271. 
15. Woodward, Origins, p. 214. 
16. Convict Labor, pp. 300, 301, 303, 323. 
17. Woodward, Origins, p. 215. 
18. McKelvey, "Penal Slavery," p. 160. 
19. See Dan T. Carter, "Prisons, Politics and Business: The Convict 
Lease System in the Post-Civil War South" (M.A. thesis, University of 
Wisconsin, 1964), p. 95. This is an excellent bibliographical source for 
materials on convict leasing, but it is confused chronologically and fails 
to consider the laws upon which the system was based. 
20. Convict Labor, p. 507. 
21. Arkansas, Revised Statutes, 1884, sees. 1213, 1214, 1235; Florida, 
Laws, 1881, c. 47, sec. 5; Georgia, Revised Code, 1882, sees. 4814, 4821 
a,b,c; Mississippi, Revised Code, 1880, sees. 3174, 3175; North Carolina, 
Revised Code, 1883, sec. 3448; Tennessee, Revised Code, 1884, sees. 6275, 
6284; Texas, Revised Statutes, 1879, arts. 3602, 3603, 3604; Virginia, 
Acts, 1878, c. 39, sec. 19 (these laws are listed because no other such 
compilation was discovered by this writer in any work on the subject); 
Louisiana, Revised Laws, 1897, p. 666, sees. 7, 8 (the act was passed in 
1894); Alabama, Revised Code, 1897, sec. 4532 (the act was passed in 
1882). 
22. Ray Stannard Baker, Following the Color Line (New York: Double-
day, 1908), pp. 96-97. 
23. Clarissa Olds Keeler, The Crime of Crimes; or, The Convict System 
Unmasked (Washington, D.C.: Pentecostal Era Co., 1907), pp. 7-12. 
24. Charles W. Russell, Report on Peonage (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 1908), p. 26. 
25. Richard B. Morris, "The Course of Peonage in a Slave State," 
Political Science Quarterly 65 ( 1950): 239 and "Labor Controls in Mary-
land in the Nineteenth Century," Journal of Southern History 14 
( 1948): 385. 
26. An excellent history of the system is given in the opm10n in 
Jaremillo v. Romero l N.M. 190 (1857), in which the case was dismissed, 
but only on the grounds that the debt was not proven. 
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27. See Wood v. Hookina 3 Haw. 102 (1869); Wood v. Afo 3 Haw. 444 
(1873); Hilo Sugar Co. v. Mioshi 8 Haw. 201 (1891); see also Rickard v. 
Couto 5 Haw. 507 (1885); Laupahoehoe Sugar Co. v. Kanaele 9 Haw. 468 
(1894). A decent, if biased, description of the system is given in 
Katherine Coman, The History of Contract Labor in the Hawaiian Islands 
(New York: Macmillan, 1903). A similar system existed in the Phil-
ippines after the Spanish-American War, and for many years after-
wards. See Dean C. Worcester, Report on Slavery and Peonage in the 
Philippine Islands (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Printing, 1913). 
28. Alabama, Revised Code, 1896, c. 154, sec. 4730; Arkansas, Laws, 
1894, c. 78, sec. 4790; Florida, Laws, 1891, c. 4032; Georgia, Acts, 1903, 
no. 345, p. 90; Louisiana, Acts, 1892, no. 50, p. 516, sec. 1; Mississippi, 
Acts, 1900, c. 101, sec. 1; North Carolina, Revised Code, 1883, c. 33, sees. 
3119, 3120; South Carolina, Revised Code, 1902, c. 16, sec. 357; Tennes-
see, Revised Code, 1884, sec. 3438. 
29. See, for example, Labatt, Master and Servant (1913), 7:320; or 
Lafayette M. Hershaw, "Peonage," Occasional Papers of the American 
Negro Academy 15 (1915). Labatt, in the standard work in the period on 
the subject of master-servant relationships in law, omits Arkansas, 
Mississippi, and Tennessee from his discussion. 
30. Georgia, Acts, 1903, no. 345, p. 90. 
31. Brown v. State 8 Ga. App. 211 (1910). 
32. Young v. State 4 Ga. App. 827 (1908). 
33. Lamar v. State 120 Ga. 312 (1904); Banks v. State 124 Ga. 15 
(1905); Townsend v. State 124 Ga. 69 (1905); Brown v. State 8 Ga. App. 
211 (1910). 
34. Vance v. State 128 Ga. 661 (1907). 
35. State v. Williams 32 S.C. 123 (1890). 
36. See, for example, Ex parte Riley 94 Ala. 82 (1891); Mcintosh v. State 
117 Ala. 128 ( 1897); Copeland v. State 97 Ala. 30 ( 1893); Thomson v. State 
56 Fla. 107 ( 1908); State v. Murray 116 La. 655 (1906); State v. Norman 
110 N.C. 484 (1892); State v. Leak 62 S.C. 405 (1901). 
37. See the body of the statutes referred to in n. 28, above. 
38. State v. Williams 32 S.C. 123 (1890). 
39. Alabama, Revised Code, 1897, c. 192, sees. 5504, 5505, 5506, 5509; 
Arkansas, Laws, 1894, c. 78, sec. 4792; Florida, Revised Statutes, 1891, 
sec. 2405; Georgia, Revised Code, 1895, sees. 121, 122; Louisiana, Acts, 
1892, no. 50, p. 516, sec. 2; Mississippi, Revised Code, 1892, c. 29, sec. 
1068; North Carolina, Revised Code, 1893, c. 33, sees. 3119, 3120; South 
Carolina, Revised Code, 1902, c. 16, sec. 359; Tennessee, Revised Code, 
1884, sees. 3438, 3439. N.B.: North Carolina and Tennessee combined 
the offenses of enticement and breach under the same title. 
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40. Florida, Revised Statutes, 1891, sec. 2405. 
41. Bryan v. State 44 Ga. 328 (1871); McBride v. O'Neal 128 Ga. 473 
(1907). 
42. Hudgins v. State 126 Ga. 630 (1906); Kine v. Eubanks 109 La. 242. 
("This is a matter of common knowledge": Wolf v. New Orleans Tailor-
Made Pants Co. 113 La. 388 [1904].) See also State v. Harwood 104 N.C. 
724 (1889). 
43. Georgia, Revised Code, 1895, see sees. 121 and 122; Miller quoted 
in Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, p. 112. 
44. Alabama, Revised Code, 1907, sec. 6851; 44 Ala. 368 (1871); see 
controlling cases listed in Tenth Special Report of the Commissioner of Labor: 
Labor Laws of the United States (Washington: Bureau of Printing, 1904), 
p. 108. 
45. See, for example, Armistead v. Chatters 71 Miss. 509 (1893); Hoole 
v. Dorroh 75 Miss. 257 (1897); Tarpley v. State 79 Ala. 271 (1885); Driscoll 
v. State 77 Ala. 84 (1884); State v. West 106 La. 274 (1902); State v. Har-
wood 104 N.C. 724 ( 1889); Duckett v. Pool 34 S.C. 311 ( 1890); Tucker v. 
State 86 Ark. 436 (1908). 
46. E.g., Armistead v. Chatters 71 Miss. 509 (1893); Tarpley v. State 79 
Ala. 271 (1885); Sturdivant v. Tolette 84 Ark. 412 (1907). 
47. Armistead v. Chatters 71 Miss. 509. 
48. 322 U.S. 4. "This is not to intimate that this section, more than 
others, was sympathetic with peonage . . . for this evil . . . and its 
sporadic appearances have been neither sectional nor racial." 
49. Bourlier Bros. v. Macauley 91 Ky. 135 (1891); Michigan, Laws, 
1903, no. 106, sec. 2; Minnesota, Revised Laws, 1905, sec. 5178. 
50. Leftist works on the s·ubject took the line that almost all workers in 
capitalistic America were peons. See, for example, Walter Wilson, 
Forced Labor in the United States (New York: International Publishers, 
1933). 
51. Woodward, Tom Watson, p. 220. 
52. Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1959), p. 270. Quoted in Herbert Shapiro, "The 
Populists and the Negro," in August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, eds., 
The Making of Black America (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 2: 33. 
53. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Knopf, 1955), 
p. 61; Woodward, Origins, pp. 258, 257. 
54. Woodward, Tom Watson, p. 218; Origins, p. 205. 
55. Woodward, Tom Watson, p. 219. 
56. Convict Labor, pp. 303, 300, 301. (See also, quotations on convict 
labor section, pp. 33, 34.) 
57. Even here, the Populists opposed the "Force Bill" which would 
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have introduced a federal presence to protect black suffrage in the 
South. The Negro Alliances supported it overwhelmingly, but the white 
Populists stood foursquare for "home rule" and "states' rights." See 
Shapiro, "Populists and the Negro," p. 33. 
58. Dunbar, quoted in Shapiro, "Populists and the Negro," p. 32. 
Chapter 5 
I. It is true that a federal court had overturned a Maryland appren-
ticeship law in 1867 as violating the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but the 
case never reached the Supreme Court. (It was generally considered 
that the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment had made an appeal 
useless.) Matter of Turner 1 Abb. (U.S.) 84 (1867). 
2. 92 U.S. 542 (1876), 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
3. 14 U.S. Statutes 546 (now sec. 158 of the United States Code). 
Senators Trumbull and Sumner, the major sponsors of the bill, believed 
that the Slave Kidnapping and Civil Rights Act of 1866 probably cov-
ered peonage, but they decided to support this additional legislation to 
cover all contingencies. (The Slave Kidnapping Act was revived for such 
use in 1939-see chapter 7.) Howard Devon Hamilton, "The Legis-
lative and judicial History of the Thirteenth Amendment" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Illinois, 1950), pp. 171-72. This work gives an excellent 
summary of the legislative history of the congressional enactments 
which were used to prosecute those who held peons. 
4. 14 U.S. Statutes 546, sec. 1. When the act was recodified in 1948, 
the specific references to New Mexico were deleted, without other sig-
nificant changes. 
5. Ray Stannard Baker, Following the Color Line (New York: Double-
day, 1908); Charles W. Russell, Report on Peonage (Washington: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 1908); U.S., Congress, Reports of the U.S. Immi-
gration Commission, Senate Documents 747, 61st Cong., 3d sess., 1911; 
Report of the Attorney General of the United States, 1907, exhibit 17, p. 211. 
6. U.S. v. Eberhardt 127 Fed. 252 (Ga. 1899). 
7. C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1951), pp. 262, 339. 
8. Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1 972), p. 44. 
9. Peonage Cases 123 Fed. 671 (Ala. 1 903). This charge and the one in 
the Florida case were reprinted in the Federal Reporter and were prime 
sources of definitions for future prosecutions. 
10. Ibid. 
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11. Ibid. 
12. See William W. Howe, "The Peonage Cases," Columbia Law Review 
4 (1904):285. 
13. Clyatt v. United States 197 U.S. 201 (1905). There is no report of 
the charge to the grand jury in United States v. Clyatt and there does not 
seem to be much in the way of interpretation evident from the trial 
record found in the Supreme Court transcript of record. Therefore, 
although this was the first reported case under the statute, it did not 
become significant until it reached the Supreme Court; see comments 
of District Judge Swayne, In re Peonage Charge, 138 Fed. 686 (Fla. 1905), 
in his charge to the grand jury. 
14. 197 U.S. 207 (1905). The statute, it may be recalled, made it a 
crime to "hold, arrest or return ... persons to a condition of peonage." 
14 U.S. Statutes 546, sec. l. 
15. 14 U.S. Statutes 546, sec. 2. 
16. See, for example, Civil Rights Cases 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
17. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). 
18. Ibid. 
19. Ibid.; Brewer was here quoting from the New Mexico case re-
ferred to earlier,jaremillo v. Romero, 1 N.M. 194 (I857). 
20. See the case notes of the period, e.g., "Peonage" in Columbia Law 
Review 8 (l908):318-I9; ibid., II (l9II):365; Harvard Law Review 2I 
( 1908): 628; Michigan Law Review 6 ( 1908): 504-5; Pennsylvania Law Re-
view 55 ( I907): 508-9; ibid., 57 (1908): 464-68. 
21. Clyatt v. United States I97 U.S. 207 (1905). 
22. Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, p. 17. 
23. 219 u.s. 219 (1911). 
24. Clyatt v. United States 197 U.S. 207 ( 1905 ); ln re Peonage Charge 138 
Fed. 686 (Fla. I905). 
25. Peonage Cases 123 Fed. 671 (Ala. I903). 
26.1n re Peonage Charge I38 Fed. 686 (Fla. I905). 
27. Ibid. 
28. United States v. Clement 17I Fed. 974 (S.C. I909). 
29. Clyatt v. United States 197 U.S. 207 (1905); United States v. Clement 
171 Fed. 974 (S.C. 1909). Indeed, they are also subject to prosecution 
under all that remained of the Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 1870, 
which provided for the prosecution of any official who, under "color of 
law" deprives any person of his civil rights. (See the discussion in chap-
ter 7.) 
30. United States v. Clement 17 I Fed. 974 (S.C. I 909); In re Peonage 
Charge 138 Fed. 686 (Fla. 1905). 
31. In re Peonage Charge 138 Fed. 686 (Fla. I 905). 
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32. See, for example, State v. Vann 150 Ala. 66 (1907), and cases listed 
in chapter 4. 
33. New York, Revised Code, 1882, sec. 673. See, for example, State v. 
Murray 116 La. 655 (1906), in which Justice Breaux quotes the New 
York statute and a similar New Jersey law as the basis for his decision 
upholding the Louisiana act. 
34. Freund, The Police Power, Public Policy, and Constitutional Rights 
(Chicago: Callaghan, 1904), sec. 452; State v. Murray 116 La. 655 (1906). 
35. 197 U.S. 221. The Supreme Court in Adair v. United States 208 
U.S. 161 (1908) had also noted "It may be-but upon that point we 
express no opinion-that in the case of a labor contract between an 
employer engaged in interstate commerce and his employee, Congress 
could make it a crime for either party without sufficient or just excuse 
or notice to disregard the terms of such contract or to refuse to perform 
it." This was also used to defend the state's position, even by legal au-
thorities. Labatt, Master and Servant ( 1913), sec. 2832, n. 2. 
36. Ex parte Hollman 79 S.C. 9 (1907). 
37. Peonage Cases 123 Fed. 671 (Ala. 1903). 
38. Robertson v. Baldwin 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
39. See Turner's Case 24 Fed. Cas. no. 14, 248 (1825). 
40. Robertson v. Baldwin 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
41. Ibid.; 30 U.S. Statutes 755 (1898). See Hamilton, "Legislative His-
tory," p. 143. The passage of the La Follette Merchant Seaman Act in 
1915 finally ended the controversy, as a result of years of efforts by 
Andrew Furuseth, head of the Seaman's Union, and Victor Olander, 
his vice-president. 
42. See chapter 4, nn. 30-34, 36, 45, for some of these cases. 
43. Ex parte Drayton 153 Fed. 986 (S.C. 1907); Ex parte Hollman 79 S.C. 
9 (1908). 
44. Florida, Laws, 1891, c. 4032; Laws, 1907, c. 5678. 
45. Toney v. State 141 Ala. 120 (1904) following Jones's declaration of 
unconstitutionality in Peonage Cases 123 Fed. 271 (Ala. 1903). 
46. 219 u.s. 219 (1911). 
47. See, for example, Glenn v. State 123 Ga. 585 (1905); State v. Nor-
man 110 N.C. 484 (1892); State v. Robinson 70 S.C. 468 (1905); Saunders 
v. State 7 Ga. App. 46 (1909); James v. State 5 Ga. App. 353 (1908); 
Starling v. State 5 Ga. App. 171 (1908); State v. Griffin 154 N.C. 611 
( 1911); State v. Leak 62 S.C. 405 (190 1). 
48. Bailey v. State 158 Ala. 18 (1908). 
49. Alabama, Revised Code, 1907, sec. 6845; Florida, Statutes at Large, 
1906, sec. 3320; Georgia, Acts, 1903, no. 345, sec. 2; North Carolina, 
Revised Code, 1905, sec. 3431; Mississippi, Revised Code, 1906, sec. 1148; 
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South Carolina, Revised Code, 1912, sees. 492, 494. 
50. Ex parte Riley 94 Ala. 82 (1891); Dorsey v. State 111 Ala. 40 (1895); 
Mcintosh v. State 117 Ala. 128 ( 1897); see also, Copeland v. State 97 Ala. 
30 (1893); and Tennyson v. State 97 Ala. 78 (1893). 
51. For an excellent and full description of some progressive Ala-
bamians' efforts to get a test case to the Court, and the results of their 
success (loss of elective offices, etc.), see Pete Daniel, "Up from Slavery 
and Down to Peonage: The Alonzo Bailey Case," Journal of American 
History 51 (1970):654-70. 
52. See the facts in Bailey v. Alabama 219 U.S. 219 (1911). Thomas 
released Bailey, after a preliminary trial, on a writ of habeas corpus, 
which was reversed by a higher court. See Bailey v. State 158 Ala. 15 
( 1908). Thomas subsequently lost his position as a result. See Daniel, 
Shadow of Slavery, chapter 4, passim. 
53. Bailey v. Alabama 219 U.S. 219 (1911). In Hodges v. United States 
203 U.S. 1 (1906) the Court had overturned the conviction for peonage 
of a group of "whitecappers," who had, by violence, prevented some 
blacks from fulfilling their contracts. "No mere personal assault ... op-
erates to reduce the individual to a condition of slavery." Thus the Thir-
teenth Amendment did not permit the application of the Civil Rights 
Acts, and the Fourteenth could not reach private action. The wide-
spread extent and discrimination of this practice of "whitecapping" was 
ignored. This is also one of the few cases in which the right to contract 
freely was not upheld by the Supreme Court. Harlan, of course, dis-
sented. 
54. Ex parte Riley 94 Ala. 82 (1891); Bailey v. Alabama 219 U.S. 219 
(1911); Bailey v. State 161 Ala. 75 (1910) (petition for rehearing). 
55. Bailey v. Alabama 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid. 
58. See Samuel J. Konefsky, The Legacy of Holmes and Brandeis (New 
York: Macmillan, 1956), chapters 1 and 2, passim; Max Lerner, The 
Mind and Faith of justice Holmes (New York: Halcyon, 1943), p. 148 and 
passim. 
59. United States v. Reynolds 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Alabama, Revised 
Code, 1907, sees. 6846, 6848. 
60. Baker, Following the Color Line, pp. 95-97; see also Jerome Dowd, 
The Negro in American Life (New York: Century, 1926), p. 132. 
61. State v. Etowah Lumber Co. 153 Ala. 77 (1907). 
62. United States v. Reynolds 235 U.S. 133 (1914). 
63. Ibid. 
64. Ibid. 
108 NOTES TO PAGES 63-68 
Chapter6 
I. See case notes in the Harvard Law Review 24 (1911):391-95; Co-
lumbia Law Review 11 ( 1911): 363-65; Michigan Law Review 11 ( 1912): 
159-60. 
2. Report of the Attorney General of the United States ( 1907), exhibit 17, p. 
208. 
3. Alabama, Laws, 1911, p. 93; South Carolina, Acts, 1912, no. 441; 
State v. Armistead 103 Miss. 790 (1913); State v. Griffin 154 N.C. 611 
(1911). 
4. Cited above, chapter 5, n. 49. 
5. Banks v. State 124 Ga. 15 (1905); Townsend v. State 124 Ga. 69 
(1905); Lamar v. State 120 Ga. 312 (1904); Lamar v. Prosser 121 Ga. 153 
(1904); Mulkey v. State 1 Ga. App. 521 (1905). 
6. Latson v. Wells 136 Ga. 681 (1911). 
7. 138 Ga. 489 (1912); see also case note, Michigan Law Review 11 
(1912): 159. 
8. Wilson v. State 138 Ga. 489 (1912). 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid.; Georgia was the only state to have such a rule. 
11. Ibid.; Bailey v. Alabama 219 U.S. 219 (1911). 
12. The court certainly did have a point when it noted that the jury 
would be under no obligation to believe the sworn testimony of such a 
witness, had such testimony been permitted. This was not only true, but 
highly likely, in the circumstances of such trials. The fact that the cards 
were already stacked, however, seems little excuse for blindfolding the 
"sucker." 
13. See, for example, Michigan Law Review 11 (1912): 159-60. 
14. Florida, Acts, 1913, c. 6528, sec. 1. 
15. Goode v. Nelson 73 Fla. 29 (1917). 
16. Florida, Acts, 1919, c. 7917. 
17. Chief Justice Browne, Associate Justices Ellis, Taylor, and Whit-
field. See opinions in Goode v. Nelson 73 Fla. 29 (1917) and Phillips v. 
Bell 84 Fla. 233 (1922). (Whitfield and Taylor had also participated in 
an even earlier case, Lewis v. Nelson 62 Fla. 71 (1911), in which they 
denied the applicability of a fraud statute to a breach of contract by a 
laborer.) 
18. Phillips v. Bell 84 Fla. 233 (1922); the case was brought up on ap-
peal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus. 
19. Ibid. Separability was "adduced," however, on the grounds that 
"We cannot say that the legislature would not have enacted this law 
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without the provision [section 2] that certain facts should be prima facie 
evidence of the intent to injure and defraud." 
20. See State v. Hunter 114 La. 939 (1905) (emphasis in the original). 
21. See State v. Breaux 143 La. 653 (1918) and cases cited therein. 
22. State v. Oliva 144 La. 51 (1918) (Bailey); State v. Rout 144 La. 53 
(1918) (Rownd); State v. Statham 144 La. 54 (1918) (Rownd). 
23. State v. Murray 116 La. 655 (1906), see above, chapter 5, n. 34. 
24. North Carolina, Revised Code, 1935, c. 4482, refers to a Green 
County statute making it a misdemeanor for a cropper or tenant to 
break a contract without just cause and go to work for another. In forty-
nine other counties in the state, a similar law was in effect (c. 4281). 
25.Johns v. Patterson 138 Ark. 420 (1919); State v. Moore 166 Ark. 
412 (1924); State v. Nix 165 Ala. 126 (1910); Rhoden v. State 161 Ga. 73 
( 1925); State v. Hunter 164 La. 405 (1927); State v. Hurdle 113 Miss. 736 
(1917); Hill v. Duckworth 155 Miss. 491 (1929); Waldrup v. State 154 
Miss. 647 (1929); and cases to be discussed below. 
26. Arkansas, Statutes, 1919, sec. 5960; Alabama, Revised Code, 1928, 
sees. 3985, 3986, 3987; Florida, Laws, 1927, sees. 7166, 7177; Georgia, 
Code, 1926, sees. 123, 125; Louisiana, Statutes, 1932, vol. 3, sec. 4384, 
vol. 3, sec. 6606; Mississippi, Code, 1930, sec. 900; North Carolina, Code, 
1931, sees. 4469, 4470; South Carolina, Revised Code, 1932, sec. 1314; 
Tennessee, Revised Code, 1932, sees. 8559, 8560. See also, Kentucky, 
Statutes, 1930, sec. 2601. (Kentucky, though not a Confederate state, 
had had an enticement law on its books since "slavery had been abol-
ished in this state." See chapter 4, n. 49, above.) 
27. Shaw v. Fisher 113 S.C. 287 (1919). 
28. As noted earlier, this was based on the old English Statute of La-
borers 23 Edw. III, c. 2, enacted in 1349, and long since repealed. 
29. Shaw v. Fisher 113 S.C. 287 (1919); see case note in the Yale Law 
journal 30 (1920): 174-76, for a discussion of the ruling. 
30. 71 Miss. 509 (1893); see also, Hoole v. Dorroh 75 Miss. 257 (1897). 
31. Beale v. Yazoo Yarn Mill 125 Miss. 807 (1921); Shilling v. State 143 
Miss. 709 (1926); Thompson v. Box 147 Miss. I (1927). 
32. Thompson v.Box 147 Miss. 1 (1927). 
33. See, for example, Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New 
York: Harper, 1944), p. 248 and passim. 
34. See Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South, 1901-
1969 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), chapter 6. Daniel 
devotes almost a third of his study to this case and the Mississippi flood 
incident and examines both in great detail. After the end of the Wilson 
presidency, federal investigations of peonage picked up considerably, 
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but few cases were brought to trial, theoretically because the complaints 
were groundless. 
35. Hugh M. Dorsey, The Negro in Georgia (Atlanta, Ga., 1921) in the 
Schomburg Collection, New York Public Library. Dorsey had just been 
defeated in a campaign for the Senate by Tom Watson, who was now an 
open (and rather vicious) racist. 
36. Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, p. 128. 
37. See Crisis 35 (1928): 1-110, for a full review of this incident. Also 
Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, chapter 8, passim. 
38. Arthur F. Raper and Ira De A. Reid, Sharecroppers All (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941); Thomas J. Woofter, 
Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation (Washington, D.C.: Bureau 
of Printing, 1936); Arthur F. Raper, Preface to Peasantry (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1936); Charles S. Johnson, Shadow 
of the Plantation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934). 
39. Taylor v. United States 244 Fed. (S.C.) 321 (I 917). The nonjudicial 
barriers, such as the failure of the Justice Department to assist in chal-
lenging the state court decisions in Wilson v. State, having been outlined 
above. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid. At this point, sections 37 and 269 of the U.S. Penal Code. 
42. Ibid. The court quoted Clyatt to this effect. 
43. Ibid. 
44. See Daniel, Shadow of Slavery, p. 80, fn. 52. Daniel mentions the 
case only in this footnote, and incorrectly states that the decision re-
stored the South Carolina statute previously declared unconstitutional 
to a status of constitutionality. The law in question had been written 
after the Bailey decision, had never been challenged, and in any case, 
was never discussed in either the majority or the dissenting opinions. 
Daniel is meticulous in his description of the brutality and violence of 
any peonage incident he chooses to discuss, but is disappointingly casual 
and often inaccurate in detailing the legal aspects. To do him justice, 
while his information is largely drawn from Justice Department rec-
ords, he does not claim to have produced a legal history of peonage; his 
interests lie in the social aspects of the practice. 
Chapter 7 
1. Office of the Attorney General, Order No. 3204, February 3, 1939. 
2. See "Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: Enforcement of 
Civil Liberties Statutes," issued on the same date as the order creating 
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the new section. (A copy of this memorandum was given to this writer 
by Professor John Elliff of Brandeis University.) 
3. For discussion of these efforts, see Robert K. Carr, Federal Protec-
tion of Civil Rights: Quest for a Sword (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1947); Fred G. Folsom, Jr., "A Slave Trade Law in a Contempo-
rary Setting," Cornell Law Quarterly 29 (1943-1944): 203-16; Sydney 
Brodie, "The Federally Secured Right to be Free from Bondage," 
Georgetown Law Journal 40 (1952): 367-98. 
4. "Memorandum for the Attorney General," p. 2. 
5. At this stage, the act was Section 444 of Title 18, United States Code. 
(Emphasis added.) 
6. Clyatt v. United States 197 U.S. 207 (1905). 
7. Charles W. Russell, Report on Peonage (Washington, D.C.: U.S. De-
partment of Justice, 1908), p. 24; United States v. Sabbia (C.C.S.D. N.Y., 
1907, unreported). Russell was badly outmaneuvered here, and Sabbia 
went free. 
8. United States v. Peacher (E.D. Ark., 1937, unreported). Peacher had 
acquired the rights to clear some town land and cultivate it. He staffed 
the project by arresting all the blacks he could find, forcing them to 
plead guilty before the local justice of the peace (the mayor of the town). 
They were sentenced to hard labor on Peacher's new farm. See Donald 
H. Grubbs, Cry from the Cotton: The Southern Tenant Farmer's Union and the 
New Deal (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), p. 
114. 
9. At this time, Sec. 443, Title 18, United States Code. 
10. Circular no. 3591, Involuntary Servitude, Slavery and Peonage, De-
cember 12, 1941. Biddle was the third attorney general in two years, as 
each of his predecessors, Frank Murphy and Robert Jackson, had been 
appointed to vacancies on the Supreme Court. This circular was strik-
ing in the precision of its language and the definitiveness of its instruc-
tions. It provides a primer for prosecution in these areas. 
11. See William Henry Huff, "Peonage or Debt Slavery in the Land of 
the Free," National Bar Journal 3 (1945) :47-48. Huff was a leading or-
ganizer of the committee. See also Pete Daniel, The Shadow of Slavery: 
Peonage in the South, 1901-1969 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1972), pp. 176-78. 
12. Taylor v. State 191 Ga. 682 (1941). 
13. Taylor v. Georgia 315 U.S. 25 (1942). 
14. Ibid. 
15. United States v. Gaskin 320 U.S. 527 (1944). 
16. Ibid. 
17. Pollock v. Williams 322 U.S. 4 (1944). 
112 NOTES TO PAGES 80-88 
18. Williams v. Pollock 153 Fla. 338 (1943); Phillips v. Bell 84 Fla. 225 
(1922), discussed in chapter 6. 
19. Pollock v. Williams 322 U.S. 4 (1944). 
20. Ibid. See chapter 6 for a discussion of this aspect of the Florida 
law. 
21. Ibid. It is not clear what the interpretation of a substantive section 
which had never been contaminated by a prima facie clause would 
be-Jackson intimates it might be valid. 
22. Ibid. 
23. United States v. Ingalls 73 Fed. 76 (S.D. Cal. 1947). 
24. U.S., Congress, Senate, Special Subcommittee on Labor and 
Labor-Management Relations, Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, Labor Practices in Laurens County, Georgia, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 
1951, pp. 79-88. 
25. U.S., Commission on Civil Rights, report no. 5, justice (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1965), pp. 55, 203 n. 94. (These were generally contract 
law accusations and private convict-labor contracts.) 
26. Harry H. Shapiro, "Involuntary Servitude: The Need for a More 
Flexible Approach," Rutgers Law Review 19 (1964): 85. 
27. Ibid. 
28. justice, p. 55. 
Conclusion 
l. The historiographical "revolt" is discussed in the bibliographical 
note. 
2. John P. Roche and Milton M. Gordon, "Can Morality Be Legis-
lated," in Joel B. Grossman and Mary H. Grossman, eds., Law and 
Change in Modern America (Santa Monica, Calif.: Goodyear, 1971), 
pp. 245-51. 
3. This is not to deny that other factors play a significant role-
perhaps most strikingly, the likelihood of failure. See Michael Lipsky, 
"Protest as a Political Resource," in Kenneth M. Dolbeare, ed., Power 
and Change in the United States (New York: Wiley, 1969), pp. 161-78, for 
a discussion of this subject. 
4. Roche and Gordon, "Morality," p. 249. 
5. See U.S., Commission on Civil Rights, Law Enforcement: A Report on 
Equal Protection in the South (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1965), pp. 89-91, for a discussion of sheriff's fees. See also, 
Charles V. Hamilton, The Bench and the Ballot: Southern Federal Judges 
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and Black Voters (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), chapter 10, 
passim, for a discussion of economic penalties. 
6. Harrell R. Rogers, Jr., and Charles S. Bullock III, Law and Social 
Change (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), p. 32. A full discussion of the 
operations and effectiveness of these provisions is found on pp. 15-66. 
7. James E. Anderson, "Public Economy Policy and the Problem of 
Compliance: Notes for Research," in Grossman and Grossman, Law and 
Change, pp. 110-18. 
8. For example, the record of the Justice Department in taking action 
on peonage complaints seems to be approached by one agency of the 
federal government-the National Labor Relations Board. The NLRB 
closed 86.5 percent of its cases before the issuance of a formal complaint. 
See Peter Woll, Administrative Law: The Informal Process (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1963), p. 127 and chapter 4, passim, for a 
review of agency action on complaint cases. 
9. See Joel L. Grossman and RichardS. Wells, 'The Concept of Judi-
cial Policy-Making," journal of Public Law 15 ( 1966): 287-310, for a full 
discussion of these factors. 
10. Roche and Gordon, "Morality," p. 250. 
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Bibliographical Note 
The prevailing note was one of tragedy. 
Claude Gernade Bowers 
What, then, constituted the alleged brutality that white southerners 
endured? First, the freeing of their slaves. 
Kenneth M. Stampp 
Bernard A. Weisberger's phrase "The Dark and Bloody Ground 
of Reconstruction Historiography" Uournal of Southern History 
25 [1959]:427-47) aptly reflects the intensity of an extraordi-
nary scholarly dispute. Since the end of World War II, the ac-
cepted view of Reconstruction presented by the followers of Pro-
fessor William A. Dunning, of Columbia University, has been 
stood on its head. This "Dunningite" approach had been the 
standard interpretation for most of the twentieth century, virtu-
ally without serious opposition in the field. The currently "ac-
cepted" writers are frankly known as "revisionists," and this title 
indicates the nature of the historiographical reversal which has 
taken place. The swing of the pendulum has been so complete 
that today the orthodoxy of Reconstruction seems to be without 
disciples. The change was not so swift as all that, to be sure, for 
there had been some voices in the dark as far back as the 1920s, 
but either metaphor gives an accurate notion of the level of gen-
eral acceptance of the different views. 
The orthodox view of Reconstruction told a simple story, 
filled with drama. The South, once the seat of gracious living 
and culture in America, is defeated in war, and devastation and 
poverty result. The careful, compassionate, and eminently sen-
sible presidential Reconstruction plans, devised by Lincoln and 
nobly advanced and defended by Johnson, are destroyed when 
Congress is captured by a radical and vengeful minority who are 
determined to destroy the South and secure the economic and 
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political dominance of the northern industrial states. Johnson is 
demeaned by impeachment and, though not convicted, is de-
stroyed by the Radicals. At this point, the Radical Reconstruction 
of the South begins, with the South degraded and corrupted 
by the ignorant and often vicious rule of scalawags, illiterate 
Negroes, and northern carpetbaggers. The prostrate South 
endured this situation for some years and then, in a surge of 
revulsion, rose to destroy its tormentors. The rise of the Ku Klux 
Klan and its terror tactics was, perhaps, an overreaction, but 
clearly the white citizens had been forced into taking a united 
stand. By the late 1870s, even the North had become revolted at 
the corruption and decadence of Reconstruction rule and, after 
the disputed Hayes-Tilden election, the South was left to its own 
devices. Thus an experiment in corruption was abandoned, and 
the nation could breathe a sigh of relief and put its mistakes 
behind it. 
This tale was not restricted to academe; it became part of the 
popular history of the nation and was, in its most vicious form, 
the basis of one of the most renowned films of all time: "The 
Birth of a Nation." Popular histories, such as Claude G. Bowers's 
The Tragic Era, further expanded the audience for the story, as 
did the novelizations of the glories of the Klan. 
Doubtless there is, in the vast supply of source material on 
Reconstruction available to the historian, sufficient evidence to 
support the thesis, but, as current historians have shown, there is 
far more contrary material. As Vernon L. Wharton has noted 
("Reconstruction," in Arthur S. Link and Rembert W. Patrick, 
eds., Writing Southern History [Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1965] ), with a vast array of sources to choose 
from, the historian can only "attempt to find the truth in terms 
of his own knowledge, conviction and values." Wharton goes on 
to ascribe the emergence of the Dunningite school to the social 
Darwinism of the period 1880-1910. The scholarly acceptance 
of white supremacy, as proven by science, and the defense of 
white Anglo-Saxon civilization against the hordes of immigrants 
and other lower races, was the background against which the 
Reconstruction scenario was written. 
There were precursors of Dunning and his disciples, for Pro-
fessor Dunning did not invent this interpretation but merely lent 
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it academic verisimilitude. Professor Dunning himself pub-
lished Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics 
(New York: Macmillan, 1897) and Reconstruction, Political and 
Economic: 1865-I877 (New York and London: Harper, 1907). 
He defended the Black Codes, grossly exaggerated black politi-
cal influence and corruption, and excused or discounted the use 
of violence by whites. His view of the Negro in Reconstruction is 
typical: "The Negro had no pride of race and no aspirations or 
ideals save to be like the whites. With civil rights and political 
power, not won, but forced upon him, he came gradually to un-
derstand and crave those more elusive privileges that constitute 
social equality. A more intimate association with the other race 
... was the end toward which the ambition of the blacks tended 
... to direct itself." He asserted that this ambition had led to "the 
hideous crime against white womanhood which now assumed 
new meaning in the annals of outrage." 
While Dunning's works were significant in themselves, his 
great influence lay in the works of his students, among whom 
were numbered such renowned scholars as james W. Garner, C. 
Mildred Thompson, Joseph G. de Roulhac Hamilton, and Wal-
ter L. Fleming. Although these and other scholars of the Dun-
ningite school produced a vast monographic literature on Re-
construction, Fleming's two-volume Documentary History of Recon-
struction: Political, Military, Social, Religious, Educational and Indus-
trial, I 865 to the Present Time (Cleveland, Ohio: A. H. Clark, 
1906-1907) was perhaps the most significant work insofar as it 
had the widest long-term effect on Reconstruction scholarship. 
A carefully selected body of brief pieces, these volumes clearly 
indicate the bias of the editor. As Wharton points out, the ten-
dency of many historians to shy away from digging into original 
sources is well known, and Fleming enabled many of them to 
avoid that laborious task. Thus, for many years to come, much of 
the major "research" in Reconstruction history consisted of look-
ing up the relevant passages in Fleming, which became a stan-
dard reference work in most libraries. Even the student with a 
reasonable degree of skepticism about the orthodox view of the 
period frequently based his arguments on sources that rein-
forced that view. 
In the period when the Dunning students were publishing 
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and solidifying their interpretation, the only opposition they had 
to face was the work of blacks. John R. Lynch, Alrutheus Am-
bush Taylor and W. E. B. DuBois all attacked the Dunning the-
sis, but were, by and large, ignored by the academic world. Du-
Bois suffered particularly from his failure to examine original 
sources and was straining credulity with his interpretations of 
the materials he used. It took some doing to disprove the Dun-
ningites when using Fleming's Documentary History as a major 
source. Further, he insisted on viewing the period through a 
Marxist glass, which was ill fitted for the task. 
The story of the beginnings of the successful revolution in Re-
construction historiography has been well told. Vernon L. 
Wharton, Richard N. Current, Bernard A. Weisberger, and 
many others have described the calls for a new emphasis on basic 
research by Howard K. Beale and Francis B. Simkins in the early 
thirties; they have also recorded the successes of Horace Mann 
Bond and others. While the revisionist interpretation has be-
come as pervasive and ubiquitous as the Dunning view once was, 
it is not clear that the call for new and basic research on source 
materials has always been answered. Much of the revisionist ma-
terial has been merely an attempt to fit the old facts into a new 
mold. 
Perhaps even more distressing is the common tendency to 
play by the Dunningites' rules. That is, the parameters of the 
dispute have been set by the revisionists' understandable desire 
to answer and contradict the historians of the old school. As a 
result, those subjects most emphasized by their predecessors 3:re 
given similar treatment by the revisionists. This factor, more 
than any other, may best explain the lack of scholarly interest in 
subjects like peonage. 
In recent years there has been an emergence of works whose 
authors are going back to original sources. The area of econom-
ics (and within this field, agricultural economics) has been par-
ticularly rich in fresh scholarly articles, but history has seen a 
revival in this regard as well. Only a percentage of this material is 
of relevance to a legal study of peonage, however, and therefore 
a survey of this literature will not be attempted here. 
C. Vann Woodward's Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1951) is required reading for 
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any student of southern politics and history. Similarly, Vernon 
L. Wharton's The Negro in Mississippi, 1865-1890 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1947) remains a superla-
tively documented account of the period. 
While George R. Bentley's History of the Freedmen's Bureau 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955) is merely 
a restatement of Paul Pierce's 1904 work, William S. McFeely's 
admirable biography of 0. 0. Howard, Yankee Stepfather: General 
0. 0. Howard and the Freedmen (New Haven, Conn., and London: 
Yale University Press, 1968), presents a fresh and intelligent re-
interpretation of the bureau and its works. (Interestingly, Mc-
Feely places great emphasis on the labor contract.) Further, The 
Freedmen's Bureau in South Carolina, 1865-1872, by Martin L. 
Abbott (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967), 
is an excellent state study which examines the day-to-day opera-
tions of the bureau. 
Theodore B. Wilson's The Black Codes of the South (Birming-
ham: University of Alabama Press, 1965) seems to fill the cry-
ing need for a study of these laws. On closer examination, how-
ever, the zealous (and rather unconvincing) defense of the 
South's posture on the codes tends to make the selections used 
somewhat less credible. It is, however, the only work that deals 
extensively with these laws, and it does provide some healthy 
quotations from them. 
Joel Williamson's After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina dur-
ing Reconstruction, 1861-1877 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1963) is a uniquely interesting book, derived 
from plantation records. It provides a much-needed description 
of the everyday life and relationships of the freedmen and plant-
ers. Of similar interest is Willie Lee Rose's Rehearsal for Recon-
struction: The Port Royal Experiment (Indianapolis: University of 
Indiana Press, 1965) which concentrates on the Sea Islands of 
South Carolina, where a unique experiment of northern and 
freedman cooperation took place. The book is eminently read-
able, but the Sea Islands situation was by no means typical in the 
context of the rest of the South. 
George B. Tindall's South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1890 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1952) is a less useful study of 
that state than the Williamson work noted above, but one chap-
120 BJBUOGRAPHJCAL NOTE 
ter is devoted to a reasonable, albeit sketchy, discussion of labor-
contract and lien laws. 
There is a visible trend towards new attempts to research the 
period. From the point of view of this study, the great failing is 
the insistent concentration on the same areas of interest which 
the Dunning school put forward and the feeling that there is no 
need to do more than dispute their conclusions. I would contend 
that race prejudice in the South can now be accepted as proven, 
that in academe at least, the debarment of Negro suff:rage on 
grounds of inherent racial inferiority may be considered a dead 
issue, and that the historian may now fully turn his attention to 
those areas of social, political, and economic history which have 
lain dormant for almost a century. 
In this latter context, the study of peonage stands out as a 
striking example of neglect. There are two studies, however, 
which do provide some insight into the subject. Howard Devon 
Hamilton's doctoral dissertation, "The Legislative and Judicial 
History of the Thirteenth Amendment" (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1950) provides the only significant legal discussion 
of the problem, albeit in short form, as the question of peonage 
is only a side issue in the study. Further, Hamilton naturally only 
becomes interested in the problem when the Thirteenth 
Amendment becomes a useful tool to combat it, thereby ignor-
ing the period 1865-1900. Nonetheless, it remains the most val-
uable work extant on this subject. 
Pete Daniel's The Shadow of Slavery: Peonage in the South, 
1901-1969 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972) is a book 
wholly devoted to peonage. It is a useful and readable book, de-
spite the fact that it concentrates on a few of the more spectacu-
lar and dramatic cases of this century as indicators of the whole 
process. However, Daniel is a bit fuzzy in his (few) legal inter-
pretations; he is forced to ignore the origins of the practice, and 
the study resolutely ignores the bedfellows of debt-slavery-
namely, enticement laws, convict labor, and so on. This last fail-
ing is, I think, the most serious and makes it impossible to get a 
realistic picture of the whole process of forced labor in the 
South. 
William Delmer Wagoner's unpublished dissertation on peon-
age, "The Non-Free Worker in Post-Civil War American His-
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tory" (University of Texas, 1961) is subject to many of the faults 
attributed to the early revisionist literature-that is, he tries to 
prove his points without incorporating any original research. 
Dan T. Carter, "Prisons, Politics and Business: The Convict 
Lease System in the Post-Civil War South" (M.A. thesis, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, 1964) is a valuable bibliographical source 
for materials on convict leasing, but less valuable when dealing 
with legal structures that made that system possible. 
The legal sources used in this study were basically the collect-
ed statutes and cases of the various states involved. As Shepard's 
Indexes proved inadequate as citators for the pre-1900 period, 
the Century Digest became a major source of cases, as did Labatt, 
Master and Seroant, a massive turn-of-the-century study of 
master-servant relationships in American law. With the excep-
tion of a few law journal "notes," the bulk of the legal research 
consisted of a determined plodding through the statutes and 
cases of the period. In brief, peonage still represents a subject 
area much in need of documentation and research. Original ma-
terials are available, but secondary sources are few and often 
suspect. 
This page intentionally left blank
Index 
Abolish Peonage Commission, 77 
Adair v. United States, 54, l06 n35 
Alabama, 5-6, 12-13,25,34,38-40, 
47-49,55-58,60-68,76,78 
Alexander v. Glenn, 28, 99 n44 
Alexander v. Pardue, 28, 99-100 n47 
Anti-Peonage Act, 42-52, 73-79, 82 
Anti-Peonage Committee, 80 
Apprenticeship laws, 3-5, 15, 22 
Arbuckle v. Nelms, 24, 98 n24 
Arkansas, 7, 30-31,75-76 
Armistead v. Chatters, 40, 70, l03 
n45, n46, n47, 109 n30 
Bailey v. Alabama, 52, 56-60, 63-67, 
69, 74, 78,80-81, 84; reactions to, 
in state courts, 63-70; in state 
legislatures, 64, 67 
Bailey v. State, 57, 58, 106 n48, 107 
n52,n54 
Baker, Ray Stannard, 35, 46, 63 
Banks v. State, 37, 64, l02 n33, lOS 
n5 
Beale v. Yazoo Yam Mill, 70, 109 n31 
Betts v. Ratliff, 24, 98 n23, n24 
Black Codes, 1-8, 16, 18, 20-21, 
25-27, 29, 34, 44, 83; as substitute 
for slavery, 2; northern reaction 
to, 6-7 
BouZa v. State, 25, 98 n27 
Bourlier Bros. v. Macauley, 40, l03 
n49 
Breach of contract: criminal penal-
ties for, 3-7, 11-13, 19-21,35,40, 
48,53,61,67, 73-74,8l;ruled 
fraudulent, 23, 25, 27, 36-38, 56, 
58-59,66-67,69,73, 78,81; in-
volving endangerment, 53-54. See 
also Prima facie evidence of fraud 
Brewer, David, 50-51 
Brown, Henry Billings, 55 
Brown v. State, 37, 102 n3l, n33 
Bryan v. State, 26, 39, 99 n36, 103 
n41 
Buck v. Payne, 24, 98 n25 
Burgie v. Davis, 28, 99 n47 
Byrnes, James F., 78 
Carpenter v. Strickland, 22, 98 nl2 
Cayce v. Stovall, 24, 98 n24 
Civil Liberties Unit. See Civil Rights 
Section 
Civil Rights Cases, 44, 50, 104 n2, 105 
nl6 
Civil Rights Section, 75-77, 79, 82 
Clyatt v. United States, 49-52, 54-55, 
67,69, 73, 76,79 
Colly v. State, 25, 98 n28 
Colored Farmers' Alliance, 29, 42 
Confessing judgment, 48, 60-61. See 
also Convict labor, private; Crimi-
nal surety 
Contract laws. See Breach of con-
tract; Labor contracts 
Convict labor, lease or public, 23-25, 
27-28,31-32, 34; competition 
with free labor, 31-33, 42; in-
crease of convict population to 
provide for, 32; and slave laws, 34 
Convict labor, private, 3-8, 15, 
25-26,28,34-35,42,44,62.See 
also Confessing judgment; Crim-
inal surety 
Copelandv. State, 38, 57, 102 n36, 
107 n50 
Criminal surety, 60-62, 71. See also 
Confessing judgment; Convict la-
bor, private 
Daniel v. Swearengen, 22, 98 nil, nl3 
Debt as the basis of peonage, 48, 51, 
63, 73-74, 76-77 
124 INDEX 
Dorsey v. State, 57, 107 n50 
Doty v. Heath, 24, 98 n23, n24 
Driscoll v. State, 40, 103 n45 
Duckett v. Pool, 40, 103 n45 
Enticement laws, 39-40; under 
Black Codes, 3, 5-7; and Freed-
men's Bureau, 11, 13, 19; under 
Reconstruction, 21-26, 28; early 
twentieth century, 35; in Alabama, 
49; after Bailey, 69, 70-71 
Ex parte Drayton, 55, 106 n43 
Ex parte Hollman, 54, 55, 106 n36, 
n43 
Ex parte Riley, 38, 57, 102 n36, 107 
n50 
Ex parte Stubblefield, 28, 100 n47 
False pretenses contract laws. See 
Breach of contract 
Federal interest in peonage, 44-62, 
75-83; rising, at turn of century, 
46-47, 53; dissipation of, 62-64, 
68, 72, 74; renewal of, in 1940s, 
82; later decline of, 82-83 
Fletcher v. Peck, 10, 95 n5 
Florida, 6, 14, 31, 39, 55, 64, 79-80, 
83; legislative defiance of court 
rulings, 67-69 
Fourteenth Amendment, 69-70; 
equal protection of, 32, 40, 57-58, 
60; and private action, 50 
Frankfurter, Felix, 79 
Freedmen's Bureau, 4-5, 9-17, 27; 
supportive of forced labor, 9-16, 
18-19, 25; under 0. 0. Howard, 
9-11, 13-14, 16-17; and value of 
labor contracts, 10-11 
Gafford v. Stearns, 25, 98 n32 
Georgia, 6-7, 10, 15, 47, 55, 57, 71, 
77-78, 82-83; under Reconstruc-
tion, 26-28; and convict labor, 
31-33; and contract laws, 36-38, 
64-69; murder farm incident in, 
71-72 
Glenn v. State, 56, 106 n47 
Goode v. Nelson, 67-68 
Hairv. Blease, 22,98 nll 
Haskins v. Royster, 28, 99 n46 
Hill v. Duckworth, 69, 109 n25 
Hilo Sugar v. Mioshi, 36, 102 n27 
Hodges v. United States, 107 n53 
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 59-60,62 
Hoole v. Dorroh, 40, 70, 103 n45, 109 
n30 
Hudgins v. State, 26, 39, 99 n37, 103 
n42 
Huffv. Watkins, 22, 98 nl2 
Hughes, Charles Evans, 57-59, 
65-66 
Hunt v. Wing, 28, 99 n47 
Implied contracts, 56 
In re Peonage Charge, 49, 52-53, 105 
nl3 
International Labor Defense, 77 
Involuntary servitude, 4, 38-39, 
76-77,82 
Jackson, Robert, 44, 77, 80-81 
James v. State, 56, 106 n47 
Jaremillo v. Romero, 51, 101 n26, 105 
nl9 
Johns v. Patterson, 69, 109 n25 
Jones, Thomas G., 47-49, 52, 54 
Justice Department, 44-45, 72, 74, 
75, 77, 82-83; and assistant attor-
ney general relative to peonage 
matters, 46, 63, 76; and Report on 
Peonage, 46-47; and Attorney 
General Frank Murphy, 77; and 
Attorney General Robert Jackson, 
77, 80; and Attorney General 
Francis Biddle, 77. See also Federal 
interest in peonage 
Justices of the peace, 21 
Kennedy v. Reames, 22, 98 nl2 
Kentucky, 40, 103 n49, 109 n26 
Kerr v. Moore, 25, 98 n26 
Kine v. Eubanks, 39, 103 n42 
Labor contracts, 38, 44, 49, 55-57; 
under Black Codes, 2-5, 7; and 
Freedmen's Bureau, 10-13, 
15-16; under Reconstruction, 
13-20, 22, 26-27; and Spanish 
peonage, 35-37; verbal, 40; de-
fended by endangerment laws, 53; 
after Bailey, 64, 67-69; and Civil 
Rights Section, 77, 80-81 
Lamar v. Prosser, 64, 108 n5 
INDEX 125 
LarTUJr v. Wells, 64-65 
Latson v. Wells, 64-65 
Laupahoehoe Sugar Co. v. Kanaele, 36, 
102 n27 
Lee v. West, 16, 27,97 n30, 99 n38, 
n39 
Lewis v. Mahon, 28, 99 n47 
Lewis v. Nelson, 108 n15, n17 
Liens, laborers', 12, 19,21-22, 
24-26,29 
Liens, merchants' and landowners', 
19,21-22,24-26,29-30;andthe 
two-price system, 30 
Local customs, habits, and social ac-
ceptance of peonage, 46, 49, 
70-71,86-91 
Louisiana, 5, 10, 13-15, 25-26, 34, 
68,69 
McBride v. O'Neal, 39, 103 n4l 
Mcintosh v. State, 38, 57, 102 n36, 
107 n50 
Mattero[Turner,44, l04nl 
Mississippi, 2-3, 10-ll, 22-25, 
31-33,55,64, 70-72; flood inci-
dent in, 71-72 
Moore v. Gray, 26, 99 n35 
Mulkey v. State, 64, lOS n5 
Murphy, Frank, 79-80. See aLw Jus-
tice Department 
Murrell v. State, 25, 98 n29 
National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, 
72, 77 
New Mexican peonage. See Spanish 
peonage 
New Mexico, 45, 47-50, 76 
North Carolina, 7, 28, 31, 39, 42, 64, 
69 
Oral contracts. See Parol contracts 
Parol contracts, 21-22, 24-26, 30, 
39, 56 
Peonage Cases, 48-49, 52, 54-56 
Phillips v. Bell, 67-68, 80 
Pollock v. Williams, 40, 80-82 
Populist movement, 29, 41-4:3 
Presumptive evidence clause, 58-59, 
63-66,69, 78,80-Sl.Seealso 
Prima facie evidence of fraud 
Prima facie evidence of fraud, 38, 
40, 57, 67-68. See also Presump-
tive evidence clause 
Progressive movement, 46, 48, 57, 
61 
Ratteree v. State, 27, 99 n4l 
Reasonable man rule, 48-49 
Reconstruction, as critical period of 
enforcement, 46,84-86 
Reconstruction legislatures, 18-28; 
and the Black Codes, 20, 22; sup-
portive of labor controls, 20-22, 
44 
Regionalism, 40-41, 57,59-60,82 
Returning to peonage, 49-52, 73, 
76, 79-80 
Rhoden v. State, 69, 109 n25 
Richard v. Couto, 36, 102 n27 
Robertson v. Baldwin, 54, 55, 166 
n38,n40,n4l 
Roseberry v. State, 25, 98 n30 
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 28, 100 n47 
Rules of evidence, 56, 58, 63, 65-66, 
78. See also Standards of proof 
Rules of proof. See Standards of 
proof 
Rules of testimony, 65-66 
Ryan v. State, 27 
Sandy v. State, 25, 98 n28 
Saulsbury v. Eason, 28, 99 n44 
Saunders v. State, 56, 106 n47 
Shaw v. Fisher, 69, 70, 109 n27, n29 
Shilling v. State, 70, 109 n3l 
Slave-Kidnapping Act, 77, 82 
South Carolina, 4-5, 12, 20-22, 30, 
32-34,37,39,55-56,64,69,73 
Southern Tenant Farmers' Union, 
76-77 
Spanish peonage, 36, 45,47-50 
Standards of proof, 40, 48, 56, 
64-65. See also Rules of evidence 
Starling v. State, 56, 106 n47 
State v. Armistead, 64, lOS n3 
State v. Aye, 4, 93 n4 
State v. Breaux, 69, 109 n2l 
State v. Custer, 28, 99 n45 
State v. Etowah Lumber Co., 61, I 07 
n61 
State v. Griffin, 56, 64, 106 n47, lOS 
n3 
126 INDEX 
State v. Harwood, 39, 40, l03 n40, 
n45 
State v. Hunter, (1905), 68, l09 n20 
State v. Hunter, (1927), 69, 109 n25 
State v. Hurdle, 69, 109 n25 
State v. Leak, 38, 56, l02 n36, 106 
n47 
State v. Murray, 38, 53, 69, l02 n36, 
l06 n33, n34, 109 n23 
State v. Norman, 38, 56, 102 n36, 106 
n47 
State v. Oliva, 69, l09 n22 
State v. Robinson, 56, l06 n47 
State v. Rout, 69, 109 n22 
State v. Shaft, 28, 99 n46 
State v. Statham, 69, 109 n22 
State v. Sypher, 26, 98-99 n34 
State v. Vann, 53, l06 n32 
State v. West, 40, 103 n45 
State v. Williams, 38, 39, l02 n35, 
n38 
Sturdivant v. Tolette, 40, l03 n46 
Swayne, Noah, 52 
Tarpley v. State, 40, 103 n45, n46 
Taylor v. Georgia, 78, 80, 82-83 
Taylor v. Hathaway, 28, 99 n47 
Taylor v. State, 77-78 
Taylor v. United States, 63,72-74 
Tennessee, 7, 31,36 
Tennyson v. State, 57, l07 n50 
Texas, 7 
Thirteenth Amendment, 58, 59, 61, 
69-70,78 
Thompson v. Box, 70, l09 n31, n32 
Thomson v. State, 38, 102 n36 
Toney v. State, 56, l06 n45 
Towmend v. State, 37, 64, 102 n33, 
108 n5 
Tucker v. State, 40, 103 n45 
Turner v. State, 25, 98 n30 
Turner's Case, 54, 106 n39 
United States Army in Reconstruc-
tion, 4, 5, 9-17; supportive of 
forced labor, 9, 11-13, 15, 19 
United States Commission on Civil 
Rights, 82-83 
United States v. Clement, 52, 105 n28, 
n29,n30 
United States v. Clyatt, 105 n13 
United States v. Cruikshank, 44 
United States v. Eberhardt, 47, 104 n6 
United States v. Gaskin, 78-80 
United States v. Harris, 44 
United States v. Ingalls, 82, 112 n23 
United States v. Peacher, 75-76 
United States v. Reynolds, 44, 60-62 
United States v. Sabbia, 76-77 
Vagrancy laws, 2-7,12,15-16,19, 
22-23,25-28,34 
Vance v. State, 37, 102 n34 
Virginia, 7, 15, 23, 36 
Voluntary contracts, 48,49 
Waldrup v. State, 69, l09 n25 
Wharton v.jossey, 26,99 n36 
White peonage, 46-47 
Williams v. Pollock, 80, 112 n18 
Wilson v. State, 65-67, 72, 78 
Wolfv. New Orleans Tailor-Made Pants 
Co., 39, l03 n42 
Wood v. Afo, 36, 102 n27 
Wood v. Hookina, 36, l02 n27 
Woods, William, 74 
Woodward, C. Vann, 30, 33, 41 
Workers Defense League, 82 
Young v. State, 37, 102 n32 
